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FLOWERS FROM THE DEVIL: AN AMERICAN OPIATE CRISIS, THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA, AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE PROHIBITION 
STATE, 1840-1940 
Chairperson: Jeff Wiltse 
This dissertation focuses on historic changes in public perception of narcotic use and abuse from 
the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth. From the 1840s to the outbreak of Civil War, 
politicians, physicians, the general public, and state and federal government remained largely 
ambivalent on the topic of drug use. Opium, morphine, and cannabis were legal, widely available 
in American pharmacies, and touted as essential medicines. Within the Bohemian community, 
artists and writers experimented with the recreational use of cannabis and their accounts of that 
style of consumption filled the pages of Harper’s, The New Yorker, and a host of other literary-
minded publications. By the 1880s, that seemingly permissive environment seemed to suddenly 
give way to a government increasingly focused on the regulation and prohibition of drugs.  
This work argues that a late-nineteenth century opiate epidemic radically transformed the 
country’s relationship with drugs and placed cannabis on a historical trajectory that led to its 
criminalization in the late-1930s. As newspapers blamed the perceived narcotic crisis that 
emerged in post-bellum America on the medical community, public opinion turned, to a large 
extent, against doctors and pharmacists. This erosion in public trust in the practice of medicine—
a direct byproduct of an American opiate crisis—instigated a transfer of control over the nation’s 
approach to drug management. Once entirely the occupation of a relatively decentralized medical 
community, crucial choices over the dispensation of narcotics and their general management 
shifted to the arena of popular politics. This dissertation argues that transference of power aided 
the formation of a prohibition-minded state that rapidly banned smokable opium, non-medicinal 
opiates, cocaine, alcohol, heroin, and—eventually—marijuana.  
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Introduction 
 In 1866, newspapers across the United States published advertisements for “Hasheesh 
Candy.” It labeled the confection a “Great Oriental Panacea!” and the “only, reliable, safe and 
agreeable preparation of this much esteemed Eastern Stimulant and Tonic.” The cannabis used to 
make the candy had been prepared “under the supervision of one of the most celebrated chemists 
in the country.” The papers billed the treat as a medicine and argued that, to those who could not 
get a good night’s sleep, it was “invaluable.” It also eased the symptoms of “nervousness, 
headache, low spirits, coughs, neuralgia, loss of appetite, chronic and camp diarrhea, dyspepsia, 
asthma, and dysentery.” In the treatment of those diseases, the promotional bulletin continued, 
cannabis was simply unparalleled. Indeed, Dr. Mott, who practiced in New York City, offered a 
testimonial that read, “the true medicinal virtues of the Hasheesh Candy are very great; much 
better than yet appears. I could wish that a remedy, so potent for good as it is, were more 
generally in use.”1 
 Sixty years later, the United States government went to war against that same substance. 
On November 27, 1937, it was widely reported that U.S. customs agents had assembled along 
the Mexican border to stop the flow of cannabis into the United States. The agents were 
“veterans in wars against international smuggling rings” and were “waging a battle to halt the 
flow of marihuana from its native Mexico” into the United States. In many cases, federal 
authorities crossed into Mexico. “The federal battle lines are moving southward,” a syndicated 
article proclaimed, “into the tiny villages of the vast, barren Northern Mexico country, where the 
dread ‘giggle weed’ is cultivated and grows wild.”2 
 
1 “Hasheesh Candy,” Fall River Daily Monitor (Fall River, Massachusetts), April 21, 1863. 
2 “Government Fights Marihuana Traffic on Mexico Border,” Portage Daily Register (Portage, Wisconsin), 
November 27, 1937.  
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How did Americans’ relationship with drugs go from permissive and experimental in the 
mid-to-late nineteenth century to fearful and prohibitory during the twentieth century? At its 
heart, this dissertation seeks to answer that question. The broad conclusion drawn here is that a 
late-nineteenth century opioid epidemic restructured the way Americans thought about narcotics 
and ultimately how they perceived the practices that defined the medical and pharmaceutical 
professions. In the process, the general public also broadly reconsidered the role government 
should play in averting public health crises. Indeed, their responses pointed to complicated and 
multilayered set of social and political developments greatly spurred by a morphine crisis 
following the Civil War—one that led to a wholesale reconsideration of all narcotics, including 
opium, cocaine, hashish, heroin, and marijuana.  
The story of how that crisis unfolded and changed American opinions on narcotic use 
starts in the 1840s in the field of medicine. A variety of social and scientific trends shaped that 
initial permissive and experimental environment that dominated the practice of medicine 
throughout the nineteenth century. During that period, the field of medicine was largely 
responsible for vetting new narcotics for the pharmaceutical marketplace and, for the most part, 
state and federal government did not interfere with that process. In an era before centralized 
agencies tested new and potentially powerful drugs for public consumption, the relatively 
unregulated medical and pharmaceutical professions assumed that role. In the process, doctors 
continued to vet medicines through trial-and-error experiments on patients they encountered in 
daily practice.  
The methods deployed to test the safety of new medicines for the marketplace in the 
nineteenth century represented the antithesis to the isolated and controlled laboratory 
experiments that would replace them in the twentieth. Nineteenth century physicians conducted 
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experiments in London, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, New Orleans, St. Louis, San 
Francisco, and nearly all the small cities and towns in between. Their subjects were not carefully 
selected, but rather included any American seeking medical treatment. The experiments were 
also not controlled or necessarily even guided by established data. The latter was especially true 
in the initial stages of experimentation when little information on the impact of a certain narcotic 
existed. In that environment of uncertainty, doctors tended to push forward with prescriptions 
that would later be deemed controversial. Throughout the period, physicians continually 
prescribed new medicines—whether it was raw opium, cannabis, laudanum, morphine, 
chloroform, cocaine, or heroin—and then noted the patient’s reactions (whether it was positive 
or negative). That information, then printed in medical journals, circulated throughout Europe 
and the United States.  
 This style of testing the medical viability of new drugs nurtured a culture of prescriptive 
latitude. It also helped that the drugs physicians experimented with did not tend to nurture 
widespread social disease—or at least that was the dominant reality before the outbreak of the 
American Civil War. The resultant overdoses, accidental poisonings, and rates of addiction 
during that period, while not unheard of, did ultimately seem relatively contained. That kind of 
containment strategy proved successful largely because the profession worked with unrefined 
plant-based substances throughout much of the nineteenth century. While raw opium introduced 
its fair share of consequences, unfortunate outcomes were ultimately deemed manageable. 
Cannabis, a substance the medical community vigorously tested throughout the mid-nineteenth 
century, led to no known deaths or addictions. Consequently, the medical community’s 
reputation for managing the dispensation and vetting of new drugs remained relatively intact 
through the American Civil War.  
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 The introduction of the hypodermic needle created an entirely different environment. The 
intravenous application of a meticulously distilled opioid began to spike rates of addiction in the 
United States and undermined the long-term viability of the medical profession’s approach to 
vetting new medicines. Physicians, just as they had done with opium, cannabis, laudanum, 
chloroform, and morphine powders, tested the power of intravenous morphine on patients with 
that familiar sense of liberality embraced by ante-bellum practitioners. According to their 
training, those individuals used it widely and treated subjects with muscular issues, depression, 
nausea, diarrhea, and etcetera. This seemingly unfettered use created a population of addicted 
Americans and many of them, at first, tended to be middle-class women. In response, the media 
fixated on the imagery of the unfortunate drug addicted American mother and pursued a style of 
reporting on the morphine problem that began to reshape popular opinion and stoke a sense of 
panic.  
 While many in the medical community arrived at the understanding that their aging 
practices seemed to have encountered a new reality that required modern thinking, the damage 
had mostly been done. In fact, as the health epidemic created by morphine addiction grew 
exponentially in the 1880s, the medical community continued experimenting with new narcotics 
like cocaine, a highly addictive drug used for toothaches, fatigue, depression, and nausea. The 
perceived inability of the profession to rapidly readjust their practices began to significantly 
damage the average physician’s public reputation. At the same time, the press increasingly 
portrayed physicians and pharmacists as out-of-touch and unprofessional while also 
sensationalizing drug related issues and encouraging a political intervention in order to solve a 
crisis it then actively promoted.  
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The criticism of the medical profession was not confined to the media alone. Dr. T.D. 
Crothers, a tireless reformer of his community’s practices, argued in 1899 that even American 
doctors were becoming addicted to the morphine needle. He used the new popular name for 
morphine dependency—morphinism—and argued that any continued ambivalence on the subject 
might threaten the core foundations of society. “I cannot stop without calling attention to the fact 
that morphinism is increasing among physicians.” He continued by pointing out that “the reports 
from private asylums and public hospitals” suggested that if the problem remained unchecked, 
“medical men” would soon form “a considerable part” of the asylum’s inmate population.3  
Crothers’ prediction was bleak and suggested the drug crisis had not only entered the 
middle-class home, but also had infiltrated the pharmaceutical and medical community itself. 
These types of stories, widely reported by the press, created a legitimate sense of alarm. Worse, 
the medical profession, which had operated largely outside the purview of state or federal 
oversight, failed to keep statistics on the rates of addiction. Consequently, the best evidence of 
rising drug dependency came from the accumulation of anecdotal news stories. In that era of 
uncertainty, then, the relative number of drug addicts in the United States was truly anyone’s 
guess. 
In an environment characterized by a lack of hard data, morphine abuse emerged as a 
favored topic of the press and a reliable source of late-nineteenth century public anxiety. 
Responding to changing public perceptions of the crisis, politicians, often pressured by 
grassroots sentiment, began to intervene into the problem and call for local, state, and federal 
laws curtailing access to “dangerous” drugs. This development led to a battle over who would 
emerge as the managers of the nation’s drug crisis. Would the medical community lead the way 
 
3 Dr. T.D. Crothers, “Startling Charge Against American Physicians,” The Times (Philadelphia, PA), December 3, 
1899. 
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with a clinic-based approach that continued to exist outside the realm of politics? Would the 
political class seize control of the crisis and govern it through drug reform legislation? Or would 
a hybrid policy develop in which state and federal governments collaborated with the medical 
profession to limit the impact of drug addiction in America? They were complicated questions to 
answer.  
A scenario in which the American public and the political class continued to allow the 
medical community to manage issues related to drug addiction without governmental oversight 
became increasingly unlikely. Although many younger physicians attempted to adjust practices 
and reform the profession, their efforts were too little, too late. It was also clear that the issue of 
drug abuse and the control of narcotics was destined to become far more of a political issue in 
the twentieth century than it had been in the nineteenth. A situation then emerged in which the 
medical community continued its internal reforms and managed the ongoing drug crisis while 
Congress developed policies that placed them under federal oversight. Simultaneously, 
politicians at all levels of government worked to curtail the public’s access to drugs through 
prohibitory legislation. From 1900 to 1937, Congress passed the Biologic Controls Act, the Pure 
Food and Drug Act, the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act, the Harrison Narcotic Act, the Anti-
Heroin Act, the Volstead Act, and the Marihuana Tax Act. Their efforts represented a stunning 
change in direction for the federal government and a new style of public health management. It 
was both regulatory and punitive, institutional and populist, and legislative, legal, and medical. 
Its cumulative impact created a modern state anchored by a politics of restriction and discipline.  
The broader story told here is about the rise, peak, near collapse, and ultimate triumph of 
the resulting Prohibition State, a term used to describe the confluence of professional reforms, 
grassroots activism, and state and federal politicking that helped shape a broad anti-drug agenda 
7 
 
in the United States. Advocates of the Prohibition State introduced a diverse set of political 
goals, many of them proposed in a bipartisan fashion. The aims of this new form of regulatory 
government could be quite specific, involving the implementation of simple pharmaceutical 
reforms, or they could be broadened to include a wholesale reconsideration of how the 
international opium supply might be monopolized. The issues surrounding drug reform might 
also be professional and rational while, at the same time, capable of veering into racism and 
xenophobia. One coherent strategy rarely dominated the nation’s emerging drug war politics. 
Rather, a multitude of responses worked in synchronicity to create robust socio-political change. 
The numerous competing theories about what caused the perceived drug crisis also influenced 
the contours of that diffuse approach. In a decentralized and democratized society, all theories 
had influence.  
The popular notion that the drug problem resulted from physicians overprescribing 
powerful drugs that were then supplied by an unregulated pharmacy continued to dominate the 
discussion. That conclusion fueled the transfer of the crisis from the medical profession to the 
political class. Less convincing theories, however, still lured followers. Other possible answers 
included citification (meaning the adoption of a harried, frenetic pace associated with a modern 
lifestyle). In that scenario, individuals unaccustomed to the breakneck change of modern 
industrial and urban living had turned to escapism in the form of drug abuse. The crisis might 
also be associated with Chinese immigrants, feminine emotions, boredom, or Godlessness. 
These theories highlighted the organic and grassroots origins of the Prohibition State. The 
process of its construction did not rely on a top-down process initiated in Washington, D.C. It 
rather depended on a bottom-up democratic process in which the states truly served as the 
laboratories of anti-drug policy making. Many of those states acted quickly to address what 
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appeared to be a rapidly progressing drug crisis. California and Oregon, for example, passed 
laws restricting morphine and cocaine in the 1880s. Congress, on the other hand, did not act until 
1914 as it prepared for World War.  
In answering the question of how the United States transformed so rapidly from a society 
tolerant of drug use to one intent on prohibition, it is important to highlight a key point. When 
considering the involvement of city councils and state legislatures in the crisis—a process that 
began in the 1870s—governmental action does not appear to emerge so suddenly. Instead, it 
represented the slow nationalization of localized laws in an environment where Congress took its 
cues from the states. When the beginning of the government’s involvement in the drug crisis is 
traced to the 1870s at the state level, it seems historically logical to place the origins of the 
Prohibition State in the immediate post-bellum years. In that context, perceptions of American 
drug history begin to change. Not only does the unfolding of a state intent on prohibiting drugs 
begin nearly forty years earlier than is typically argued, but its early construction involves city 
councils and state legislatures more than it does Presidents or Congresses.  
 The primary argument of this work, then, is that the federal response to a perceived drug 
crisis came as the result of a decidedly liberal and democratic process built on local grassroots 
politics, lobbying, and state-level legislation; and that a late-nineteenth century morphine 
crisis—a national opiate crisis—inspired these developments. By the time Congress passed 
nationals laws, many states had already established legal and legislative precedents for those 
statutes. Ultimately, federal involvement in the early erection of the Prohibition State largely 
involved the slow nationalization of existing local laws.  
That explanation is still too simplistic. The bigger crisis—the one that truly nurtured the 
opioid epidemic that inspired local action—involved systemic breakdowns in the practice of 
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medicine. Indeed, the crisis illustrated the extent to which liberal nineteenth century theories 
about how new medicine was to be vetted for public consumption were no longer workable in a 
modern environment that included intravenous morphine. Further complicating the story, those 
issues were global. The United States followed British, French, and German medical practices 
and each country suffered from the opioid crisis—even if less severely than the United States. 
Consequently, the transfer of the drug problem from the medical community to the federal 
government occurred in those countries as well, which made the construction of the Prohibition 
State—and the seemingly endless war on narcotics it encouraged—a transatlantic collaboration; 
one that was, in the case of the United States, implemented first at the municipal and state level.  
The literature in the field of drug and alcohol history tends to view the political 
intervention into the medical management of drugs as a kind of hostile takeover. The state’s 
subsequent management of the drug problem is then approached with seemingly relentless 
skepticism. The most prominent historian of the American opioid crisis, David Courtwright, 
argues that by the time the federal government intervened to control the nation’s problem with 
opiates, it had been largely solved by the medical community. In his illuminating work Dark 
Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America, Courtwright argues that “opiate addiction 
increased throughout the nineteenth century, peaked in the 1890s, and thereafter began a 
sustained decline.” He further suggests that “the major reason for the rise, as well as the fall, in 
the rate of opiate addiction was the prevailing medical practice of the day.” His argument, 
however, somewhat understates the role of government in spurring the medical community 
towards corrective action. Consequently, subsequent analysis minimizes problems the medical 
community faced in reforming its mid-nineteenth century practices and casts political solutions 
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as measures that came after the problem had been solved. This brand of analysis ultimately 
portrays governmental responses as largely unnecessary.4 
This skepticism of the government’s formulation and enactment of drug policy defined 
the field for decades. Courtwright’s claim that “another fundamental feature of American 
narcotic laws is that they were passed, interpreted, and defended on the basis of misleading, even 
fraudulent information” established a deep sense of unease in the field. That assertion, which cast 
the government as a hapless—if not malicious—actor in the American drug crisis, has had 
profound influence. The modern literature on the topic mirrors this approach. Historian Kathleen 
Frydl, whose work focuses on the period from 1940 to 1973, argues that “more than anything 
else, the drug war extended or enabled certain state agendas, like policing inner cities embroiled 
in conflict, or wielding influence and power abroad, especially throughout the developing 
world.” She continues by asserting that “the drug war compensated for deficiencies in other 
institutions and instruments of government. Bereft of other tools, the state punished its way to 
power.”5 
 The problem with Frdyl’s indictment of state motives is largely one of periodization and 
focus. If, for example, a history of the nation’s narcotic problem begins in 1940 after decades of 
foundational lawmaking—and then focuses entirely on the national government’s work in 
preserving institutions created as early as 1901—the state appears as a highly irrational actor. 
While her arguments present a very fair and thoughtful analysis of the ways in which the post-
war state benefited from and preserved its prohibitionist agenda, broader contextualization would 
likely lead to less certain conclusions. A similar strategy is deployed by Courtwright in 
 
4 David Courtwright, Dark Paradise: Opiate Addiction in America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).  
5 Courtwright, p. 6; Kathleen Frydl, The Drug Wars in America, 1940-1973 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 
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suggesting that the federal government did not react to the morphine crisis until 1914, an 
assertion that effectively removes the role of state laws in shaping national agendas.  
In Lisa McGirr’s The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and the Rise of the American State, 
which can be viewed as a corrective to many of the issues in the scholarship, she writes that “the 
war on alcohol was a prime example of a recurring theme of United States mass politics.” She 
continues by suggesting “the nation’s powerful traditions of evangelical Protestantism and its 
freewheeling brand of expansive capitalism emerged in tandem—and in tension with one 
another.” This phenomenon, she argues, led to a situation in which the combination of those 
forces “fueled moral crusades among men and women unsettled by social conflict and change.” 
This more nuanced interpretation of the social movements that led to the rise of the Prohibition 
State adds much needed depth to the narrative. Most importantly, she portrays the prohibition of 
alcohol as a grassroots effort, which is a crucial point. Indeed, some of this work’s key 
arguments borrow from McGirr’s work. Her assertion that the “nation’s nascent domestic and 
international drug-prohibition regime emerged symbiotically with national alcohol prohibition” 
serves as the building blocks for the final chapter of this dissertation, which highlights the 
intensive overlapping of alcohol and drug prohibition politics.6 
 On the other hand, deep suspicions regarding the wielding of state power similarly 
characterize McGirr’s work. She argues that alcohol reformers “turned to the state to stabilize 
social order, and secure their place within it, with strong doses of coercive moral absolutes” 
while averring that their “monumental anxieties over industrial capitalism, mass immigration, 
and the increasingly large and potentially volatile proletarian populations congealed around the 
campaign against the saloon and liquor traffic.” McGirr’s work ultimately helps steady the shaky 
 
6 Lisa McGirr, The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and the Rise of the American State (New York: W.W. Norton &     
Company, 2015).  
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argument that the entirety of America’s approach to drug and alcohol reform may be found in 
largely discredited anxieties that were cynically used by bureaucratic entrepreneurs to 
unnecessarily expand the state.7 
 This work can be distinguished from the existing scholarship by its relative lack of 
suspicion or sense of conspiracy. While it does not refute the overwhelming evidence that racist, 
xenophobic, classist, and other generalized anxieties fueled the growth of the Prohibition State, it 
nonetheless concludes that the story was far more complicated. The rise of the Prohibition State 
was a liberal and democratic process, backed by the voting public, heralded by activists, exalted 
by the press, embraced in bipartisan fashion, promoted in churches and schools, funded by 
philanthropists and expanding budgets, corroborated by judges, policed at all levels of law 
enforcement, and widely celebrated as common-sense governing. Indeed, the push for drug 
reform started in the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant and reached its peak during Franklin 
Roosevelt’s administration. It transcended political partisanship and gained the support of one of 
the most diverse political coalitions in American history—one that lasted for 150 years.  
 Moreover, much of the scholarship on the prohibition of drugs and alcohol rests on a 
reading of social anxiety that casts the phenomenon as an irrational force that inspires equally 
irrational policy making. This work operates from the standpoint that social anxiety is a 
constant—and not ahistorical—factor that influences the history of the United States. It also 
contends that moral panic is a common everyday force that actively shapes national responses to 
crises (for better or worse). The business of deciding what is and what is not a legitimate 
response to a perceived threat is largely outside the purview of historical analysis. As Robert S. 
Billings, Thomas W. Milburn, and Mary Lou Shaalman argue in their work “A Model of Crisis 
 
7 McGirr, 7. 
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Perception:” “although crisis is common, little is known about how a situation becomes defined 
as a crisis.” They further note that there is an “incomplete development of the concept of crises 
or of the process of perceiving crises.” While their work is dated (1980), there has been relatively 
little scholarship on the subject since.  
In this work, the state is viewed as an everchanging, elastic, highly imperfect, and 
oftentimes unfortunate reflection of various national anxieties. The state, according to this 
reading of history, is not necessarily an idea to be broadly condemned. The rise of the 
Prohibition State in this story, which seems to occur suddenly, also accorded with longstanding 
American political traditions. It was a global project that began at the local level and then 
became a municipal and state level enactment of international trends. The war on drugs the 
Prohibition State engendered and supported mirrored America’s most rational and irrational 
tendencies, simultaneously embodying the nation’s ingenuity as well as its racist underbelly. 
Within that context, the Prohibition State emerged as the bureaucratic manifestation of one of 
America’s most deep-seated fears—the spread of addictive and deadly drugs within their 
communities.8  
The first chapter of this work takes inspiration from James H. Mill’s histories of cannabis 
in England, especially Cannabis Britannica: Empire, Trade, and Prohibition, 1800-1928. By 
anchoring his story in the nineteenth century and connecting it to the politics of the present, a 
complicated story of medicine, empire, and politics emerges. It also offers a rare narrative that 
covers the topic of drug use in western society in a century long context. In emulation, this work, 
which seeks to chart the rise of a prohibition-minded twentieth century state, begins in 1840.  
 
8 Robert S. Billings, Thomas W. Milburn, and Mary Lou Shaalman, “A Model of Crisis Perception: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (June 1980), 300-316. 
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This first chapter focuses exclusively on the medicalization of cannabis in the mid-
nineteenth century. It was during that period, one significantly defined by the Britain’s Opium 
Wars with China, that the western world discovered medicinal cannabis. From the laboratory of 
William O’Shaughnessy, an Irish physician employed by Britain’s East India Company, the 
substance then spread to London, Paris, and eventually Boston, New York, Philadelphia, New 
Orleans, St. Louis, and Chicago. This chapter interprets the arrival of cannabis in the United 
States through a transatlantic medical information exchange developed in the early-nineteenth 
century.   
 Cannabis arrived in the United States during a period of pharmaceutical experimentation. 
The European and American medical professions were rapidly developing new and more 
powerful medicines and a kind of therapeutic revolution lay just around the bend. The profession 
had experimented widely with the implementation of cannabis in the practice of medicine, but 
eventually determined it to be too erratic for serious use. Ultimately, however, it was the 
emergence of the opioid epidemic that swept cannabis to the margins of legitimate medical use. 
The consistent pain relief physicians hoped cannabis might ultimately provide had been 
remedied, in large part, by the effective results delivered by intravenous morphine. So, the 
medical community, which once hoped cannabis might replace opium as a pain reliever, then 
abandoned it and returned to a more distilled form of opium—intravenous morphine. This 
chapter also highlights the halcyon days of the profession’s control of the nation’s narcotic 
supply and offers a scenario in which their strategies worked reasonably well.  
 In chapter two, which focuses on the rise of the popular “hasheesh confessional,” a 
literary genre focused on detailing one’s recreational use of cannabis, this project continues to 
outline the dimensions of the nineteenth century’s tolerance of broad experimentation with 
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drugs. It argues that this artistic rendering of cannabis use also had medical value and ultimately 
walked a tightrope between science and literature. More, this work suggests that in an 
environment lacking centralized agencies charged with vetting new drugs, a broad and liberal 
approach to testing medicines characterized the process. Because of that, hallucinatory literary 
prose had influence and was reluctantly embraced by a medical profession intent on gathering 
information from all experiences with the substance in question.  
 In chapter three, close attention is paid to transitions within the medical community. The 
period covered marks the moment when the medical vetting process used to test cannabis and 
other new drugs began to fail in a modern world that included intravenous morphine. It presents 
a profession devoted to liberal experimentation using a hypodermic syringe in the same way it 
did tinctures of opium and cannabis. The results led to spiking levels of addiction and morphine-
related death, a new media uniquely focused on drug dependency, an erosion in public trust in 
the medical profession, and the increased politicization of the crisis.  
 Chapter four highlights the active transfer of the nation’s drug problem from the medical 
and clinical setting to the political arena. By 1900, debates about drugs had dramatically 
changed. The American public, no longer ambivalent on the topic, begins to embrace 
governmental regulation of the medical and pharmaceutical industries as well as the prohibition 
of drugs. This chapter charts the legislative foundations of a Prohibition State and focuses on the 
Biologic Controls Act, the Pure Food and Drug Act, the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act, and the 
Harrison Narcotic Act. In the backdrop, it also focuses on the rise of a new American-led foreign 
policy centered, to a large degree, on controlling the global opium supply. By 1914, the medical 
profession is largely absent in debates around how to best control the nation’s ongoing opioid 
epidemic and the issue is entirely political.  
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The final two chapters of this work interpret the peak, decline, and triumph of the 
Prohibition State from 1919-1937. After passing the Harrison Narcotic Act in 1914, which 
prohibited cocaine and placed historic limitations on non-medicinal opioids, Congress followed 
with the Volstead Act and the Eighteenth Amendment prohibiting alcohol in 1919. Then, in 
1924, Congress implemented the uncontroversial Anti-Heroin Act, banning that substance as 
well. These maneuvers represented the apex of prohibition-minded government and pointed to a 
stunning transformation in public perception and policy since the outbreak of America’s first 
opioid epidemic. Much of the public, the press, and government at all levels had become united 
in their stance against drug and alcohol use.  
Just as the Prohibition State reached its pinnacle with a ban on alcohol, it seemingly 
collapsed with the repeal of the Volstead Act, passed just twelve years later. That profound 
rebuke of the fundamental philosophies of the state did not, however, blunt the progress and 
evolution of the state’s prohibitionist agenda. Despite popular historical narratives, the 
prohibitionist movement continued in different forms. Budgets and agents were merely 
transferred to new agencies like the Alcohol Tax Unit. Instead of stifling prohibitionist zeal, the 
repeal of alcohol prohibition led to the empowerment of its sister agency—the Bureau of 
Narcotics—which almost immediately began to pursue the criminalization of marijuana in the 
mid-1930s. The subsequent shift in focus to the so-called Reefer Madness that allegedly plagued 
the United States, along with the fact that alcohol prohibition agents and the budgets that enabled 
continued on in different forms, ultimately led—this work suggests—to the long-term triumph of 
the Prohibition State.  
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Chapter One 
 
“Giving the Resin of Hemp an Extensive Trial:” The Rise of a Global Medical 
Marijuana Economy 
 
When William O’Shaughnessy, a young Irish physician, first arrived in 1830s Calcutta to 
take a post at the city’s medical college, cannabis could easily be found. On the streets and in the 
city’s bazaars, merchants sold its dried leaves—called gunjah—which were then smoked, most 
often in a hookah. They kept its “larger leaves and capsules” for use in a popular milk-based 
drink that possessed mildly intoxicating effects. Those larger leaves, referred to as bhang, could 
also be smoked or baked into edibles widely sold as majoons. The market for cannabis in India, 
essentially a legal and recreational one, showed the extent to which eastern society had adopted 
the substance as heartily as the west did alcohol and it caught the attention of this young 
physician recently employed as a corporate doctor by the East India Company.1  
While Dr. William O’Shaughnessy became known for a variety of achievements not 
related to cannabis, he nonetheless occupies a coveted spot in American drug history as the man 
who introduced medical marijuana to the west. After he arrived in India in the 1830s, 
O’Shaughnessy held a number of professional positions, experimented with the possibility of 
underwater telegraphy, and published prolifically in his field. He was best known for his work in 
establishing the telegraph (above ground) in India, an achievement for which he was ultimately 
 
1 W.B. O’Shaughnessy, “On the Preparation of Indian Hemp, or Gunjah (Cannabis Indica:) their Effects on the 
Animal System in Health, and their Utility in the Treatment of Tetanus and Other Convulsive Diseases,” New York 
Journal of Medicine and Collaborative Sciences (November 1843): 390; For a broader view of the cannabis 
industry in India, see: James H. Mills, Cannabis Britannica: Empire, Trade, and Prohibition, 1800-1928 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003); John Kaplin, Marijuana; Report of the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission, 
1893-1894 (Simla: Printed at the Government Central Printing Office, 1894); E.L. Abel, Marihuana: The First 
Twelve Thousand Years (New York: Springer Science, 1980); Col. Sir R.N. Chopra, Chopra’s Indigenous Drugs of 
India (Kolkata: Academic Publishers, 1933). 
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knighted by the British government. For a short time though—from roughly 1838 to 1843—his 
name was synonymous with cannabis experimentation.2  
O’Shaughnessy’s efforts eventually led to the establishment of a medical marijuana 
economy in the United States that lasted into the 1930s when Congress banned its possession. 
While the doctor had a clear impact on the practice of medicine, his socio-cultural impact was, 
perhaps, even greater. His unyielding advocation of the use of cannabis accelerated a culture of 
narcotic experimentation that defined the practice of medicine throughout the nineteenth century. 
After O’Shaughnessy introduced cannabis to the west, physicians began experimenting with its 
medical potential while. Almost simultaneously, hashish use became popular in Bohemian 
literary circles and a culture of cannabis consumption emerged in the United States.  
The story of western cannabis experimentation did not end as O’Shaughnessy imagined it 
would, however. Physicians struggled with the substance in ways their eastern counterparts had 
not. The drug was irascible, generated frustrating results, and was difficult to prescribe with any 
sense of clarity. Doctors often noted unwelcome effects that exacerbated the underlying 
conditions they initially sought to treat. By the late-nineteenth century, after decades of repeated 
struggles, the mainstream medical community began to slowly marginalize its use of the 
substance. It was ultimately not a story of triumph for medical marijuana in the west. Once 
celebrated by the scientific community, cannabis ultimately became a problematic substance 
deemed too resistant to standardization.3 
 
 
2 M. Adams, Memoir of Surgeon-Major Sir William O’Shaughnessy Brooke: In Connection with the Early  
  Telegraph in India (1889), Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2008. 
3 The basic narrative recounting the arrival of cannabis in the United States has been covered in a variety of 
scholarly and popular works, see: Martin Booth, Cannabis: A History (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2003);  
Martin A. Lee, Smoke Signals: A Social History of Marijuana—Medical, Recreational, and Scientific (New York:  
Scribner, 2012); Isaac Campos, Homegrown: Marijuana and the Origins of Mexico’s War on Drugs (Chapel Hill:  
The University of North Carolina, 2012).  
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While fundamentally a rise and fall history, the story of marijuana in America also points 
to larger social trends. It highlights a story about global connections and the transatlantic 
exchange of medical knowledge from England to the United States. It advances this perspective 
while also offering a glimpse at the international dimensions of the practices that shaped an early 
medical marijuana economy. During the period highlighted here, England, France, and Germany 
did not collaborate to suppress the spread of cannabis as they would just a few decades later, but 
rather worked to increase its use as a modern medicine with untold potential. The mainstream 
medical community in England, in fact, embraced Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s work with the substance 
and reports of his findings traveled from Calcutta to London, Paris, Berlin, New York, Boston, 
Louisville, and throughout urban and rural United States.4  
Within that narrative of global exchange, there is another story about the way in which 
the British government appropriated and exported Indian medical knowledge. The classical 
historical literature on colonial/settler relationships typically presents information exchanges as a 
one-way transmission from London to Calcutta. Even in the revisions countering the 
“Orientalism” inherent in that perspective, there are few examples of Indian culture directly 
impacting and reshaping thought in the west. William O’Shaughnessy’s embrace of medical 
cannabis and the exportation of that knowledge to the United States illustrates such an example. 
While histories highlighting the Indian influence on the medical culture of London are rare, those 
 
4 With the exception of historian James H. Mills enlightening works, specifically Cannabis Britannica: Empire,  
Trade, and Prohibition, 1800-1928, the field of drug history has only recently begun to fully analyze the global  
dimensions of both medical and “illicit” marijuana consumption. For the most notable works to emerge, see:  
Bradley J. Borougerdi, Commodifying Cannabis: A Cultural History of a Complex Plant in the Atlantic World  
(New York and London: Lexington Books, 2018); Chris S. Duvall, The African Roots of Marijuana (Durham, NC:  
Duke University Press, 2019); In that sense, this work contributes to a literature on the European influence on     
American medicine, see: W.F. Bynum, Science and the Practice of Medicine in the Nineteenth Century (New   
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Harley Warner, Against the Spirit of the System (Baltimore and  
London:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Charles E. Rosenberg, The Cholera Years: The United States  
in 1832, 1849, and 1866 (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
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dealing with its impact on the same community in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, New 
Orleans, and St. Louis through a transatlantic crossing are exceedingly so.5 
 Within that larger context, this work highlights the American medical profession’s 
dependency on European practices—especially upon London. It was that reliance on European 
medicine that led American physicians towards the use of medical cannabis in the first place. 
Physicians in the United States mirrored the practices of their British colleagues and began to 
test the substance in order to reveal its therapeutic viability. The medical marijuana trials that 
spilled from O’Shaughnessy’s Calcutta laboratory then depended on this transatlantic 
collaboration in which scientific conclusions and hypotheses traveled quickly across the ocean. 
More, this consistent interchange ultimately led to the realization that cannabis, while a 
potentially powerful healing agent, was also an incredibly complex substance not easily tamed 
by the scientific method. Its effects were deemed unpredictable, which made it difficult to 
prescribe with confidence. After two decades of attempting to transform cannabis into a trusted 
mainstream medicine, the American medical community—frustrated by its mysterious 
composition—began to turn away from its use.  
 The medical community’s loss of confidence in cannabis also occurred in London, 
Berlin, and France, illustrating ongoing global interconnectedness and intellectual cohesion in 
the two decades leading up to the Civil War. While the medical community considered cannabis 
to be possibly more powerful than opium in the 1840s, it gradually adjusted its expectations and 
 
5 David Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization, 1773- 
1835, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969); Suresh Chandra Ghosh, The Social  
Conditions of the British Community in Bengal, 1757-1800 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970); Andrew Sartori, Bengal in     
Global Concept History (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Subrata Dasgupta,    
Awakening: The Story of the Bengal Renaissance (London: Random House, 2011); Jana Tschurenev, Empire,  
Civil Society, and the Beginnings of Colonial Education in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019);  
The scholarship highlighting a situation in which England exported medical or cultural knowledge from its Indian  
colony to the United States (in a way that significantly impacted life in America) is seemingly unavailable.  
21 
 
used the drug with a narrowed focus while continually working to uncover the source of its 
psychoactive power. Charged by O’Shaughnessy’s advice to give “the resin of hemp an 
extensive trial,” the medical community responded enthusiastically and provided a diverse set of 
case studies that guided the use of the substance into the twentieth century.  
The Calcutta Experiments  
Dr. William O’Shaughnessy embodied the spirit of global exchange in the early-to-mid-
nineteenth century. He was born in Limerick, Ireland, in 1809, a major commercial center in the 
southern region of the country. He left Limerick for Edinburgh, where he studied medicine and 
obtained his degree before briefly settling in London where he felt persecuted because of his 
Irish heritage. In response, he joined the Bengal Medical Service of the East Indian Company, a 
multi-national corporation that maintained its own army and functioned as a for-profit agent of 
the British government. The company then sent him to Fort William in Calcutta in 1833—a 
fortress it built in 1696. In a matter of a decade after leaving Ireland, O’Shaughnessy found 
himself in Calcutta via Edinburgh and London.6  
 When he first arrived in Calcutta, O’Shaughnessy worked as an Assistant Surgeon in the 
general employ of the East Indian Company until 1834 when he was sent to the “Civil Stations 
of Gyah and Cuttack successively.” Towards the end of that year he “was doing duty with the 
artillery at Dum-Dum.” Thereafter, he managed the medical care of the 72nd Bengal Native 
Infantry, the 10th Regiment Bengal Light Cavalry, and served as the First Assistant to the Opium 
Agent in Bihar. He travelled extensively, from Indian metropolises to the outlying countryside, 
 
6 M. Adams, Memoir of Surgeon-Major Sir William O’Shaughnessy Brooke: In Connection with the Early  
  Telegraph in India (1889) (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2008).  
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and gained a wide breadth of experience as a clinical physician turned army doctor—for both 
British and Indian troops—and then as an opium agent.7 
 It was at the British Opium Agency in Bihar that O’Shaughnessy first learned the power 
of Indian psychoactive botanicals. In an article published in 1840 titled “On Opium in India,” the 
doctor wrote, “to this important subject I propose to devote more space than it generally claims 
in elementary treatises on chemistry.” He undertook the task of detailing the plant’s power 
because it was a “source of enormous revenue, and an article of the highest commercial interest.” 
O’Shaughnessy felt he was the logical candidate for the task considering he had “held the 
appointment of Assistant to the Opium Agency of Behar for a considerable period.” His astute 
analysis of how poppy plants were harvested, the manner in which they arrived to the agency, 
and the processing that occurred before being shipped for global sale mirrored the style of his 
later writings on cannabis—a substance with a profit potential he would have recognized from 
his dealings with opium in Bihar.8 
 O’Shaughnessy was then appointed Professor of Medicine in the Medical College at 
Calcutta in April of 1835. The school was in the process of a reformation in which the more 
objective scientific methods of western medicine supplanted the alleged folk remedies of 
traditional eastern practices. O’Shaughnessy arrived to help retrain a new generation of Indian 
doctors in those methods considered more modern and scientific. He wrote little about his 
 
7 M.	Adams,	Memoir	of	Surgeon-Major	Sir	William	O’Shaughnessy	Brooke,	Kt.,	Simla:	Printed	at	the	Government		
Central	Printing	Office,	1889.		
8	William	O’Shaughnessy,	“Art.	XXIII:	On	Opium	in	India,”	American	Journal	of	Pharmacy,	(July	1840):138;	For		
an	overview	of	the	modern	scholarship	on	the	Opium	Wars,	see:	Glenn	Melancon,	Britain’s	China	Policy	and		
the	Opium	Crisis:	Balancing	Drugs,	Violence,	and	National	Honour,	1833-1840	(New	York:	Routledge,	2003)	
Carl	A.	Trocki,	Opium,	Empire,	and	the	Global	Political	Economy:	a	Study	of	the	Asian	Opium	Trade,	1750-1950	
(New	York:	Routledge,	1999);	Mao	Haijian,	The	Qing	Empire	and	the	Opium	War:	The	Collapse	of	the	Heavenly		
Dynasty	(London:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005);	Song-Chuan	Chen,	Merchants	of	War	and	Peace:	British		
Knowledge	of	China	in	the	Making	of	the	Opium	War	(Hong	Kong:	Hong	Kong	University	Press,	2017);	Frank		
Dikotter	et	al,	Narcotic	Culture:	A	History	of	Drugs	in	China	(London:	C.	Hurst	and	Co.,	2004).  
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experiences in Calcutta or at the Medical College. It is ironic, however, that after being hired to 
educate native students in western medicine he spent much of his time learning about the ancient 
eastern practice of using cannabis as a therapeutic. Instead of undermining native physicians, he 
instead utilized their knowledge, documented it, and published his findings. While his actions 
constituted what could easily be considered an appropriation of eastern custom for western gain, 
it was—on some level—a medical collaboration.9 
 On the other hand, O’Shaughnessy’s arrival in the city coincided with the First Opium 
War between England and China over the latter’s reluctance to embrace the importation of the 
drug by British commercial interests. It was also a period of intense botanical imperialism, in 
which the control of plants like cannabis and poppies were transferred from Indian society to the 
British Empire for western profit. In that sense, it is ultimately more accurate to say that the 
doctor’s cooption of medicinal cannabis use was a continuation of the British tradition of mining 
India’s resources for imperial benefit.10 
 The appropriation of medicinal marijuana from India, however, was subtler than it had 
been with opium. In the case of the latter, India had been transformed into a factory farm in 
which opium was cultivated, harvested, processed, and shipped abroad—especially to China—
solely for profits that were then deposited in London banks. Cannabis never reached that level of 
commercialism, ultimately failed to generate profits significant enough to incite wars, and thus 
remained in the realm of medical experimentation. For the British, it existed almost solely as a 
subject of scientific inquiry.  
 
9 Jana Tschurenev, Empire, Civil Society, and the Beginnings of Colonial Education in India (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2019). 
10 Ibid.  
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 After a season of preparatory research, Dr. O’Shaughnessy began a series of cannabis 
experiments in the late-1830s on animals and then quickly evolved to testing it on patients at the 
Calcutta Hospital suffering from severe symptoms of disease. His work culminated in the 
publication of a highly influential article, “On the Preparations of the Indian Hemp, or Gunjah, 
(Cannabis Indica) their Effects on the Animal System in Health, and their Utility in the 
Treatment of Tetanus and other Compulsive Diseases.”11 
In his work, first published in 1841, the doctor readily admitted he was not the discoverer 
of the medical use of cannabis. He wrote that the “narcotic effects of hemp are popularly known 
in the South of Africa, South America, Turkey, Egypt, Asia Minor, India, and the adjacent 
territories of the Malays, Burmese, and Siamese.” He contended, however, that the substance 
was most often used in those countries by the “dissipated and the depraved, as the ready agent of 
a pleasing intoxication.” He further noted that physicians in those countries employed it to treat a 
wide variety of ailments, and O’Shaughnessy turned to those cases to inform how he might use it 
in his own practice. While he did not condone the recreational use of cannabis, he nonetheless 
concluded that the substance possessed unique healing power, and therefore had medical uses. 
 After laying out these general points, the doctor then pursued a detailed account of the 
plant itself. He started with its physical characteristics and noted it was “diaceous, annual, about 
three feet high, covered over with a fine pubescence.” Its stem was “erect, branched, bright 
green, angular” with leaves “alternate or opposite, on weak petioles.” The plant was “digitate, 
scabrous, with linear, lanceolate, sharply serrated leaflets, tapering into a long smooth entire 
point.” It had “clusters of flowers axillary with subulate bractes” and males that were “lax and 
 
11 W.B. O’Shaughnessy, “On the Preparation of Indian Hemp, or Gunjah (Cannabis Indica:) their Effects on the      
 Animal System in Health, and their Utility in the Treatment of Tetanus and Other Convulsive Diseases,” Vol. 1,   
 Iss 3, New York Journal of Medicine and Collaborative Sciences (November 1843): 390.  
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drooping, branched and leafless at base.” It was “calyx downy, five parted, “imbricated” with 
“five stemens,” possessed “anthers large and pendulous, and “calyx covered with brown glands.” 
The cannabis plant had roundish ovaries, with “pendulous ovule, and two long filiform glandular 
stigmas; achenium ovate, one seeded.” O’Shaughnessy culled that information from Lindley’s 
Flora Medica, a popular 1830s reference manual written for medical students to help in 
developing a more thorough understanding of the botanical characteristics of commonly used 
medicines.12  
 His thorough introduction of the plant began the process of western medical subjugation. 
As for its chemical properties, the doctor noted that “in certain seasons and in warm countries a 
resinous juice…concreted on the leaves and slender stems and flowers” of the plant. That resin 
when “separated and in masses” constituted the churrus—as they called it in “Nipal and 
Hindostan.” Those secretions, he believed, gave the plant its psychoactive powers. That resin 
was also soluble in alcohol and ether, partially so in alkaline, and, when pure, gave off a blackish 
grey color. Its odor was “fragrant and narcotic” with a taste “slightly warm, bitterish, and 
acrid.”13 
O’Shaughnessy continued by pointing out that when cannabis was used for the purposes 
of recreational intoxication only, “four or five persons” usually joined together “in this debauch” 
where they exchanged a hookah. Each person took “a single draught” and intoxication occurred 
almost instantaneously thereafter. The subsequent cannabis high usually led to “heaviness, 
laziness, and agreeable reveries.” This section of O’Shaughnessy’s article revealed that 
medicinal cannabis use in the east had also been accompanied by a pronounced recreational 
 
12 W.B. O’Shaughnessy, “On the Preparation of Indian Hemp, or Gunjah (Cannabis Indica:) their Effects on the      
 Animal System in Health, and their Utility in the Treatment of Tetanus and Other Convulsive Diseases,” Vol. 1,  
 Iss. 3, New York Journal of Medicine and Collaborative Sciences (November 1843): 390.  
13 Ibid, 390.  
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culture. That had been true of opium as well. Similarly, in the United States, as physicians 
attempted to implement cannabis into the practice of medicine, a recreational culture of 
bohemian hashish use developed at the same time solidifying the interconnectedness of the two 
styles of use.14 
 A man named Ameer, one of the physicians O’Shaughnessy consulted, reported the 
existence of seven or eight majoon makers—or purveyors of cannabis edibles—in Calcutta. 
These entrepreneurs often created special orders for customers and “all classes of persons, 
including the lower Portugese, or ‘Kala Feringhees,’ and especially their females” consumed the 
drug. He claimed that this form of edible cannabis was “most fascinating in its effects” and 
produced “extatic [sic] happiness, a persuasion of high rank, a sensation of flying, voracious 
appetite, and intense aphrodisiac desire.” Ameer also claimed that cannabis did not lead to 
madness, impotence, or to the “numerous evil consequences described by the Arabic and Persian 
physicians.” O’Shaughnessy entered the narrative at that point to acknowledge he did not agree 
with Ameer on those specific points.15 
Still, O’Shaughnessy clearly respected his colleagues in India and the Middle East. “I 
owe my cordial thanks,” he wrote, “to the distinguished traveler Syed Keramut Ali, Mootawulee 
of the Hooghly Imambarrah.” He thanked Hakim Mirza Abdul Razes of Teheran, who had 
furnished him “with interesting details regarding the consumption of hemp in Candahar, Cabul, 
and the countries between the Indus and Herat.” O’Shaughnessy concluded by acknowledging 
the Pandit Moodoosudun Gooptu, who gave him notices “of the statements regarding hemp in 
the early Sanscrit authors on materia medica.”16  
 
14 W.B. O’Shaughnessy, “On the Preparation of Indian Hemp, or Gunjah, 390. 
15 Ibid, 390.  
16 Ibid.  
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  For additional information on the substance, O’Shaughnessy turned to Persian writers, 
who claimed that the first use of cannabis long predated “Haider’s era.” Hippocrates referred to 
cannabis in his writings and so, too, did Dioscorides. Egypt passed “very severe ordinances” 
against the substance in 780, which resulted in the uprooting of cannabis gardens. Perpetual 
violators of the new ban on cannabis were then subject to having their teeth extracted. 
O’Shaughnessy cited the 35th chapter of the 5th volume of “Rumphius’ Herbarium Amboinense” 
as “containing a long and excellent account of hemp.” In that work, Rumphius identified upper 
India as its habitat. He then “notices very briefly the exciting effects ascribed to the leaf, and to 
mixtures thereof with spices, camphor, and opium.” The author doubted cannabis had actual 
aphrodisiac powers and attributed the rise of that reaction to the general temperament of the 
consumer. “This was the amount of preliminary information possessed by our author,” 
O’Shaughnessy admits, “when he entered upon his experiments to determine its application to 
man as a remedial agent.”17 
 While O’Shaughnessy acknowledged those non-British individuals, who informed his 
initial understanding of medicinal cannabis, it was not simply a medical or scientific 
collaboration. On November 6th, 1839, as O’Shaughnessy collected information on the use of 
medical cannabis, for example, George Thompson took the podium at the Friend’s Meeting 
House on Mount Street in London to deliver an address on British interests in India. He told the 
audience “how capable India” was in “supplying to you, in any quantity, the crude material, and 
of taking from you in return the varied manufactures of this country.” That, of course, 
represented O’Shaughnessy’s approach to the exportation of medical cannabis. The bottom line 
 
17 W.B. O’Shaughnessy, “On the Preparation of Indian Hemp, or Gunjah, 390. 
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was that cannabis was a potentially lucrative commodity supplied by India that would be 
exported for western gain. O’Shaughnessy’s research was partly directed to that end.18 
 In the same speech, Thompson called for a “hearty and energetic movement towards 
India” and heralded the “application of British capital and skill,” “the encouragement of native 
industry,” “the improvement of the means of internal communication,” and “the importation into 
British ports the products of the east.” To men like Thompson, British involvement in India was 
good for the economy, led to the modernization of the country, and created new markets in an 
ever-expanding capitalist economy. It was an era of global connections in which Britain worked 
to make permanent the social, intellectual, and economic ties to its broad network of colonial 
holdings.19 
  Indeed, in October of 1840, as O’Shaughnessy penned his article on the medicinal 
benefits of cannabis, the East India Company, in collaboration with the British government, 
chartered a Bank for British India to better facilitate the exchange of products. “On the 
establishment of this institution,” the Leicester Chronicle reported, “every dependency of the 
British empire will be linked in monetary connection with the mother country.” Asia, 
“Australiasia,” the West Indies, “the Canadas,” and the Ionian Islands would all have “their 
respective banks in England.” The paper reported that these banks were not just important from a 
financial point of view, but from a social and political perspective as well.20 
 This kind of financial network prevented the need “for the transfer of bullion from one 
country to another,” lowered the interest rates by supplying capital wherever it could “be 
advantageously employed,” and steadied and equalized the exchanges. Such a system also gave 
 
18 “Mr. George Thompson’s Last Lecture on British India,” The Guardian, November 13, 1839.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
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“confidence to all engaged in distant trading operations” and would “induce merchants to direct 
all [their] skill, energy, and means to the production and transfer of profitable commodities.” 
This style of bank created a “powerful and enduring tie of mutual self-interest” that bound “in an 
indissoluble way” a “peculiarly pleasing” union between the “distant dependency and the parent 
state.”21 
 At the same time, in Calcutta, the British, on the verge of completing the construction of 
two major cotton factories and the East India Company, had commenced fighting China to 
maintain a recreational drug market, captured Aden in Yemen, and engaged in the First Anglo-
Afghan War. The Times of India had just been recently established and Britain completed the 
first iron bridge on the continent. All the while, O’Shaughnessy—who also worked to establish 
the telegraph in India—experimented with the medicalization of cannabis for the western market. 
The Irish doctor was, in every sense of the word, a reliable agent in creating a peculiarly pleasing 
union between India, the distant dependency, and England, the parent state.22 
 While there may have been strong profit-motive behind the cooption of medical cannabis, 
O’Shaughnessy also had an objective and scientific mind and conducted his cannabis trials with 
a sense of professionalism. Having gathered as much information as he could by consulting local 
experts, he finally embarked on his own trials. He used it first on canines and gave “a middling 
sized dog” ten grains (approximately 65 milligrams) of cannabis. One half hour later, the animal 
became “stupid and sleepy, dozing at intervals, starting up, and wagging his tail as if extremely 
contended.” O’Shaughnessy closely observed the animal and documented that it “ate some food 
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greedily” and then collapsed into “helpless drunkenness.”  Despite its dramatic reaction to 
cannabis, the animal had fully and happily returned to his pre-cannabis temperament within six 
hours. The doctor proceeded by administering a much higher dose to a smaller dog and, this 
time, the animal became “ridiculously drunk” within twenty minutes. The symptoms ultimately 
faded and the dog, like the others, returned to its natural state.23 
 Dr. O’Shaughnessy, encouraged by these early experiments, then gave cannabis to three 
baby goats on which it had no noticeable effect. In response, he returned to canines and 
administered to a “very small” dog a high dose of the substance. It immediately “lost all power 
over the hinder extremities” and, while acknowledging its name being called, tried hard to rise, 
but ultimately could not and collapsed back to the ground. These rather severe symptoms passed 
in a matter of hours, however. To be certain the plant had no unforeseen consequences, 
O’Shaughnessy continued serving it to fish, dogs, cats, swine, vultures, crows, horse, deer, 
monkeys, sheep, and cows. The total impact on the system, he concluded, was ultimately 
negligible. “No hesitation could be felt as to the perfect safety of giving the resin of hemp an 
extensive trial,” O’Shaughnessy informed his readers, adding that the substance was most 
appropriate in cases where its “apparent powers promised the greatest degree of utility.”24 
 As cannabis had not caused lasting harm in those extensive trials on animals, 
O’Shaughnessy comfortably turned to prescribing it to human patients at the hospital who were 
not responding to more traditional methods of treatment. His first two cases involved patients 
suffering from acute rheumatism and he reported they had responded relatively well to the 
substance. O’Shaughnessy, like present-day physicians, sought to treat the inflammation of the 
muscles that made the disease so painful and cannabis seemed ideally suited for the task. The 
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first patient given cannabis fell into catalepsy (or was temporarily paralyzed) and the doctor and 
his aides helped the man to a sitting posture by “raising his arms and limbs in every imaginable 
attitude.” Had he been “a waxen figure,” O’Shaughnessy theorized, the man, according to his 
notes, could not have been more “pliant or stationary.” The patient also became “insensible” and 
made no sign of understanding the questions asked of him.25  
The second patient, aroused by the noises made while moving the first, “seemed vastly 
amused” by the “statue-like attitudes in which the first patient had been placed.”26 The image of 
the first case then caused the second to emit a “peel of laughter” and compelled him to admit to 
those near him that he believed “four spirits were springing with his bed into the air.”27 The 
man’s disruptive behavior led to O’Shaughnessy escorting him from the room. After sleeping for 
two hours, the patient emerged lethargic and hungry, but ultimately healthy. O’Shaughnessy was 
thrilled that, after the passage of twenty-four hours, the patients were “not only uninjured by the 
narcotic, but much relieved of their rheumatism.” They were then discharged. The complex side 
effects, however, offered a preview of what the western medical community would struggle with 
for the next two decades. Sudden paralysis, hallucinations, and uncontrollable laughter were not 
ideal medical outcomes when seeking to treat common disease.28 
 The Calcutta experiments continued when cholera “attacked an athletic Rajpoot” and the 
victim was sent to O’Shaughnessy “pulseless, cold, and in a state of imminent danger.” The 
doctor tried to stabilize him with the resin of hemp and, within twenty minutes, the man’s pulse 
returned, his skin became warm, his purging ceased, and he fell asleep. Within an hour, the 
patients was cataleptic and remained in that condition for several hours. By morning, however, 
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“he was perfectly well and at his duty as usual.” While it is unlikely that cannabis resin 
resuscitated patients who had momentarily passed and then cured them of cholera, it certainly 
seemed to provide a means, as O’Shaughnessy put it, “to strew the path to the tomb with 
flowers.”29 
The doctor, for one, was quite excited and suggested that the substance might be a cure 
for cholera, tetanus, and arthritis. In 1843, he wrote that he knew no “remedy [comparable] to 
[cannabis] as a general and steady stimulant when given to Europeans in half drachm doses 
during the tractable stage of the disease.” The doctor also thought it was unparalleled in dealing 
with nausea and claimed it controlled vomiting “much more certainly than the opium 
preparations.” While O’Shaughnessy exaggerated the medical power of cannabis on many 
occasions, he was right that it could be very useful in lessening the pain accompanying disease. 
His assertion that the drug worked differently on Europeans than it did on Indian patients added a 
degree of bizarre insight, but his trials—the first of their kind reported in the west—began an 
intense process of vetting the potential power of cannabis as medicine.30 
 Buoyed by his successful treatment of the symptoms related to cholera and arthritis, 
O’Shaughnessy employed it in cases of tetanus. Ramjan Khan, a thirty-year-old patient, was 
admitted to the Calcutta Medical College and Hospital on December 13, 1838. The patient had 
an ulcer on the back of his hand that had been treated five days earlier by “a native empiric” who 
applied “a red hot gool (the mixture of charcoal and tobacco used in a hookah).” This treatment 
caused Khan and his brother, who had received the same remedy, to develop tetanus. Khan’s 
brother, however, refused to visit the hospital and died three days later. Khan, on the other hand, 
was admitted after enduring a series of spasms that led to lock-jaw. He was promptly given 
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liberal doses of opium mixed with calomel and, after physicians considered his case to be 
hopeless, O’Shaughnessy gained permission to administer to him cannabis resin dissolved in 
alcohol.31 
Soon after taking the doctor’s cannabis cocktail, Khan allegedly “felt giddy” and slept 
soundly. His spasms returned, however, and O’Shaughnessy responded by administering an 
additional two grains every three hours after performing a purgative enema. He then increased 
doses to three grains every two hours and the patient seemed to stabilize although he often 
seemed “much intoxicated.” Khan continued to improve until he developed a fever and exhibited 
bloody stools, which the doctor treated by applying leeches to his abdomen and by giving the 
patient a starch and opium enema containing acetate of lead every two hours. While his tetanus 
seemed to subside, the ulcer on his hand only grew worse and his dysenteric symptoms persisted. 
O’Shaughnessy’s staff suggested they amputate his arm, but Khan refused. He died of 
exhaustion on January 23, 1838.32 
Cannabis could not ultimately save lives, but O’Shaughnessy argued that “an 
unprejudiced view” of the case involving Ramjan Khan showed that, if nothing else, it had 
powerful sedative effects. He wrote that “although the patient died, it must be remembered that it 
was of a different disease, over which it is not presumed the hemp possesses the least power.” 
Other cases, however, bolstered his confidence. One of his patients, Chunoo Syce, who 
developed tetanus after being kicked by horse, and Huroo, a twenty-five-year-old female victim 
with the same ailment, were both given cannabis and discharged from care soon after. 
O’Shaughnessy concluded that “when given boldly and in high doses, resin of hemp is capable 
of arresting effectually the progress of this formidable disease, and in a large proportion of cases, 
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of effecting a perfect cure.” He added that cannabis acted like opium and wine, but was far more 
certain in impact. “I have no hesitation in saying, that in cases in which the opium treatment is 
applicable, hemp will be found far more effectual,” he concluded.33 
The Attempted Medicalization of Cannabis  
The results of Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s almost immediately capture the attention of the 
British medical community and gained early advocates. William Ley, a British physician, 
emerged as an early and fervent supporter. He had heard about the Calcutta experiments through 
the telegraph and compiled as much information as he could on O’Shaughnessy’s work. In the 
summer of 1840, Ley informed a gathering of the newly created Provincial Medical and Surgical 
Association in London that William O’Shaughnessy “strongly recommends the use of the resin 
of the garden hemp as a narcotic and anti-spasmodic.”34 Although Ley did not have access to the 
full scope of O’Shaughnessy’s work in Calcutta, he nonetheless poured over the available 
second-hand accounts and said he was “very much desirous in using the remedy.”35  
In late-February 1843, Ley reported the results of O’Shaughnessy’s trials to the Royal 
Medico-Botanical Society of London, claiming that cannabis caused an “inebriation of the most 
cheerful kind” and often incited a person “to sing and dance, to eat food with great relish, and to 
seek aphrodisiac desire.” Ley had, by then, conducted his own cannabis experiments and 
reported the story of a lady who had been confined to a hydrostatic bed for five years due to a 
spinal disease. Her situation had become so dire that whenever he moved her in order to change 
the Indian-rubber bed sheet, that simple action caused a series of violent spasms that often lasted 
through the night. The spasms came suddenly and drew her “body back into an arch” before 
 
33 O’Shaughnessy, “On the Preparation of Indian Hemp, or Gunjah, 343.  
34 W. Ley, “On the Efficacy of Hemp in Some Convulsive Disorders,” Provincial Medical Journal and Retrospect  
of the Medical Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 20 (August 20, 1842): 407-409. 
35 Ibid., 407. 
35 
 
ceasing abruptly and causing her to collapse onto the bed. Even worse, one spasm rapidly 
followed another and continued for hours throughout the night making the patient faint, sick, and 
incoherent. After Ley tried a variety of traditional remedies to ease the intensity of her seizures, 
he ultimately turned to cannabis and found that it helped her sleep through the night and worked 
to control her spasms. The lady, “who from long illness” knew most of the medicine on the 
market, argued that cannabis affected “the muscles principally,” relieved “ordinary pains less 
surely than opium,” did not upset the stomach, and produced “an unpleasant sensation in the 
head.”36  
Ley’s work was significant on several levels. First, he successfully replicated 
O’Shaughnessy’s findings and became the first physician to confirm that cannabis did, in fact, 
seem to have clear medicinal capabilities. Secondly, he delivered his speech at the esteemed 
Royal Medico-Botanical Society, illustrating the rapidity with which news of Indian cannabis 
penetrated the mainstream medical community. On the other hand, a closer reading of Ley’s 
experiments could suggest that the substance had failed in treating the woman’s condition. He 
even conceded that the patient, who had an expansive knowledge of available remedies, 
suggested it was less effective than opium with bothersome side effects. Physicians, of course, 
would continually confirm those findings in subsequent experiments. Ley’s enthusiasm, 
however, overwhelmed her opinion and he upheld the case as a triumph. Did he, then, replicate 
O’Shaughnessy’s findings or did he simply want the doctor’s work to be more valid than it might 
have otherwise been?  
 When viewed in the context of later conclusions drawn by the medical profession about 
the viability of cannabis as medicine, many of O’Shaughnessy’s cases appeared problematic as 
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well. In scenarios involving severe illnesses like tetanus, cholera, and hydrophobia, the doctor 
administered heavy doses of cannabis that seemed to have the effect of simply overwhelming the 
symptoms of disease by generating a psychoactive distraction. In some cases, it appears as 
though O’Shaughnessy quickly discharged the patient after administering the cannabis. Did he 
cure the patient? Or did he momentarily relieve the symptoms of the underlying disease without 
significantly contributed the source of the illness? The doctor also failed to provide useful 
information from any follow-up visits.  
 The prestigious Royal Medio-Botanical Society, founded by John Frost in 1822, 
embraced Ley’s work, which was perhaps even more problematic than O’Shaughnessy’s. It was 
also true that the institution served as another administrative arm of Britain’s larger imperial 
aims and its stated goal was to study the medicinal benefits of plants from around the globe. In 
the process, the institution hosted lectures and procured awards for outstanding research. The 
fact that that venerable of an institution validated O’Shaughnessy’s Calcutta experiments 
propelled the work to heights it perhaps did not deserve. Again, however, it is hard to remove 
these early developments from the context of empire. While it is difficult to prove that British 
medical society might have confirmed O’Shaughnessy’s work because it fit neatly within the 
nation’s larger imperialist agenda, it is worth considering the blurred lines separating western 
science from capitalist motive.  
In her fascinating work, Flora’s Empire: British Gardens in India, historian Eugenia W. 
Herbert writes that “India was part of global network of botanical exploration and collecting that 
gathered up the world’s plants for transport to great imperial centers like Kew.” Historian Lucille 
Brockway similarly argues that the “British botanic garden network”—which thrived from 1841-
1941—“played a critical role in generating and disseminating useful scientific knowledge, which 
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facilitated transfers of energy, manpower, and capital on a worldwide basis and on an 
unprecedented scale.” She further suggests that the British accelerated “plant transfers and 
scientific plant development that resulted in new plantation crops for tropical colonies.” That had 
been the case with opium. In the 1830s, it seemed cannabis was poised to follow those 
precedents.37 
It may not have mattered whether those initial cannabis trials were as convincing as they 
should have been. It was about science, yes, but also about how science advanced imperial aims. 
It is also difficult to remove O’Shaughnessy and Ley’s cannabis experimentation from the 
context of Britain’s battle to maintain an open opium market in China. Uncertain of the outcome 
in that war, cannabis would have been a perfect substance to hedge imperial bets with. Whether 
it was tea, sugar cane, coffee, cocoa, cinchona (to be processed into quinine), opium or, in this 
case, the resin of Cannabis indica, colonial botanicals provided indispensable profits for 
O’Shaughnessy’s employer—the East India Company. The cultivation, processing, distribution, 
and retailing of these plant-based commodities transformed many Eastern and Caribbean 
colonies into gardens that produced essential revenue for the empire.38  
The medical profession nonetheless took O’Shaughnessy’s work seriously, engaged his 
findings with intellectual vigor, and debated conclusions in academic journals. Indeed, the 
doctor’s article created enough excitement that he felt it necessary to publish a caveat shortly 
after publication. O’Shaughnessy wrote, “too much importance has been attached by 
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commentators on my paper on the occurrence of catalepsy as an effect of this drug.” He argued 
that in cases of tetanus, “no trial of the drug [was] at all conclusive” unless dosages were pushed 
“to the extent of inducing stupor and insensibility.” In that case, the doctor admitted, the goal 
was to overwhelm the symptoms of tetanus with what could only be described as an overdose of 
the substance. His faith in the cannabis’s potential nonetheless appeared to be genuine. He wrote 
to the profession, “many failures must be expected at first,” and then concluded that caution and 
time would prove cannabis to be an essential medicine.39 
 In his continued advance of O’Shaughnessy’s cause, Ley echoed his mentor and noted 
that cannabis would become “most practical and beneficial,” arguing that the drug had potential 
that could only be “confirmed by experience.” Others in the profession, thereafter, began 
experimenting as well. In an early trial, Martin Lynch, a British general practitioner, gave the 
substance to a sixty-four-year-old man who heard about it in the press and wanted to try it 
(mostly just to observe the effects). For a doctor excited to experiment, the aging man 
represented an ideal candidate. Lynch administered a significant dose and the patient noted an 
“itchiness at the roots of the eyelashes and in a few points of the lower extremities and scrotum.” 
His other symptoms were mild and he did not demonstrate any “sexual excitement.” That was 
the extent of that particular trial.40 
 In that same edition of the Provincial Medical Journal, released in 1843, the publication 
introduced the case of James M’Lellan, a forty-year-old carpenter with “temperate habits,” who, 
while crossing one of the canal bridges late at night, heard splashes in the water and went to the 
bank to investigate. He found a dog struggling in the water and when he tried to help the animal, 
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it “snapped at and bit two of his fingers, which bled freely, and gave him considerable pain.” M’ 
Lellan responded to the unexpected dog bite by dipping his fingers in rum. After a couple of 
weeks, the rum healed his wounds—or so it seemed to M’Lellan at the time.41 
 More serious problems developed when M’Lellan began to experience the onset of a 
series of “bizarre” symptoms later diagnosed as hydrophobia. His case, considered severe, was 
forwarded to E. Parker, House Surgeon of the Liverpool Northern Hospital, who decided it 
warranted the use of cannabis extract. Parker administered a low dose of cannabis and the patient 
had no reaction. He did not proceed with his experimentation and simply wrote an asterisk that 
read “the dose of hemp administered to inhabitants of this country should be much greater than 
those given to natives of India.”42 Dr. Parker, either through caution or lack of enthusiasm, 
administered one small dose, made a peculiar point similar to earlier ones by O’Shaughnessy 
about the nationality of patients and how it impacted the physiological effect of the substance, 
and discontinued his experimentation. Still, M’Lellan’s case was added to the record.  
 On April 8, 1843, Dr. James Inglis wrote the Provincial Medical Journal “gentlemen, it 
was with much pleasure that I read in your journal the paper of Dr. O’Shaughnessy.” The article, 
he claimed, convinced him of “the beneficial effects of the Indian hemp in those cases which so 
often resist the influence of other remedies.” He had received a tincture of cannabis from 
O’Shaughnessy himself and was excited to test it. After receiving the substance, Inglis 
“happened to have a slight attack of rheumatism” and so he “commenced a trial of the gunjah” 
upon himself.  He self-administered various doses for three nights in a row, but did not 
experience any effects and he submitted that news to the medical community. It may have been 
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less than compelling, but it too became part of the public record on the medicinal use of 
cannabis.43 
 These trials marked an inauspicious beginning and somewhat undercut the notion that 
cannabis would become a wonder-drug. In the meantime, however, Ley’s enthusiastic promotion 
of medicinal cannabis crossed the Atlantic to the United States. In May of 1843, Philadelphia’s 
Medical Examiner and Retrospect of the Medical Sciences reprinted Ley’s article in that month’s 
London Lancet. In it, Ley wrote that he “found the resinous extract of hemp of service in the 
treatment of acute rheumatism, cholera, chorea, effusion into the knee-joint, housemaid’s knee,” 
(or the inflammation of the fluid filled cavity above the knee), and “enlarged ganglia.” That 
article then appeared in Louisville’s The Western Journal of Medicine and Surgery.44 
 In a matter of three years, in a landscape defined by limited communication, 
O’Shaughnessy’s article travelled from Calcutta to London to Philadelphia and finally to 
Louisville, Kentucky. American physicians, emulating O’Shaughnessy and Ley, also began 
experimenting and attempting to adopt the new global trends in medicine. The trend, however, 
was that both British and American physicians struggled to find that optimism so distinctly 
expressed by O’Shaughnessy. In London, Edward Crosse observed that cannabis, when taken 
himself, produced nothing more than “an inclination to rub the eyelids and some indisposition to 
exertion.” Somewhat disappointed, he then took a double dose and mixed it with alcohol. This 
time, his spirits “in an hour were much elevated” and his “eyelids felt as if they had become 
oedematous.” Crosse also believed “that some object was near to me which was not in the 
room.” At the same time, his pulse, usually ninety, dropped to seventy. He argued that “the most 
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marked effect of this substance was, that my recollection (not my memory) intermitted regularly 
every two minutes, so that while in conversation, I was obliged to stop speaking, from a 
momentary total loss of the subject.”45  
 Crosse also encountered that unpredictability that so many of his colleagues had also 
found. He experienced dislocation, hallucinations, memory loss, and accelerated heartrate— 
side-effects difficult to justify especially when those effects were not followed by marked relief 
in actual pain. In Crosse’s case, the “phenomenon” experienced gradually disappeared in four or 
five hours and was succeeded “by a languor and great inclination to find the lowest possible 
horizontal position, accompanied by the sensation of being bitten in many parts of the body by 
some insect.” Crosse concluded that, “there is no doubt that this is a powerful remedy” and 
argued that it was “desirable that the profession should early be made acquainted with it, as 
much positive and negative injury may occur from skepticism on the point.”46 
 Still, the news of cannabis’ medical potential continued to reach the United States. 
Washington D.C.’s The Daily Madisonian reported the details of Ley’s presentation to the Royal 
Medico-Botanical Society in the spring of 1843 and recounted his argument that it “may be 
safely employed wherever opium is indicated.” The paper also instructed its readers that 
O’Shaughnessy had gained important knowledge “from a series of experiments on dogs, 
instituted in the native hospital of Calcutta” and predicted it would “prove a direct antidote—the 
first of its class.” The New Mirror, a weekly literary-minded New York City paper gleefully 
announced that “a drug has been discovered by the British in India” and that it had “wonderful 
properties.”47 
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 In England, Ley, an indefatigable proponent of medical cannabis, wrote the Provincial 
Journal in 1843: “Gentlemen: I send you the following case of tetanus, treated with cannabis 
indica, for the sake of the record. If it is not satisfactory, it affords hope of future utility in the 
remedy.” Ley’s case involved Thomas Stephens, a fifteen-year-old boy, who complained of 
shivering and intense sweating. After observing his patient for three days, Ley wrote that 
Stephens had gone back to work but returned two hours later complaining of back pain and went 
to bed. At eleven at night, the boy left to get pie for dinner, but he could not open his mouth to 
eat it. He then had a cup of milk and a jalap (a purgative obtained from the roots of a Mexican 
climbing plant) and laid face down, complaining of extreme back pain, and chills. Stephens’s 
condition worsened as he began to have back spasms that made it difficult for him to breathe. His 
condition was severe enough that both his parents and the attending physician thought he was 
dying.48 
 Ley intervened and “requested to be allowed to give an extract prepared in Calcutta, 
which [was] certainly five times the strength of [those sold in London], and is otherwise 
better.”49 Ley gave two grains of his Calcutta extract rubbed into powder with sugar every two 
hours. Within a few hours, Stephens improved and not only understood what was being said to 
him, but also could show his tongue. He no longer “wished to be turned in bed; the muscles were 
soft” and his knee was capable “of being flexed a little.” While the cannabis relaxed his muscles 
and lessened the intensity of the spasms, it did little to relieve the chest congestion and was 
incapable of lessening his problems breathing. Two days later the “contraction of the muscles of 
the chest” entirely overpowered his breathing and he died “in the same rigid state that the most 
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violent spasm could reduce him to—every muscle had the hardness of a board, and the skin had 
become a copper color.”50 
 It was another case of cannabis use, submitted to the medical profession so that it might 
analyze and weigh the results. It was also one that tended to confirm the conclusion that 
cannabis, while potentially powerful, was a remarkably unpredictable drug with questionable 
efficacy in treating cases of advanced tetanus. Doctors like Ley, however, continued to suggest 
that it could ultimately treat tetanus—even though it rarely, if ever, cured it. Early consensus on 
the topic of cannabis’s power pointed to the idea that the distillations available at the local 
pharmacy had not been properly distilled. That reality, many theorized, was to blame for its 
inconsistency.  
 The Provincial Medical Journal responded by printing the commonly used recipe, 
inspired by O’Shaughnessy, in order to encourage others to improve it. It instructed readers to 
“take of gunjah (finely bruised), four pounds, avoirdupoise; rectified spirit (0.838), five gallons, 
old. M.” Then, they were to macerate the gunjah in “two gallons of the spirit for seven days, and 
strain; mix the two tinctures, and filter.” After boiling the hemp in the remaining two gallons of 
liquor for fifteen minutes, they were to filter again while hot. Lastly, the tinctures were to be 
mixed and distilled. The recipe produced twelve ounces.51   
 In the United States, a young pharmacist named Alexander Duhamel emerged as an early 
supporter of implementing cannabis into everyday medicine. He introduced the substance to an 
annual American pharmaceutical meeting in Philadelphia in November of 1843 and pointed out 
that “for the knowledge we possess of this active remedy,” William O’Shaughnessy was “due the 
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credit of introducing it to the medical public as a valuable therapeutic agent.” He informed the 
gathering that the consensus among physicians, at that moment, was that cannabis served best as 
an anti-convulsive and as a therapy that was sure to ease the symptoms of tetanus, cholera, and 
hydrophobia. Duhamel downplayed the unpredictable side effects and paraphrased 
O’Shaughnessy in noting that cannabis intoxication was “of the most cheerful character, 
producing extatic [sic] happiness, a persuasion of high rank, a sensation of flying, voracious 
appetite, and intense aphrodisiac desire.”52  
 As the medical community called for, American physicians increased their 
experimentation with cannabis. Dr. H.T. Child used cannabis in hydrocephalus—or water on the 
brain—after his initial prognosis of became “very unfavorable.” He used cannabis because it was 
“our duty to do something.” “A most excellent and experienced physician” of New York 
introduced the doctor to cannabis and recommended its use. While it “unquestionably, in several 
cases, proved useful,” it ultimately a failed to effectively treat the disease’s symptoms. His 
conclusion represented an adjustment in expectations. While O’Shaughnessy had perhaps 
overstated cannabis’s power, he rightly argued that it was, in certain circumstances, a valuable 
agent. That was the case especially in lost cause situations where, no rational person could 
expect it to save the patient. It could, however, “strew the path to the tomb with flowers.”53 
 For medical professionals tragically over-reliant on the Materia Medica, the western 
world’s collection of plant-based remedies and their best applications, the community could not 
afford to abandon any substance with the potential to relieve pain. That was why the profession 
continued to call for further experimentation. In a pre-Food and Drug Administration world, 
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where a drug’s value and safety were largely determined through practical trial-and-error, 
cannabis was neither stunningly effective nor particularly dangerous. While it seemed to wildly 
underperform at times, that was largely because Dr. O’Shaughnessy shackled it with unrealistic 
expectations and sold it as a potential cure-all. Even though it did not exceed—or even meet—
the expectations of the American and British medical profession, there was little incentive to stop 
using it. So, physicians continued experimenting with it.  
 Indicative of the profession’s devotion to “further experimentation,” Dr. Wigglesworth—
of Boston—wrote a letter to the Boston Medical Journal in 1845 accompanied by a pound of 
cannabis that had recently been sent to him by William O’Shaughnessy. The doctor found 
cannabis a “very powerful agent in relieving pain,” but did not feel justified “in applying to it all 
the encomiums bestowed by Dr. O’S.” He had no further use for it because he had fallen ill and 
had to close his office. Still, Wigglesworth felt professionally obligated to send a pound of 
cannabis to a medical journal with instructions that if it proved “worthy of notice, to make them 
public.”54 
 In England, Dr. John Conolly, physician at the Hanwell Lunatic Asylum in London, 
wrote in 1846 that “the Indian hemp,” which had been “lately introduced into English practice, 
seems to be a valuable addition to our means of controlling vehement disorders.” Conolly noted 
that, while there was very little Indian hemp in Europe, it had to become “an important article of 
commerce.” English physician Benjamin Barrow wanted more research and better information. 
He suggested in 1847 that “the Cannabis Indica, being one of those drugs, the use of which has 
been, I believe, very limited, and of which little is known” would benefit from greater 
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illumination. He concluded that “it may be interesting to some and useful to others of our 
profession to have a few particulars of the plant and preparations laid before them.”55  
 Dr. Barrow offered his own study for the record. He used cannabis in a case of 
dysmenorrhea, or excessive abdominal cramping during menstruation. He used it on a patient, a 
twenty-six-year old married woman, “of a thin, spare habit, of a naturally feeble condition, and 
who had suffered for some years” from the issue. Barrow had treated her in the past by 
administering “very large doses” of opium and morphine, which ultimately “became so 
obnoxious to [his] patient” that it often caused her to become sick for several days. Considering 
this, Barrow turned to cannabis, his “attention having been directed to this remedy and its use 
recommended, by a valued and professional friend.”56  
 His patient’s experience with cannabis turned out to be an unpleasant one. After receiving 
a heavy dose of the substance, the woman found some relief and had a restless sleep. She awoke 
and had dinner with her family along with a glass of wine. “A degree of incoherence was noted 
by her family during the meal,” the report continued, “and almost immediately afterwards she 
became violently sick and vomited, being at the same time altogether unconscious.” Her 
extremities turned cold and Barrow could not detect a pulse and found her “eyes wide open and 
staring.” The woman’s condition lasted for a quarter of an hour until warm brandy and opium 
brought her back to a relatively stable condition.57 
 Instead of rejecting further use of cannabis, Barrow wrote, “upon all these points of 
interest, and upon the effect with which others have observed to follow the exhibition of 
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cannabis,” he felt it to be a useful test case. He was anxious to learn more and submitted his 
experience to the Provincial Journal. Barrow believed it was “the duty of every man to give to 
his professional brethren the advantage of his experience.” The mounting evidence, proven in 
Barrow’s case and many others, was that cannabis produced bizarre reactions that tended to 
complicate treatments rather than produce cures. In the case of his twenty-six-year-old patient, 
who had previously been treated for painful menstruation (with opium and morphine), cannabis 
caused vomiting and catalepsy—as it had been known to do from previous cases. In Barrow’s 
case, he did not, in fact, note it having any beneficial effect.58 
The Adjustment of Expectations and the Search for the Drug’s Active Agent  
 Further experimentation continued in the United States with mixed results. The Boston 
Medical Surgical Journal reported in 1849, “through the earnest endeavors of Prof. 
O’Shaughnessy, of Calcutta, the extract, a few years since, was extensively prescribed for 
neuralgic diseases, with high expectations.” The uncertainty of the drug, however, continued to 
impede researcher’s efforts and the journal added, “In New England, at least, it was found to be 
nearly if not quite powerless.”59 That cannabis was nearly—if not quite powerless—seemed to be 
the direction early experiments pointed. Yet, the flurry of new experimentations confirmed a 
crucial point O’Shaughnessy had been correct on from the beginning: it caused little, if any, 
harm. In a world filled with disease, there was no reason to eliminate it from practice.  
 In New York City, in 1848, for example, there were 15,919 deaths. 1,161 came as the 
result of premature births and 327 were from suicide and murder. Of the nearly 16,000 deaths, 
7,020 were adults and 8,899 were children; 8,343 were male while 7,576 were female. 11,302 
were native born, 3,949 were Irish, 694 German, 454 English, 141 Scottish, and 68 French. 
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Officials cited typhus fever as one of the major illnesses that plagued the city as it had taken 
1,396 lives. On the other hand, “diseases of the bowels” caused 2,227 deaths and 444 succumbed 
to small pox. There were also 12 cases of poisoning, 7 deaths from hydrophobia, 20 from 
tetanus, and 34 from suicide.60 
 Even when considering the fact that the average physician of the nineteenth century could 
not afford to eliminate tools from his or her kit, there also appeared to be moments of triumph.  
Dr. Isaac Hiester of Reading, Pennsylvania, argued in the summer of 1846 that he had 
successfully used cannabis to treat tetanus. His assertion received widespread attention in 
American newspapers and in English medical journals. The case involved sixteen-year-old Cyrus 
Hassaman, who, while “quarrying stones,” deeply cut his index finger. It seemed to have healed 
after ten days, but then four or five days after that Cyrus felt his jaw stiffening, which was 
accompanied by sharp pains in his chest and neck. Hiester treated him with lye poultice and 
returned the next night to find his symptoms had worsened. Cyrus’s muscles were rigid and 
inflexible, lock jaw had set in, and he suffered from unpredictable spasms.61 
 Hiester considered the case “a fair one for the trial of cannabis Indica” and gave Cyrus 
two grains of resin in liquid form. After the doses the patient became tranquil and was able to 
finally sleep. While he still suffered from the spasms, their intensity noticeably decreased. 
Hiester found that cannabis—along with a dose of morphine—completely arrested his seizures. 
It seemed to be a crucial case confirming cannabis’s potential as an anti-convulsive and 
redeeming O’Shaughnessy’s earlier predictions. It was also true that Hiester coupled cannabis 
with the far more powerful morphine. It was unclear, then, if Hiester simply attributed the 
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powers of morphine to cannabis. Also, few of the cases cited—whether a success of failure—
received any news of follow-up visits or information from prolonged care.62 
 Even though its efficacy in treating tetanus remained unclear, the use of cannabis 
expanded during the 1850s to treat other maladies. Dr. Simpson, of Edinburgh, gave doses of 
cannabis to women experiencing “tedious labor” in the interest of “ascertaining if it possessed 
oxytoxic effect (like Ergot or Rye) in increasing and exciting the parturient action of the uterus.” 
Inspired by Dr. Churchill in London, Dr. Simpson found cannabis to induce labor “very 
remarkably” after “exhibition of the hemp.” He also acknowledged, “far more extensive and 
careful experiments would be required” before a definite opinion could be formed. Louisville’s 
Western Journal of Medicine reprinted Simpson’s trials.63 
 Eight months later, the same publication introduced the work of Dr. Christison, also of 
Edinburgh. Christison found that cannabis “seemed to possess a remarkable power of increasing 
the force of uterine contraction during labor.”64 The author continued, “[Christison] reports, in 
the August number of the Edinburgh Journal of Medical Science, some cases in which it was 
given, with this view, at the Maternity Hospital of Edinburgh.” Christison was otherwise reliant 
on Ergot, a medicinal fungus that decreased bleeding during childbirth. So, he considered 
cannabis to be far superior as it acted faster and more noticeably. The benefit of cannabis in 
issues relating to childbirth and infant care seemed to be confirmed by Charleston, South 
Carolina’s Dr. Gaillard, who reported that he had cured two cases of “the trimus of new-born 
infants” with Indian hemp.65 
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 That cannabis could be useful in child birth was a new angle in the 1850s and, as had 
characterized knowledge of its uses previously, the news quickly traveled abroad. In this case, it 
emerged from Edinburgh, was quickly picked up in London and sent to the United States, where 
it led to experiments in South Carolina. It was a rare moment of unambiguously positive 
cannabis news in the field of medicine.66 
 Those who continued to use it in general practice, however, continued to struggle with 
effectively harnessing its mysterious impact. Dr. George S.D. Anderson of Rapides, Louisiana 
wrote in 1855 that “since the publication of Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s account of the virtues of the 
Indian hemp” it had been used by many respected physicians.” He suggested that it was far too 
powerful a narcotic agent to ignore and urged the profession to continue to test its use in 
practical medicine. Somewhat overestimating the power of cannabis, Anderson argued that just 
because “it was capable of destroying life in not a very large dose” was no reason to discontinue 
its use. For his part, Anderson administered cannabis to a total of six patients, including an infant 
and an eighty-seven-year old woman, who seemed to have overdosed on it and momentarily lost 
her pulse. As a man devoted to the objectivity of his field, Anderson submitted his results 
“without comment.” Still, from what he witnessed, he was convinced “of the extraordinary 
powers of the medicine” and he believed that “in time” cannabis would “become one of our most 
valued and esteemed medicinal agents.”67 
 In the mid-1850s, frustrated with its inability to tame medical cannabis, the profession 
looked to altering the recipes guiding the distillations. The search for the substance’s hidden 
powers had started with the Calcutta experiments when William O’Shaughnessy claimed they 
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could be found in the flower’s resins, but that theory was proven to too simplistic. In one of the 
earliest attempts to revise it, M. De Courtive, a French pharmacy student, presented a thesis on 
cannabis to the School of Pharmacy in Paris in 1848.  His “inquiry was directed by the effects he 
noticed it to produce upon the lunatics at the Bicêtre.” During his lecture, Courtive argued that “a 
resin which he extracted through a complicated process of maceration, and the action of alcohol” 
was undoubtedly the source of cannabis’s strange power. He called the resin “cannabina” and 
claimed that doctors could do more with much less of his extract.68  
 This news excited the medical community, which argued that “if a resin of unvarying 
strength can be fully procured, it will provide us with a most eligible form of administering the 
drug.”69 As time went on, however, Courtive’s experiments, while interesting, could not be 
widely replicated. While Courtive introduced his new theory on the active agent, Andrew 
Robertson, a colleague of William O’Shaughnessy in the Chemistry Department at the 
University of Calcutta, began building on his coworkers’ original recipe. He began by buying 
thirty pounds of cannabis for “the purpose of having its medical qualities fully tested by 
European medical men.”70 
 Dr. Robertson then sent quantities of his improved substance to London, Paris, Berlin, 
Scotland, and to friends in the profession hoping they would experiment with it. He found that 
O’Shaughnessy had heated the alcohol above boiling point, which turned it brown and limited its 
overall impact. Robertson’s mixture, on the other hand, was “deep green” and “gave a grass 
green tincture.” He claimed that the “inactivity” of cannabis in British medicine could be 
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attributed to this unfortunate over-boiling. The experience had been much for Robertson, 
however, and he announced he “did not care about making more” because the process was 
“tedious and troublesome” and he was “tormented by the Excise regulations.”71 
  William Hodgson, an American physician, commented in 1858 that the problem with 
medicinal cannabis was that United States pharmacies “in making the preparation generally 
adopt the proportions of the Dublin Pharmacopeia.” After analyzing a London made tincture, 
Hodgson found that forty percent of the extract consisted of materials that were not soluble in 
alcohol. His comments gave credence to the idea that the unpredictability associated with the 
effects of medicinal cannabis might not be the fault of the plant at all, but rather the result of 
poorly created tinctures. Ultimately, Hodgson’s tincture contained less than thirteen grains per 
fluid ounce instead of the twenty-two outlined in the Dublin Pharmacopeia. He acknowledged 
that the cost of ensuring the purity of the tincture was almost double what it would otherwise be, 
but argued “this ought to be of no moment, compared with the importance of supplying a reliable 
article.” Ultimately, Hodgson’s theories failed to gain traction in the pharmaceutical industry, but 
they highlight the ongoing efforts to make cannabis into “a reliable article” with consistently 
predictable effects.72 
 The history of the many attempts to tame cannabis proved that making the drug a 
standard pharmaceutical was difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In 1860, Tilden and 
Company, of New Lebanon, New York, also claimed they had mastered the art of the cannabis 
tincture. Their product, they averred, would soon be proven the best in the world. The company 
complained that cannabis was “not used as it should be, partly probably from the fact that it has 
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so often proved unreliable.” They, like O’Shaughnessy, Courtive, Robertson, and Hodgson, 
thought they had, once and for all, solved the problem. They had not.73 
 In 1861, William H.H. Githens, an American pharmacist, wrote that “having observed a 
great want of stability in the mixtures of cannabis indica…it occurred to [him] that much more 
elegant preparations might be introduced.” After a series of trials, however, Githens got no closer 
to perfecting the remedy than his predecessors and admitted defeat. William Proctor, Professor at 
the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy, asked in 1860, “is there a reliable test for the active resin 
of Cannabis sativa of the East Indies” so that it could “be satisfactorily and easily ascertained by 
the pharmacist?” Frustrated, he listed the many efforts at perfecting a reliable medicine from the 
resinds, including several of his own tests. He concluded by arguing that the issue had to be 
“made more manifest by further experimentation.”74  
 The state of the western medical profession’s attempt at turning cannabis into a reliable 
drug stood, in 1860, where it had in 1840—with calls for further experimentation. William 
O’Shaughnessy had argued that there should be no hesitation in offering the resin of hemp an 
extensive trial. It is clear from the optimism in his writing that he was fairly certain the 
profession would find that it had extensive curative powers. It seemed apparent in 1860 that it 
did not. On the other hand, it continued to survive as a medicine and physicians prescribed it 
readily and continued to experiment with it. Those days in which it was considered a revelatory 
medicine, however, seemed to have passed. It worked well in arresting seizures and seemed to 
function as a moderately effective pain reliever. These more modest uses of cannabis would 
continue for a long time. It was not until the 1930s that the medical profession entirely gave up 
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on it, and that was only due to the fact that it was criminalized. Had that not happened, it is likely 
that doctors would have, in limited cases, continued to prescribe it as a pain reliever.  
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Chapter Two 
“Adventurous Tasters”: Non-Medicinal Drug Use in Nineteenth Century America 
At the Hôtel Lauzun on the Ȋle Saint-Louis in Paris, a group of men, mostly writers and 
artists, gathered in the 1840s to ingest hashish and extensively note their reactions to it. They 
wore Arabic robes, laced Turkish coffee with significant doses of cannabis, and followed the 
mental distortions the substance brought. Dr. Jacques-Joseph Moreau, a French experimental 
psychiatrist, hosted these narcotic fueled soirees and one of his comrades, author Theophile 
Gautier christened the group “Le Club Des Hachichins” in an article he wrote for the Revue des 
Duex Mondes in 1846. Gautier embodied the boundary pushing spirit of the Hashish Club. After 
publishing Mademoiselle de Maupin in 1835, the story of a transgender opera singer and sword 
aficionado, he settled into the life of a literary, art, and dance critic. 
As a regular member of the Hashish Club, Gautier joined other luminaries like Honorè 
Balzac, Victor Hugo, Alexandre Dumas, Charles Baudelaire, Eugène Delacroix, and Gèrard de 
Nerval. Under the guidance of Dr. Moreau, these literary figures consumed cannabis and 
published the ways in which the substance altered their minds. In doing so, the group operated in 
similar ways to the medical community that simultaneously worked to establish cannabis as a 
mainstream medicine. The Hashish Club, however, existed in a liminal space where hashish, 
experimental psychology, and Romantic literary tropes intersected to define a style of use that 
was neither recreational nor for the sake of the medical record.  
  Both styles of use originated in India and the Middle East. Dr. William O’Shaughnessy 
conducted his experiments with cannabis in Calcutta where he used the substance according to 
the instruction he received from Indian physicians who had experience using it. He then exported 
his findings to London where they were subsequently transmitted to the United States through a 
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transatlantic information exchange. Similarly, Dr. Moreau, once a physician to wealthy French 
travelers, first consumed hashish in Egypt and, upon returning to Paris, he hosted cannabis fueled 
soirees that mirrored the Middle Eastern style of recreational use. In addition to Arabic robes and 
Turkish coffee, the stories subsequently written often included surrealist imagery set in the 
Middle East. Just as O’Shaughnessy appropriated the Eastern style of medicinal cannabis use, 
the Hashish Club coopted a more recreational style that emerged from the same region. 
 A strong transatlantic connection also characterized the dissemination of Moreau’s 
experiments from Paris—just as they had O’Shaughnessy’s from London (via Calcutta).  
The London medical community collected reports of O’Shaughnessy’s Calcutta trials and then 
forwarded them to the United States. The Hashish Club, repeating styles of use learned by 
Moreau in Egypt, published their experiences in the French press; stories that were then 
translated and exported to literary journals in the United States. That more recreational style of 
cannabis experimentation, like the controlled medicinal trials it complemented, similarly became 
a global phenomenon.  
 Soon thereafter, American artists and intellectuals—including Bayard Taylor and 
Fitzhugh Ludlow—experimented recreationally with cannabis and documented the results of 
their experiences in widely read drug confessionals. While these confessionals appealed to the 
reading public, they also functioned as a kind of supplementary text that aided in the vetting of 
new drugs for the medical marketplace. In the process, the confessionals existed on the margins 
of both medicine and literature, which not only offered that style of writing an air of legitimacy, 
but spurred the formation of America’s first recreational cannabis subculture.   
 Historians often view the Hashish Club and the authors it influenced as colorful asides in 
the history of cannabis use in Europe and the United States. A closer look, however, reveals their 
57 
 
works to be important accompaniments to the practice of medicine. The authors, who viewed 
their endeavors as fundamentally scientific, explored the psychological effects of cannabis in 
seemingly more thorough ways than mainstream medicine allowed. Indeed, Dr. Moreau 
eventually published a work exploring the possibility of using cannabis to better understand 
mental illness.  Believing hashish induced the common symptoms associated with “madness,” 
Moreau utilized the confessionals to gain a more psychologically acute knowledge of the origins 
of mental disease. In an era before centralized agencies governed the vetting of new drugs for the 
medical marketplace, the testing of new narcotics remained highly decentralized and the 
boundaries separating controlled laboratory experiments from those conducted by laymen were 
incredibly elastic.  
 Indicating the extent of the interconnectedness between the literary and medical texts 
regarding cannabis in America, the popularity of the hashish confessionals rose and fell with 
medical cannabis. From the 1840s-1860s, as the profession suggested cannabis had broad healing 
powers, the public embraced tales of hashish hallucinations and they continued to gain popularity 
within the literary community. After the Civil War, as the profession concluded that cannabis 
was too unpredictable to become a reliable and widely applied treatment, the popularity of the 
hashish confessional similarly waned. Indeed, the two movements were inextricably linked and, 
for a period, provided a holistic view of cannabis’s powers—one from the medical community 
and the other from a Bohemian subculture that continually crossed the boundaries of what 
constituted scientific experimentation.  
The Origins of Recreational Drug Use in Europe and the United States 
 Dr. Jacques-Joseph Moreau did not invent the modern drug confessional nor could he be 
credited with creating the conditions that inspired it. That honor went to Thomas De Quincey, 
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who published the essays that led to his epic novella Confessions of an English Opium Eater in 
1821, over two decades before the first meeting of the Hashish Club in Paris. De Quincey’s work 
followed a simple style—it recounted the horrors of addiction, oftentimes in a wild romantic 
narrative, and then concluded with a tale of recovery, stability, and a restoration of sanity. That 
style, in many ways, resembled the confessions of Christian literature, especially those of St. 
Augustine.1 
 The writings that emerged from the Hashish Club in Paris, which inspired emulators in 
the United States, had deep historical roots. The impulse to sin, confess, and pursue a path of 
repentance was not a groundbreaking concept in western society. De Quincey cast sin in his story 
as opium addiction and meticulously detailed his dependency for the benefit of others. Although 
it was a simple concept, De Quincey knew his work had the potential for causing controversy 
and so and he proceeded cautiously. “I present you, courteous reader, with the record of a 
remarkable period of my life,” he wrote. Like the stories of addiction that would follow it, and 
continue into present day, De Quincey wanted his work to be more than just an entertaining read. 
Indeed, he imagined it becoming a helpful source for others suffering from similar maladies. It 
was “in that hope” that he wrote his Confessions. De Quincey continued “and that must be my 
apology for breaking through the delicate and honourable reserve, which, for the most part, 
restrains us from the public exposure of our own errors and infirmaries.”2  
His novella elevated the Romantic Era focus on the self to even greater heights than it 
had already been lifted. It was a memoir, but not one of a hero or a public servant. Rather, it 
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painted a detailed and unique portrait of a social menace, one of the west’s first anti-heroes. De 
Quincey mastered the tightrope walk between remorse and a heedless offering of the lurid details 
of addiction. Indeed, the author acknowledged he fully understood that nothing was “more 
revolting to English feelings” than an individual who willingly spoke about his “moral ulcers or 
soars.” He noted that a large number of those sorts of stories were often told by “demireps, 
adventurers, or swindlers.” That, De Quincey assured his readers, was not his intention. He 
wanted to offer a realist glimpse of addiction. His story, however, would be one of triumph—just 
like St. Augustine’s—in which a broken man found renewal and grace.3 
De Quincey’s novella influenced the Hashish Club, whose members read his work 
extensively and used it as a resource in writing their mid-nineteenth century hashish 
confessionals. In Charles Baudelaire’s Artificial Paradises, first published in 1860, the author 
paid homage to De Quincey’s groundbreaking work. He, Gautier, and a small group of other 
French writers had, by then, become known as “The Second Romantics” and they seemed to 
have widely discussed Confessions of an English Opium Eater. Baudelaire not only sent his 
friend Gustave Flaubert a copy of his own work on hashish, but also recommended De Quincey. 
Flaubert responded, “I must especially thank you for introducing me to Mr. De Quincey, a 
charming man! How likable he is!”4  
Baudelaire informed his mother that he planned to introduce a French translation of De 
Quincey’s work, writing that “The Opium Eater is a new translation of a magnificent author who 
is not yet know in Paris.” Baudelaire had a publishing contract with the Moniteur, but the editors 
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balked after receiving the first translations. Baudelaire told his mother that “the bizarre nature of 
the work frightens them.” After many rejections, which led the author into a lengthy depression, 
and battles with publishers over space and content, his translation was finally published in 1858.5 
Although De Quincey’s work had been controversial in the 1820s—and also in 1850s 
Paris—the public ultimately accepted it as a significant contribution to literature. Like the works 
of the Hashish Club, the medical community viewed De Quincey’s work as a potential resource; 
one that, through artful healing, offered medical and psychological insights that might prove 
useful to average physicians. The American Medical Recorder wrote in July of 1822 that “when 
we first glanced at this production, we considered the title as a mere vehicle, through which some 
romantic or satirical tale was to be conveyed.” After reading it, however, the journal decided its 
initial perception had been “erroneous, and that these confessions bore intrinsic marks of 
authenticity.”6 
The literary community similarly praised De Quincey’s work. The North American 
Review argued in 1824 that “we believe that very few persons, if any, in this country, abandon 
themselves to the use of opium as a luxury; nor does there appear to be any great danger of the 
introduction of this species of intemperance.” It described the author’s work to American 
audiences for the first time, noting “it abounds in fantastical and splendid images, and is 
interspersed with descriptions of great beauty and magnificence, and with detached thoughts and 
expressions of singular force and felicity.” Confessions of an English Opium Eater became one 
of the first literary works to have crossover appeal within the medical profession.7 
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The American Medical Recorder (Philadelphia), Vol. 5, Iss. 3, July 1822. 
7 “Art. IV.—Confessions of an English Opium-Eater,” The North American Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 42 (January 1824):  
190.  
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 It fit neatly within the literary styles that dominated the period and Confessions would 
eventually be considered a classic text of the Romantic period. On the other hand, it had genre-
defying characteristics. The work veered into Gothic horror in the same manner that Mary 
Shelley did with Frankenstein, published just two years earlier in England. De Quincey’s work 
could also be considered a staple of the Dark Romantic style, a genre it contributed to—
interestingly—as a memoir. Indeed, the author often presented himself as a Frankenstein-like 
character; part gentlemanly scholar, traveler, artist, junkie, degenerate. His work mixed romantic 
and transcendental imagery with filthy dankness, lust, night sweats, and amorality, ultimately 
propelling it into a stark originality unusual for the time.8 
 Consequently, British and American readers accepted it as a near instant classic. It also 
continued to cross the boundaries that traditionally separated science from the art world. In 1829, 
The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal printed an article entitled “Opium Eaters—From Mr. 
Madden’s Travels in Turkey.” The writer, Mr. Madden, claimed he had “heard so many 
contradictory reports of the sensations produced by [opium]” that he “resolved to know the truth, 
and accordingly took [his] seat in the coffee-house, with half a dozen Theriakis.” He then 
recounted his experience in the style of Thomas De Quincey. Those around him, who had 
already ingested the substance, “were frightful: and spoke incoherently.” Their “features were 
flushed, their eyes had an unnatural brilliancy, and the general expression of their countenance 
was horribly wild.”9 
 
8 See: Tim Fulford, Debbie Lee, and Peter J. Kitson, Literature, Science and Exploration in the Romantic Era  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Robin Jarvis, The Romantic Period: the Intellectual and Cultural 
Context of English Literature, 1789-1830 (London and New York: Routledge, 2004); Michael Gamer, Romanticism 
and the Gothic: Genre, Reception, and Canon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Lois Peters Agnew, 
Thomas De Quincey: British Rhetoric’s Romantic Turn (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 2012); Daniel Sanjiv Roberts, Revisionary Gleam: De Quincey, Coleridge, and the High Romantic Argument 
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000).  
9 “IV. Opium Eaters. From Mr. Madden’s Travels in Turkey,” The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 
32 (September 22, 1829): 123.  
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 Mr. Madden’s narrative was an unusual contribution to a prestigious medical journal and 
it highlighted the extent to which Confessions had captured the imagination of the profession. 
Madden continued describing his experience and noted that his “faculties appeared enlarged” and 
everything he “looked at seemed increased in volume.” He no longer had “the same pleasure” 
when he closed his eyes as he did when they were open. It seemed to him that his mind turned 
“external objects” into “images of pleasure.” “In short,” he wrote, “it was the faint exquisite 
music of a dream” but in a “waking moment.” He left the Turkish opium parlor and made his 
way home as quickly as he could, “dreading, at every step” that he might be capable of 
committing “some extravagance.” As he walked, Mr. Madden barely noticed his feet touching 
the ground and he immediately went to bed where “the most extraordinary visions of delight 
filled [his] brain all night.” In the morning he arose “pale and dispirited,” his head ached, and he 
remained on the sofa for the entire day, “dearly paying for [his] first essay at opium eating.”10  
 The medical community heavily relied on the use of opium and, as a result, became 
specialists in managing the addictions it created. In an article titled “Autopsy of an Opium 
Eater,” also published by the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, Dr. M.S. Perry, in 1835, 
examined a seventy-seven-year-old woman. She was, according to a medical history obtained 
from her friends, “of nervous temperament, but enjoyed good health.” Her medical treatment 
began after an attack of pleurisy, an inflammation of the tissues that line the lung and chest 
cavity, which caused a serious and persistent cough. She was eventually prescribed opium. For 
nine years prior to her death, she increased her opium use to fifteen, twenty, and sometimes even 
thirty grains per day. Before her death, the woman locked herself in her bedroom for weeks at a 
time and often replaced food and water with thirty grains of opium each night. Her attending 
 
10 “IV. Opium Eaters. From Mr. Madden’s Travels in Turkey,” 123. 
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physician noted she could not live without that level of opium and screamed until she received 
it.11  
 To professionals perplexed by opiate addiction, De Quincey’s work offered a guidebook. 
In some cases, journals directly cited Confessions. The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 
argued that, for those who had “accustomed themselves” to the use of opium, it was possible for 
them to increase the amount of the drug until they could ultimately “swallow enough to destroy 
three lives under ordinary circumstances.” An American, Dr. Smith, reported that on a visit to 
Turkey he saw individuals ingesting between three and six drachms of opium regularly. “It was 
about this portion,” he contended, “that an individual took who has acquired considerable 
celebrity in this country, from his publication of a little volume which was entitled ‘Confessions 
of an English Opium Eater.’”12 
 The journal reported that, in Confessions, De Quincey took 320 grains of opium once a 
week and that he typically ingested the bulk of those doses on Saturday nights before the opera. 
The opium, according to De Quincey’s telling, enhanced the music in profound ways. The 
author’s gradual elevation of doses, however, led to a more formidable addiction. “One sensation 
which he describes,” the author of the article continued, “I myself have felt when obliged to have 
recourse to opium for the alleviation of pain, and which likewise I have heard others allude to, 
namely, the singular lengthening out of time, so that a single night appears to have been of years’ 
duration.” The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal concluded by arguing that De Quincey’s 
portrait of addiction could be confirmed by science. The journal confidently informed its readers 
 
11 M.S. Perry, “Autopsy of an Opium Eater,” The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 20  
(December 23, 1835): 319.  
12 “Opium,” The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal (1828-1851); Boston Vol. 16, March 1, 1837: 55.  
64 
 
that “these are not the imaginary sufferings of a romance writer,” but rather the “inconceivable 
sensations” that many other patients had attributed to opium use.13 
 The medical community found De Quincey’s prose convincing. De Quincey did, indeed, 
provide glimpses into the agony of long-term dependency. The author claimed that “during the 
last two months” of his addiction, he slept “much in the daytime and was apt to fall into transient 
dozings at all hours.” The sleep, however, was not restorative, but rather more disturbing than 
the time he spent awake.  
Besides the tumultuousness of my dreams (which were not only so awful as those which I 
shall have to describe hereafter as produced by opium), my sleep was never more than 
what is called dog-sleep; so that I could hear myself moaning, and was often, as it seemed 
to me, awakened suddenly by my own voice; and, about this time, a hideous sensation 
began to haunt me as soon as I fell into a slumber. 
 
Later, De Quincey argued, “this is the doctrine of the true church on the subject of opium: of 
which church I acknowledge myself to be the only member—the alpha and omega; but then it is 
to be recollected, that I speak from the ground of a large and profound personal experience.” 
This made him, according to the author himself, far more knowledgeable on the issue of the 
subject than medical practitioners. “Even those who have written expressly on the materia 
medica, make it evident, from the horror they express of it, that their experimental knowledge of 
its action is none at all.” De Quincey understood his work to be a medical trial of sorts, one in 
which the educated user of substances rose above the classically trained practitioner. That 
instinct mirrored the spirit of the times, which exhibited an almost total faith in experimentation 
over detached theory. That instinct, of course, guided O’Shaughnessy’s trials and inspired the 
Hashish Club in Paris decades later.14 
 
13 “Opium,” The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, March 1, 1837: 55. 
14 Thomas De Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium Eater (New York: John B. Alden Press, Publisher, 1885).  
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Not only did De Quincey’s work provide important context for the medical community, it 
also inspired other writers to follow in his footsteps. In 1839, The New Yorker published excerpts 
of his novella.15 Soon after, William Blair, an unknown writer, penned an article titled “An 
Opium Eater in America.” He emulated De Quincey’s signature style: “before I state the results 
of my experience as an opium-eater, it will perhaps not be uninteresting, and it certainly will 
conduce to the clearer understanding of such statement, if I give a slight and brief sketch of my 
habits and history previous to my first indulgence in the infernal drug which imbittered [sic] my 
existence for seven most weary years.” According to the story, the young man sailed to New 
York from England in hopes of becoming a writer, but he failed to find work. Depressed, he 
began to drink and take opium. He was then offered $2,000—or roughly $62,000 adjusted for 
inflation—to write “Passages from the Life of an Opium Eater,” an indication of how well De 
Quincey’s work had sold in the market. While attempting to begin the project, however, he 
discovered he could not write and so he remained in Brooklyn until November of 1841, at which 
point he moved into the city where he lived in “great poverty” and was “frequently unable to 
procure dinner” as the few dollars he did receive all went to supplying himself with opium. 
“Whether I now shall be able to leave off opium,” he wrote, “God only knows!”16 
An unnamed man, writing for Colton’s admitted that his “imagination was once so 
kindled by the perusal of a little book called the ‘Opium Eater,’” that he purchased from the 
 
15 “Confessions of an English Opium Eater (An Extract from the Life of a Scholar), The New Yorker, Vol. 7, Iss. 19  
(July 27, 1839): 296; The New Yorker, Vol. 7, Iss. 20 (August 3, 1839): 311; The New Yorker, Vol. 7, Iss. 21 
(August 10, 1839): 323; The New Yorker, Vol. 7, Iss. 22 (August 17, 1839): 341; The New Yorker, Vol. 7, Iss. 23 
(August 24, 1839): 357; The New Yorker, Vol. 7, Iss. 24 (August 31, 1839): 373; The New Yorker, Vol. 7, Iss. 24 
(September 7, 1839): 391; “Confessions of an Opium Eater, in America,” The Age and Lancaster and Chester 
County Weekly Gazette, August 6, 1842, 1.  
16 William Blair, “An Opium Eater in America,” The Knickerbocker; or New York Monthly Magazine, Vol. 20, Iss. 
1 (July 1842): 47.  
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apothecary “two enormous doses of the precious drug.” The author of the piece then engaged the 
subject of drug addiction in that wild prose poetry innovated by De Quincey:  
Thence again I emerged, with the placidity and power of Neptune over his troubled 
realm, and driving my watery team over the excited bosom of the ocean, harmonized its 
elements into the deep bass it sustained in the bursting anthem of the infant world. And 
then with the fleetness of a disembodied spirit, I seemed to float around just between the 
incumbent circle of the blue heaven and the sea, discerning within upon the surging plain 
the motion of innumerable ships skimming the wave with the lightness of the swallow, 
while without the circle I beheld, far down in the twilight and lurid gloom of an 
immeasurable gulf, the wrecks of worn out worlds.” 
 
 The idea that deep personal experience with opiate addiction had medical value began to 
prevail. In 1844, J. Root wrote a book entitled “The Horrors of Delirium Tremens.” The 
Columbian Lady’s and Gentleman’s Magazine argued that “if the author had contented himself 
with an exposition, derived from his personal experience, of the remarkable phenomenon 
attendant upon that temporary insanity which is caused by excess of cerebral stimulants, he 
might have produced a work which would be read with as much of pleased curiosity as the 
celebrated ‘Confessions of an English Opium Eater,’ by De Quincey.” Instead, the author chose 
to “overlay his narrative with a mass of psychological and theological speculation.” In other 
words, Root had simply studied delirium tremens. He had not lived the horror of withdrawals 
from alcohol like De Quincey had opium. As such, the periodical considered him something of a 
charlatan. In that particular case, actual expertise in the field, gained through experience, was 
cast as the promotion of unscientific analysis. In many cases, firsthand experience seemed to 
matter more than an actual education in the matter being discussed.17 
 
17 “Miscellany: Effects of Opium—Teriakis, or Opium Eaters—An Experiment with the Drug—Its Effects on the 
Imagination—Grandeur and Horror of its Dreams,” The Vermont Mercury (Rutland, Vermont), October 18, 1839, 2; 
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 In the spring and summer of 1845, De Quincey published a sequel to his famous work 
entitled Suspiria de Profundis—or “Sighs from the Depths”—and it began circulating through 
literary journals just as his original masterwork had. These new essays would be considered as 
equally powerful as their 1822 precedents. At the same time, the drug confessional engrained 
itself in European and American society more fully. A Manchester, England paper argued that 
“the practice of eating opium was surrounded with so poetical a halo by the two great opium 
eaters Coleridge and De Quincey that some years ago it threatened to become rooted in our 
universities among all those inspiring youths who affected the character of men of genius.” As 
medical journals printed quasi-confessionals in the interest of gaining a more thorough 
education, British and American youth experimented with it to experience that Romantic 
intoxication the author had so powerfully described.18 
 De Quincey’s appeal, then, was not without consequences. While his work provided 
needed context, at times, for the medical community, it also seemed to inspire a recreational use 
of opium that had the potential of exacting grave consequences. Opium could cause premature 
death and there were numerous tragedies to point to even in the early-1800s. That reality 
somewhat challenged the romance of De Quincey’s experimentation. Charles Wheedon, for 
example, was a London papermaker who died suddenly at the age of forty-two years old from an 
opium overdose. T. Fardon, a chemist on Stone Street, admitted he had known the man and that 
he usually bought a pennyworth of opium every three or four days. Wheedon had been in the day 
before his death, however, and asked for a pennyworth of “the old sort.” Fardon “remarked 
jocosely that he was extravagant” as he filled the order. The coroner’s verdict was “death from 
 
18 “Opium Eating in Scotland,” Manchester Weekly Times and Examiner, August 31, 1847, 1. 
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an overdose of opium, taken without any criminal intent.” These kinds of incidences were 
commonplace in the early-to-mid nineteenth century.19 
 Similarly, Thomas Bowyer, a forty-two-year-pensioner who had served the East India 
Company for twenty-seven years, died at Mason’s Arms, “a small beerhouse” in London. 
Bowyer, who had served honorably in the war in Afghanistan, “drank some hard cider with an 
old soldier, and while there, he took some opium from a paper, put it in his mouth, chewed it, 
and then called for water to wash it down.” He then laid his head on the table of the bar as if he 
had fallen asleep and “suddenly fell to the ground a corpse.” These men represented the reality of 
drug addiction in England and the United States far more than Thomas De Quincey did.20 
 Opium had become a complicated phenomenon by the 1820s and 1830s. It eased pain 
more reliably than any other available drug on the market and was, in that context, a saving grace 
to those employed in the art of the suffering public. On the other hand, that power came with 
consequences—ones felt by Charles Wheedon, Thomas Bowyer, and their loved ones. Unlike 
Thomas De Quincey, they did not survive their addictions and could not use them as examples of 
an unfortunate past ultimately redeemed (which, in De Quincey’s case, had become a very 
lucrative story). There were far more tragedies than there were tales of redemption, which was a 
fact that may have, in part, led to the popularity of Confessions. It offered hope that addiction 
could be overcome and that a normal life could once again be restored. De Quincey had been 
able to return from a wrecked state when many others seemed incapable of such a triumphant 
return.21 
 
19 “Sudden Death of an Opium Eater,” The Morning Post (London), April 15, 1847, 1.  
20 “Sudden Death of an Opium Eater,” The New Castle Weekly Courant, September 1, 1847, 2.  
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The members of the Hashish Club worked in the shadows of De Quincey’s monumental 
writings and they knew it. His work, a masterpiece of the romantic period, became one of the 
first novellas to directly influence the practice of medicine and its immediate dissemination of tto 
France and the United States indicated the early presence of the transatlantic connection crucial 
in spreading cannabis knowledge in the middle of the nineteenth century. Confessions of an 
English Opium Eater paved the way for Dr. Moreau, his subjects, and for the Americanization of 
the genre, which reached its peak with the publication of Fitzhugh Ludlows The Hasheesh Eater 
in 1858.   
Dr. Moreau’s experiments with cannabis, conducted in the latter two decades of De 
Quincey’s life, continued the tradition of obfuscating the lines separating art and science. On the 
other hand, Moreau’s medical education and interest in the psychological origins of 
hallucinations distinguished his work from De Quincey’s. Indeed, Moreau’s interests were 
unabashedly scientific and continued his important work on the psychological origins of mental 
distortions. Yet, Moreau, even more than De Quincey, facilitated the literary exploration of drugs 
by organizing and hosting the Hashish Club in Paris’s Left Bank. De Quincey may have inspired 
the first moments of crossover between the two communities, but Moreau redefined the 
interactions by hosting relatively controlled experiments with cannabis using the most prominent 
writers in Paris at the time.  
Charles Baudelaire’s description of Moreau’s trials offer a unique view of the privileged 
world in which the doctor conducted his work. Baudelaire rented a room in the Hotel Lauzun, the 
Hashish Club’s headquarters, and described the rooms as “noble lodgings” being “worthy of 
Lords.” He chose one of the establishment’s smaller rooms, which had very high ceilings and a 
nice “view of the wide green river” from the window. The wallpaper, patterned red and black, 
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“perfectly matched the antique Damask curtains that fell in heavy folds to the floor.” Baudelaire 
had an “immense table of walnut and several armchairs of oak;” an entire series of Delacroix’s 
Hamlet lithographs; a large collection of Latin and Roman poets; and a shelf of Rhine wine. 
Baudelaire wrote that the back portion of the hotel “was illuminated by the light of several 
suspended lamps” and that the wood panel walls were lavishly decorated with antique paintings. 
The ceilings were “rounded into a cupola” and painted with “allegorical figures.”22 
Far from the dank milieu in which De Quincey descended into opium addiction, the 
members of the Hashish Club created an environment of art, privilege, and experimentation. In 
one account, as Baudelaire approached the back of the downstairs room in which the club met, 
uncharacteristically late to a meeting, his friends greeted him warmly as he stepped into the light. 
Dr. Moreau stood next to a “buffet of oak, upon which rested a tray crowded with porcelain 
saucers.” The doctor then offered the guests a “small morsel of Oriental hashish” from a crystal 
glass. After the drug had been fully ingested, the doctor offered coffee “in the Arab manner; that 
is to say, with marc, and without sugar.”23 
Reports of Moreau’s eccentric gatherings spread quickly. A New York periodical 
exclaimed, “amongst several subjects of scientific inquiry in France, placed for the meantime in 
abeyance by the revolution of February, one of the most remarkable was the peculiar influence of 
certain drugs upon the human mind, and the alterations which they produce upon the perceptive 
powers, the imagination, and reason.” It continued, “whilst discussing the nature of 
eccentricities, or fantasias, and illusions, [Moreau] was led to describe the singular power of a 
drug, the produce of the Indian Hemp, called Hashish.” The drug, it continued, led to an 
 
22 Charles Baudelaire, Artificial Paradises (New York: Citadel Press, 1996), 12.  
23 Ibid.  
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“awakening in the mind a train of phenomena of the most extraordinary character, entrancing the 
senses in delicious reveries, and modifying the organic sensibility.”24  
Dr. Moreau used the experiences to write his widely regarded 1845 book, Du l’hachisch 
et de l’aliènation mentale, which translated to Hashish and Mental Illness. In the work, he 
explored the idea that cannabis could be used to induce a form of mental illness that offered 
insight into the origins of psychological disturbance. By the 1840s, Moreau had situated himself  
on the cutting edge of experimental psychology and his extracurricular activities at the Hotel 
Lauzun proved it. The doctor also inspired many of his students and colleagues to try cannabis. 
A relatively obscure American periodical, The Albion, noted that “so invitingly did [Moreau] 
paint the nature of the new impressions which arose from its use, that in a short time all the 
physicians and medical students were indulging in doses of the new addition to the charms of 
life.”25 
While Moreau’s work impacted the Parisian medical community, the recently published 
writings of the authors who served as his subjects circulated through the literary world. In 1849, 
a Vermont paper noted that “public attention” had recently turned towards cannabis and that, 
“particularly in France, since 1846,” there had been strong interest in hashish. It reported that 
French authors had “published memoirs on the subject” and closed with an extensive sampling of 
Gautier’s writings. In it, Gautier claimed that within a few minutes after taking the drug “it 
appeared to him that his body was dissolved, that he had become transparent” and that he clearly 
saw in his chest “the hashish, under the form an emerald.” Due to the transatlantic exchange that 
brought De Quincey to the United States, Gautier’s audience expanded from the Left Bank of 
 
24 “The Hashish,” The Albion, a Journal of News, Politics, and Literature, Vol. 7, Iss. 52 (December 23, 1848): 614.  
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Paris to include rural Vermont. He, like De Quincey, O’Shaughnessy, and Moreau, had gone 
global.26 
As Americans read translations of Gautier’s work, French physicians copied the 
unconventional style of Moreau’s cannabis trials. In 1850, the Scientific American pulished an 
article titled “Curious Drugs for Producing Hallucination.” The piece featured an unnamed 
French physician who, instead of conducting his work in a laboratory, “went to a familiar Café, 
selected his subjects” and gave them each one grain of cannabis. The doctor overseeing this 
peculiar trial then dissolved another grain of cannabis in a glass of Curacoa, a liqueur flavored 
with dried citrus peels, and gave it to “the master of the house.” The man had two “young and 
handsome daughters” who he forbade “to taste of the drug.”27  
The French doctor featured in the article epitomized this newer style of uncontrolled 
experimentation. Whereas O’Shaughnessy and Moreau kept their work confined to closed 
spaces, this physician went public. He randomly selected participants from a café and then 
administered cannabis on site. His work created a few moments of very public mayhem. The 
“the youngest daughter, for whom the owner of the café forbade from cannabis use, ultimately 
“tasted of the forbidden fruit,” which caused her to sink into a “delirium” accompanied by 
“hysterical movements of a very alarming appearance.” Her “shrieks” were “rapid, most violent” 
and she appeared only half-conscious of her condition, imploring those around her “not to 
conclude that she was mad.” As the doctor led the troubled girl to bed, the men in the café began 
having similar fits. One man, who had otherwise remained poised, began laughing hysterically 
before rolling “up on the floor” and proclaiming he felt as if he was rising to heaven. Another 
individual simply fell asleep standing up. Later, the benches were arranged around the café for 
 
26 “The Hashish,” Vermont Watchman and State Journal, May 31, 1849, 1.  
27 “Curious Drugs for Producing Hallucination,” The Scientific American, Vol. 5, Iss. 30 (April 13, 1850): 237.  
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“the slain” to rest on and they fell into “delightful dreams, producing strange laughter” which 
ultimately “repaid the adventurous tasters for their curiosity.”28   
The experiments in the French café introduced an unusual methodology that deviated 
quite significantly from established scientific norms. The Scientific American, withholding 
judgement, instead transitioned into the ways in which “Hindoos” used the substance. “A man 
under [cannabis’s] influence looks like a madman,” the periodical argued, and expressed himself 
by “dancing, singing, shouting, and tossing his arms.” These individuals claimed to use the 
substance because “it made them forget all their pains and fatigue.” Like other publications, the 
magazine warned against excessive use and suggested that cannabis could be “dangerous to 
sanity and health, as is the use of all unnatural stimulants.” It concluded with a balanced 
perspective, “in commenting upon any subject, authors and editors should always have a moral 
in view—to warn where there is danger, to encourage where this hope.”29 
In many ways, this new style of experimentation confirmed the results of work carried 
out by American and European physicians in testing the medical viability of cannabis by 
showing how dramatically unpredictable the drug could be. The behavior of the individuals in 
the café would not have surprised William O’Shaughnessy or the multitude of physicians who 
worked to corroborate his findings. These revolutionary experiments also maintained an aura of 
scientific validity. In the café, a physician oversaw the lacing of the drinks and the periodical 
reporting on the events that transpired promoted the results as valuable medical evidence. The 
magazine’s conclusion that all use of the drug should have a “moral” objective provided a loose 
criterion for experimentation. Moreau, the Hashish Club, and the French doctor working in the 
café certainly had objectives—even if they pursued them in unconventional ways.  
 
28 “Curious Drugs for Producing Hallucination,” The Scientific American, April 13, 1850.  
29  Ibid.  
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The literary descriptions of the effects of cannabis offered a far more thorough view of 
the substance’s impact on the mental faculties, which benefited physicians like Moreau. In 
Artificial Paradises, Baudelaire wrote:  
This giddy cheer, poignant or languid by turns, this uneasy joy, this insecurity, this 
permutation of the malady, generally lasts but for a short time. Soon the links that bind 
your ideas become so frail, the thread that ties your conceptions so tenuous, that only 
your accomplices understand you. And here again you cannot be completely certain; 
perhaps they only think they understand you, and the illusion is reciprocal. These 
outbursts of loud cries and laughter, which resembles explosions, seem like true madness, 
or at least like the ravings of a madman, to all those who are not similarly intoxicated. 
Likewise will wisdom, good sense, and the logical thoughts of the sober, prudent 
observer, delight and amuse you like a particular form of dementia. The roles are 
reversed. His detachment drives you to the extremes of sarcastic mockery. Now is this 
not really a mysteriously comic situation, when a man is moved to incomprehensible 
mirth by a person whose condition differs from his own. The lunatic pities the sane man, 
and henceforth the idea of his own superiority begins to dawn on his intellect’s horizon. 
Soon it will explode like a meteor. 
These narratives enabled Moreau’s pursuit of deeper insights into how cannabis induced a 
momentary sense of mental illness. In Moreau’s world, that larger scientific objective placed 
Baudelaire’s work within the realm of science. The nature of the subject and the artistic prose, 
however, also allowed it to double as literature.30 
 Indeed, Baudelaire focused on the gulf cannabis created between the mind of an 
individual under the influence of and one not. Baudelaire wrote, “I once witnessed a scene of this 
sort, pushed to extremes, the grotesque aspect of which was only intelligible to those who knew 
of, or at least had heard of, the substance and the enormous varieties of effect it can produce even 
on two supposedly equal intellects.”31 Baudelaire’s story involved a famous musician, “who was 
unfamiliar with hashish and who, perhaps, knew nothing of it even by name.” The subject 
arrived at a party where almost everyone “was under [Cannabis’s] sway.” Those at the party tried 
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to educate the man, who refused to listen and, instead, “smiled graciously, obligingly, upon 
hearing these fantastic accounts, like a man willing to be tolerant for a moment.” Those “whose 
wits had been sharpened by the poison quickly sensed his scorn” and began laughing. Their 
laughter “wounded him” and the “wild demonstrations of mirth and joy, the altered 
countenances, the strings of puns, the whole dissolute atmosphere of the place irritated him” and 
he confronted them. “Amusement,” however, “like lightning, flashed over their faces” and they 
laughed harder.32 
 Cannabis, in crucial ways that De Quincey’s opium could not, did seem to offer a 
window into hallucination, delusion, and, more generally, the underlying phenomenon of mental 
illness. The musician in Baudelaire’s story recognized the disparity in reasoning caused by the 
substance and shouted “this extravagance may be good for you, but it doesn’t suit me in the 
least” to which they replied “it suits us, that’s all that matters.” The musician could not tell 
whether they “were truly mad or merely simulating madness,” but he nonetheless decided to 
leave. He quickly found that they had locked the door and removed the key. One of the 
partygoers then dropped to one knee in front of the musician and apologized profusely. 
Ultimately, he agreed to stay and play the violin for them, but several of the attendants began to 
cry and he became frightened.33 
The Americanization of the Drug Confessional  
 By the 1850s, American writers began to produce hashish confessionals that maintained 
the surrealist imagery outlined by the French. In April of 1854, Putnam’s Monthly published “A 
Vision of Hasheesh,” written by poet and essayist Bayard Taylor. Like so many English and 
French writers, Taylor became fascinated with the Middle East and Asia and travelled to Syria in 
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the 1840s, a decade after Jacques Joseph Moreau accompanied wealthy French tourists there. 
Taylor’s travels resulted in journalistic accounts of his time spent in Europe. In 1846, he 
published a collection of articles entitled Views Afoot, or Europe Seen with Knapsack and Staff. 
He did not reach widespread attention, however, until he arrived in Syria, which led to a flurry of 
publications: A Journey to Central Africa; or, Life and Landscapes from Egypt to the Negro 
Kingdoms of the White Nile, The Lands of the Saracen; or pictures of Palestine, Asia Minor, 
Sicily, and Spain, both published in 1854. His most significant work that year, however, was “A 
Vision of Hasheesh,” a short essay about a respite in Damascus, where he sampled hashish.  
 His story began with the purchase of the substance from “a dark Egyptian,” who spoke 
“only lingua franca of the East.” After securing the drug, he took it back to the hotel to share 
with his friends. It was difficult for Taylor to remember when it overtook him, but he recalled 
that “the sense of limitation—of the confinement of our senses within the bounds of our own 
flesh and blood—instantly fell away.” Consequently, “the walls” of Taylor’s frame “burst 
outward and tumbled into ruin.” As Taylor’s visions turned more ominous, they resembled that 
fall into despair described so articulately by De Quincey.34 
 The hashish confessionals typically recounted the story of a single night and did not 
include the ongoing and long-term degradation of the body like De Quincey. They rather focused 
on a momentary overthrow of the mind. The visions, which could certainly turn nightmarish, 
were also far more surreal and shorter lived. They were sudden hallucinations more than 
experiences derived from entrenched addiction. Taylor believed his body had turned into “a mass 
of transparent jelly, and a confectioner poured [him] into a twisted mould.” He struggled to free 
himself, but like so many others who had taken cannabis and reported their experiences, seemed 
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to straddle two realities. He noted that “the sober half of me went into fits of laughter” at the 
absurdity of the visions. Simultaneously, however, he realized the visions were quite real and it 
struck him with horror. Taylor then claimed to laugh until his eyes overflowed with tears and 
“every tear that dropped, immediately became a large loaf of bread, and tumbled upon the shop-
board of a baker in the bazaar of Damascus.”35 
 Taylor’s confessions borrowed heavily from both De Quincey and the works that 
emerged from the Hashish Club. His work mirrored Baudelaire’s in its focus on two realities—
the sober versus the inebriated. In the process, Taylor’s writing also overlapped with the 
scientific themes of hallucination and mental illness that Dr. Moreau explored throughout his 
career. Even more imaginatively unmoored from reality than the Hashish Club, Taylor claimed 
to believe he was floating over the desert in “a barque made of mother of pearl…studded with 
jewels of lasting lustre.” The sand was made of grains of gold and the “air was radiant with 
excess of light, though no sun was to be seen.” Taylor “inhaled the most delicious perfumes” and 
heard harmonies in his head that “Beethoven may have heard in dreams but never wrote.” Even 
though his experiment led to a kind of surrealist mental terror, Taylor “did not regret having 
made it” and concluded that “it revealed to me the deepest rapture and of suffering which my 
natural faculties would have never sounded.”36 
 In the end, Taylor’s experience with hashish conformed to the style De Quincey 
innovated and he repented and returned to his faith. The experiment taught him the power and 
“majesty of human reason,” and he hoped, like De Quincey, that his account did not encourage 
others to follow his lead. If his work happened to inspire other, he encouraged readers to “take 
the portion of hasheesh which is sufficient for one man, and not, like me, swallow enough for 
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six.” Taylor spent “two days afterwards” recovering from the experience because he was “weak 
in body and still confused in [his] perceptions.” For a change of scenery, Taylor “started for 
Baalbek,” a town in Lebanon. He found that “pure mountain air” and the sleep he got that night 
“completed his cure.” The next morning, he rode through a mountain valley with the “towering, 
snow-sprinkled ridge of the Anti-Lebanon on [his] right, a cloudless heaven above [his] head.” In 
that moment, he realized that the “last shadow had rolled away” from his brain. Taylor felt that 
he was once again master of himself and confessed that “the world glowed as if new-created in 
the light of [his] joy and gratitude.” He thanked God for leading him out of “a darkness more 
terrible than the Valley of the Shadow of Death.”37 
 The literary community embraced Taylor’s cannabis confession just as it had De 
Quincey’s stories about opiate addiction. The unsuspecting Maine Farmer instructed its readers 
that the next edition of Putnam’s would feature a “portrait of the author of ‘Visions of 
Hasheesh,” Bayard Taylor, in Turkish costume” and argued that “the contents were of a kind that 
will bear reading more than once.” It went further to suggest that Putnam’s had, “as an 
experiment…demonstrated to our satisfaction the existence of a purely American literature.”38 
 The literary embrace of the cannabis confessionals accompanied the medical 
community’s advocation of the substance as a potentially powerful new medicine. While this 
overlap occurred, there were crucial differences. First, the medical community, which had 
become aware of cannabis’s hallucinatory power, focused instead on its therapeutic qualities. 
The hashish confessional took the opposite approached and highlighted its hallucinatory powers 
while scarcely mentioning any healing effect it may have possessed. In the process, Americans 
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were given a holistic portrait of the drug and, as a consequence, the public developed an 
ambivalence towards its use. While understanding it to be an increasingly common medicinal 
available in local pharmacies, Americans also perceived it to be a source of hallucinations and 
delusions that were simultaneously amusing and terrifying.  
 In a popular poem written by John G. Whittier in the mid-1850s, titled “The Hashish,” 
the author compares pro-slavery advocates with hashish users, thus amplifying in stark terms the 
popular notion that cannabis caused destructive hallucinations. His work began “Of all the Orient 
lands can vaunt/of marvels with their own competing/the strangest is the hashish plant/and what 
will follow on its eating.” The author then claimed that the west had a plant that created even 
deeper delusions than hashish—cotton, which compelled support of slavery. “It makes the 
merchant class, with ware/and stock in trade, his fellow sinners/and factory lords, with equal 
care/regard their spindles and their spinners,” it continued. For ministers, it noted, “the preacher 
eats, and straight appears/his Bible in a new translation/it’s angels negro-overseers/and heaven 
itself a snug plantation.” Whittier’s poem concluded, “Oh, potent plant! So rare a taste/Has never 
Turk or Gentoo gotten/The hempen hashish of the East/Is powerless to our Western cotton.”39 
 As the American Civil War rapidly approached, the American literary scene produced the 
first true heir to De Quincey’s style. Fitzhugh Ludlow, a young New Yorker, published his 
novella The Hasheesh Eater in 1858 and it became something of a national sensation. Ludlow’s 
work, like those writers who had so clearly inspired him, first appeared in Putnam’s. The title of 
Ludlow’s first piece, “The Hasheesh Eater,” paid direct homage to De Quincey’s Confessions of 
an English Opium Eater. Ludlow also borrowed from Taylor’s popular essay and began his story 
began in Damascus. Continuing the appropriation of eastern culture, Ludlow commented that 
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“certainly no other spot could be so worthy, unless it were Baghdad, the marvelous city of the 
marvelous Sultan, Haroun al Rashid.”40 
  The author’s hallucinatory journey began with “a sudden nervous thrill, followed by the 
whirl and prodigious apparent enlargement of the brain.” His head “expanded wider and wider, 
revolving with inconceivable rapidity, and enlarging in space with every revolution. It filled the 
room—the house—the city; it became a world, peopled with the shapes of men and monsters.” 
He then lost “all perception off time and space, and knew no distinctions between the realities 
around [him] and the phantasmata [sic] which sprung in endless succession from [his] brain.”41 
Three months after Putnam’s published the piece, it followed with a sequel—Ludlow’s 
“The Apocalypse of Hasheesh.” Based on the popularity of his cannabis writing, Ludlow secured 
a book deal with Harper and Brothers and the company produced The Hasheesh Eater; Being 
Passages from the Life of a Pythagorean in 1858. Evidenced by the subsequent editions of the 
work, Americans widely read the book. By the time of its publication, however, the confessional 
style had been well-established and Ludlow obsessed over the perception that he had copied his 
work from Thomas De Quincey. He wrote “I am deeply aware that, if the succeeding pages are 
read at all it will be by those who have already learned to love De Quincey.” Still not satisfied, 
the author admitted he would “not for a moment compare the manner of [his] narrative with that 
most wondrous, most inspired Dreamer.” Still insecure, Ludlow added, “Frankly do I say that I 
admire De Quincey to such a degree that, were not imitation base and he inimitable, I know no 
master of style whose footsteps I should more earnestly seek to tread.”42 
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To guard himself “against the risk of burlesquing the inimitable,” Ludlow claimed to 
have not looked at De Quincey’s Confessions “from the beginning to the end of [his] 
undertaking.”43 Ludlow continued by stating that the only explanation he had for any overlap 
“was that we both saw the same thing.” It seemed obvious to Ludlow that “the state of insight 
which [De Quincey] attained through opium” was similar—if not exact—to what he reached “by 
the way of hasheesh.” Later in his work, Ludlow felt the need to revisit the topic, “if in any way, 
therefore, except servilely, I seemed to have followed De Quincey, I am proud of it.”  He also 
wrote that “it was the hasheesh referred to by Eastern travelers, and the subject of a most graphic 
chapter from the pen of Bayard Taylor, which months before had moved [him] powerfully to 
curiosity and admiration.”44 
Whether Ludlow was comfortable with the comparisons or not, he nonetheless emerged 
as the American De Quincey. There were many similarities between the two works beyond the 
titles and the style of writing. The Eastern imagery that characterized all the hashish 
confessionals was especially prominent in Ludlow’s work. On the other hand, there is little 
evidence to suggest that The Hasheesh Eater crossed the Atlantic or significantly influenced 
British or French culture the way in which American society had been influenced by De Quincey 
and Moreau. There is also no indication that Ludlow’s work infiltrated the medical community to 
the degree De Quincey and Moreau had. With that being said, the American pharmacy played a 
significant role in his writing.  
Ludlow wrote that “About the shop of my friend Anderson,” who ran the pharmacy in his 
hometown, “there always existed a peculiar fascination, which early marked it out as my favorite 
lounging-place.” In the essays he published with Putnam’s, Ludlow stated he took hashish in 
 
43 Fitzhugh Ludlow, The Hasheesh Eater, 4.  
44 Ibid, 5.  
82 
 
Syria, but in the preface to his novella, he admitted he also obtained cannabis from his local 
pharmacy. In his writing, the author exhibits behaviors that would later be attributed to a drug-
seeker. Ludlow wrote about his friend’s pharmacy: 
Here the details of surgical or medical experimentation has held me in as complete 
engrossment as the positions and crises of romance; and here especially, with a disregard 
to my own safety which would have done credit to Quintis Curtius, have I made upon 
myself the trial of the effects of every strange drug and chemical which the laboratory 
could produce. Now with the chloroform bottle beneath my nose I set myself careening 
upon the wings of a thrilling and accelerating life, until I had just enough power 
remaining to restore the liquid to its place on the shelf, and sink back into the enjoyment 
of the delicious apathy which lasted through the few succeeding moments. 
 
Ludlow presented himself as a De Quincey like figure—the alpha and omega of his 
particular drug scene. The primary difference, however, is that Ludlow wrote as an active drug 
user not in recovery. That fact pushed the drug confessional into new territory. Ludlow did not 
have advice for the reader on how to overcome the habits that once seized him because he was 
still in their throes. Still, he thought of himself as a kind of scientist, explaining that “in all these 
experiences, research and not indulgence was my object, so that I never became the victim of any 
habit in the prosecution of my headlong investigations.” Here, he emulated Moreau and, while 
clearly using chloroform for a recreational intoxication, he ultimately claimed it was all done in 
the interest of “investigation.” That sense of scientific pursuit had, since De Quincey’s work, 
characterized the seemingly non-medicinal experimentation with drugs.45 
Fitzhugh Ludlow, the self-proclaimed “hasheesh-eater,” considered himself to be a 
master of drug use. “When the circuit of all the accessible tests was completed”—or after he had 
tried very drug in the pharmacy—Ludlow sat back and “ceased experimenting,” feeling like a 
“pharmaceutical Alexander, with no more drug-worlds to conquer.” It was in one of those 
moments of triumphant repose that Ludlow found cannabis. His friend Anderson asked him if he 
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had seen the pharmacies “new acquisitions?’” Ludlow excitedly checked the shelves searching 
for a drug he had not yet experimented with. “Added since my last visit,” he stated, was “a row 
of comely pasteboard cylinders inclosed [sic] vials of the various extracts prepared by Tildon & 
Co. Arranged in order according to size.” The sight of these new drugs “comforted [him].” 
Ludlow then “approached the shelves” so that he could better take the new narcotics “in review.” 
He analyzed the new additions and realized they were, for the most part, drugs he had already 
been acquainted with—“conium, taraxacum, rhubarb.” Then, he spotted a new one: “what is 
this? Cannabis Indica?”46 
 Ludlow’s friend warned him not to take cannabis unless he had suicidal intention. Being 
a self-proclaimed Alexander of “drug-worlds,” however, Ludlow waited until Anderson was out 
of sight so that he would not “terrify him by that which he considered a suicidal venture.” He 
then uncapped the cannabis and ingested it. At first, Ludlow experienced no effect whatsoever. 
He then escalated his use until he achieved the desired result: “Ha! What means this sudden 
thrill? A shock, as of some unimagined vital force, shoots without warning through [his] entire 
frame.” Ludlow, on successive doses, finally found the experience he was looking for.47 
 The author’s experience in the pharmacy illustrates several important points. First, it is 
likely Ludlow first ingested cannabis in New York and not Damascus, Syria, as Bayard Taylor 
had. Secondly, Ludlow pursued a recreational style of drug use that did not adhere to the 
standards of the writers he emulated. Unlike Gautier and Baudelaire, his work was not for the 
benefit of scientific advancement—and did not culminate in the publication of a work like 
Moreau’s Hashish and Mental Illness. Unlike De Quincey, Ludlow did not offer a message of 
repentance and hope. Indeed, he appeared to be taking cannabis—and chloral and opium—for 
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the sake of simply feeling its effects. In that sense, he emerged as the first famous recreational 
drug user in the United States.  
On cannabis, Ludlow wrote that “the value of this experience to me consists in its having 
thrown open to my gaze many of the sublime avenues of spiritual life, at whose gates the soul in 
its ordinary state is forever blindly groping, mystified, perplexed, yet earnest to the last in its 
search for that secret spring which, being touched, shall swing back the colossal barrier.” Ludlow 
argued that, under the spell of a hashish vision, he had, “in a single instant…seen the vexed 
question of a lifetime settled, the mystery of some grand recondite process of mind laid bare, the 
last grim doubt that hung persistently on the sky of a sublime truth blown away.” To Ludlow, 
cannabis use represented a search for meaning and a way to clear his mind, but it ultimately had 
no higher purpose.48 
 This relatively unrepentant recreational use of cannabis did little to dampen the 
enthusiasm over his contribution to the genre of the confessional, however. The National Era, a 
mid-nineteenth century abolitionist newspaper, claimed that Ludlow’s work was “in the vein of 
De Quincey’s Opium Eater,” and that readers would find it immensely interesting, and that the 
style of the prose was “nervous and graphic.” The Maine Farmer, ever an advocate of the 
hashish narrative, wrote that Ludlow’s “graphic confessions” would “interest both those who 
delight in spiritual phenomena, and lovers of the curious and marvelous.” Graham’s American 
Monthly Magazine of Literature went further, arguing that “those desirous of reading one of the 
most extraordinary, fantastic, and beautifully-delirious books ever written, should get ‘The 
Hasheesh Eater’ published by Messrs. Harper of New York.” It also noted “we should prefer not 
instituting a comparison between it and the Opium Eater by De Quincey, but the press has 
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generally done so, and we take the liberty of giving our own views.” Graham’s argued that 
“inferior as a polished writer and trained metaphysician to De Quincey, The Hasheesh Eater 
excels his prototype in wild gorgeous imagery.”49 
 Just as De Quincey inspired copycats, so did Ludlow. In April of 1858, Russell’s 
Magazine printed excerpts of a hashish confessional from Benjamin West Ball’s book of poetry 
Elfin-Land, which had first appeared in 1851. In a brief preface explaining his decision to 
publish the account, the magazine’s founder and editor, Ed Russell confessed that he did so 
“somewhat against [the publication’s] convictions of propriety.” Russell’s sense of decency was 
not strong enough to prevent him from printing it, however, and so he “consented to publish this 
curious account of Hasheesh experience, differing as it does, in certain details, from all other 
accounts we have seen.”50 
 The emulations of Ludlow—who had masterfully channeled Thomas De Quincey while 
adding his own renegade touch—continued and the subsequent writing oftentimes involved 
confessions from individuals recounting their experiences with different drugs like chloroform 
or, in one case, tea. In the summer of 1858, the Indiana Farmer published the story of a man 
who drank too much tea and claimed “the resemblances to some of the most peculiar effects of 
hashish, in large doses” would be noticed in his work. The author had been under unusual stress 
at his job and the turmoil led him into the habit of overconsuming tea at night. At his worst, the 
young man took in “a basin of very strong tea four or five times a day” for several days straight. 
One night, while sitting with his mother, he “felt a sudden dizziness” overcome him after 
consuming “a draught of tea stronger than any [he] had taken before.” He asked his mother to get 
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him a glass of sherry, but before she could return with it, “consciousness of surrounding objects” 
completely left the man. The best way he could describe the ensuing experience was 
“indescribably perfect.”  Moreover, the experience “seemed to last for ages” and he “awoke in 
horror of a soul which had been for ages in woe.” When he regained consciousness, he found his 
mother standing over him with a glass of sherry and he asked her how long he had been 
unconscious and she informed him only the amount of time it took her to get the sherry.51 
 As these writers confessed to excess, American collapsed into Civil War. The same week 
that Quantrill’s Raiders entered Lawrence, Kansas, for example, to kill any man old enough to 
carry a gun, Zion’s Herald published a story in which an unnamed author detailed an intoxication 
stemming from the recreational use of Quinine, an ancient muscle relaxant later used to treat 
malaria. The author noted, “I have learned from De Quincey some of the singular effects 
produced upon mind and body by the use of opium” and confessed “I have read Bayard Taylor’s 
account of his experiments with hasheesh” and it made him curious if Quinine might produce 
similar results. After taking the drug, the author noted his spirits became elevated and he felt 
invincible. Then, suddenly and sans prelude, he fell “from this vast elevation to the Infinite and 
Absolute,” ultimately falling “with Hegel into the abyss of nihilism.”52  
 Due to this level of popular exposure, the idea that hashish undoubtedly excited 
hallucinatory aspects of human psychology gained traction. Hashish use became a kind of avatar 
for off-kilter, fanatical, or delusional thinking. During the Civil War, in fact, hashish was 
sometimes cited as a metaphor for the political views that led to the outbreak of violence. In 
1862, a soldier writing back home to Michigan from Benton Barracks, Missouri, wrote:  
“We have had a long night of weary, weary months, and now none but a prophet can tell 
when day-break will come. We know light follows darkness in regular succession, and 
 
51 “Excessive Tea Drinking,” Indiana Farmer, June 1858.  
52 “Quinine,” Zion’s Herald and Weseylan Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 34 (August 26, 1863): 134.  
87 
 
our faith in the Union is almost as strong as in the regularity of the laws of nature, but the 
last are divine and the first human, and the strength of our Union is being tried by a 
population of twelve millions, with an army of half a million fighting on their own soil, 
and commanded by able and desperate men. Let those who dream of peace, speedily, take 
hasheesh and get a different, if not more sensible vision.”  
 
In other words, those who thought there was still a chance of peace in 1862 were even more 
delusional than those operating under the influence of cannabis. Hashish, to the young soldier 
observing the conflict first hand, would have likely produced a less absurd vision than the one he 
outlined.  
 A soldier writing from a Pennsylvania regiment reported that, at one point in a recent 
battle, his side “occupied the town” and “proffered the friendship of the Union to its inhabitants.” 
In the process, they had been able to lift “the cloud from the eyes of many of the deluded,” who 
had “so many hasheesh visions of sectional Independence.” A different Pennsylvania paper 
offered this view: “the black poppy, Abolition, whose opiate seeds are the deadly Hasheesh upon 
which the people of the North, have, alas! too long been feeding, has at last opened its dark 
leaves in full blown maturity to the astonished gaze of the deluded populace.”53  
Hasheesh Backlash  
 Just as the Civil War had become a moment of transition for medicinal cannabis, in 
which the optimism of the mid-nineteenth century faded into skepticism and frustration with the 
plant, the same occurred in the psycho-literary arena. Not only had it entered the American 
psyche as a problematic delusion inducing agent, incidents of cannabis use seemed to cite 
different reactions. On May 4, 1863, under the simple headline “Horrible,” a Buffalo, New York 
paper reported that “several promising young men” of the city had taken to eating hashish and 
“in some instances” had become “slaves to the terrible vice.” A few nights before the printing of 
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the story, “several of them “assembled together and drugged themselves to such an extent that 
they sank, one by one, into utter insensibility.” It represented an issue of perception. Most 
narratives from the mid-nineteenth century featured individuals sinking—one by one—into utter 
insensibility, but it had been greeted then with bemusement, not consternation or scorn. That 
began to change in the Civil War period.54 
 The idea that young and vulnerable Americans appeared to be emulating Ludlow alarmed 
the press. The Yale Courant, in 1865, addressed “vague rumors” that many students had been 
“dabbling” with hashish and “putting into their mouths an enemy to steal away their brains.” It 
reported that “these things go by fashion” and understood “you are confident in your strength; 
you think that you can stop when you choose. You are influenced by curiosity; you desire to try 
everything and this among others.” It asked its readers, “Do you want to become a Palaeaster 
Niagerensis, (vulgo starfish,) your mouth in the center of your body, five arms sprawling out to 
infinity, fixed on a pivot, whirled till red-hot, and then struck by a hammer about as large as a 
State House? If so, take hasheesh.” Even in its repudiation of the drug’s use, the Courant 
resorted to the absurdist imagery and stream-of-consciousness style of the confessionals.55 
The premature death of Fitzhugh Ludlow did not help save the hashish—or quinine, 
chloroform, and tea—narratives. His reputation had been in decline throughout the 1860s. In 
May of 1866, Rosalie Ludlow, Fitzhugh’s wife, divorced him on grounds of “neglect and 
infidelity” and immediately married his friend, the artist Alfred Bierstadt. The Buffalo 
Commercial, in which the divorce announcement was published, added: “Poor Ludlow is fast 
becoming broken down in person and reputation.” It was rumored “that he is a slave to the 
fascinating vices of which he gives such thrilling description in his ‘Hasheesh Eater.’” In late-
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1867, the Hartford Courant wrote that Ludlow had returned to the “Elmira Water Cure,” where 
he was trying his methods for curing opium addiction. The same paper noted that Bayard Taylor 
was deathly ill in Rome, suggesting an era of liberality had come to an end. While De Quincey 
likely saw the publication of The Hasheesh Eater from his deathbed, there seemed to be no 
willing heirs to Ludlow and Taylor’s work.56 
In Albany, Oregon, the local paper argued that “many of our readers will remember a 
fellow named Fitz Hugh Ludlow, who journeyed through Oregon two years ago.” It then 
reported him to be “an unmitigated bore, a sponger, and a nuisance where he stopped.” The 
purpose of the article, however, was to let its readers know that “the poor wretch” had gone 
insane and lived at the Lunatic Asylum in New York. It then suggested that “Eating ‘hasheesh’ 
did the business for him.” Four years later, at the age of thirty-four years old, Fitzhugh Ludlow 
died in Geneva, Switzerland, after being chronically ill and riddled with addiction for years.57 
His obituary began by honoring “his first important literary venture,” The Hasheesh 
Eater, arguing that it “suffered by the comparisons that were necessarily made” between it and 
De Quincey’s Confessions of an Opium Eater. When his widow, Maria Owen Ludlow, died 
twenty-seven years later, her obituary similarly focused on her husband, pointing out that he was 
the author of “The Hasheesh Papers,” a volume “in imitation of De Quincey” and that he died 
tragically “in a reckless desire to imitate De Quincey.” Philadelphia’s The Evening Telegraph 
wrote that “his constitution” had been “shattered by his indulgence in opium” and that “his death 
was not unexpected.” It closed by pointing out that he had been married to Rosalie, “but the 
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union was not fortunate, and his wife obtained a divorce from him, and was subsequently 
married to a distinguished artist.”58 
The confessional lost its social and literary power after the death of Ludlow. The news 
covering the dangers of hashish use began to supplant earlier ambivalence. The public had 
finally picked a side in post-bellum America and it was not in favor of liberal cannabis use. An 
1878 expose on hashish published by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch argued it was “a more potent 
drug than opium,” which was certainly not the medical opinion of the mid-nineteenth-century. 
The story then mentioned the work of Bayard Taylor, but this time he was not upheld as a 
literary genius, but as “grotesque.” Whereas the alleged insanity caused by the drug had been 
downplayed or ignored throughout the mid-nineteenth century, the Post-Dispatch argued that 
“madness in particular” was always on the horizon when one used the drug and that “permanent 
insanity” frequently followed even minor use.59 
Hashish users still frequented newspaper columns, but in a decidedly less romantic light.  
The New York Times, for example, noted that police discovered “a “hasheesh eater” in the vein 
of Fitzhugh Ludlow in 1866. Miss Isabella Calkins reported the man, Mr. Charles Weston, for 
indecent exposure and told the police he had been pacing back and forth in front of her shop 
window, “with his clothes very much disarranged, and his person indecently exposed.” Weston 
claimed he was unable to say whether the man was guilty, but he reported he had “lately been in 
the habit of taking opium, laudanum, hasheesh, and other narcotics for the purpose of deadening 
the pain resulting from neuralgia.” Weston turned two bottles of laudanum over to the police. 
Witnesses claimed they saw Weston pacing in front of the store, but could not be certain if he 
exposed himself. In the end, Weston begged for his bottles of laudanum back, the court refused, 
 
58 “Obituary: Fitzhugh Ludlow,” The Evening Telegraph, October 5, 1870.  
59 “Novelties of Narcotics,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 11, 1878.  
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and he was held for sentencing. It represented quite a turn from Bayard Taylor’s exquisite 
hashish prose from Damascus.60 
 This kind of coverage aligned with a general change in Americans’ perceptions of drug 
use, which was brought on by a post-Civil War intravenous morphine crisis. That drug, perfected 
by army medics, hit the marketplace at the conclusion of the war and almost immediately led to a 
drug addiction crisis that would transform society for decades to come. Cannabis, however 
tangentially connected to the far more ravenous outcomes involved in the use of hypodermically 
injected morphine, would fail to inspire the ambivalence—or even excitement—it did in the mid-
nineteenth century. The American public, the media, and medical profession that often inspired 
and guided thinking on the topic of narcotics, would lead society into a new and far more anti-
drug era.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 “LAW REPORTS: An Interesting Trial for Malicious Prosecution—The Jury Fail to Agree—The History of a  
Diamond Ring in Brooklyn. Disorderly Men and Women—A Hasheesh Eater,” New York Times, October 28,  
1866.  
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Chapter Three 
An American Opiate Crisis, 1870-1905 
After the death of her father, a prominent Seattle hotel owner, Ella Henderson started 
taking morphine to ease her grief. She was thirty-three years old and, because of her education 
and intellect, frequented social circles “most exalted by her sex.” Her “thirst for morphine,” 
however, had successfully “dragged her down to the verge of debauchery.” Ella’s story, first told 
by Seattle’s The Daily Intelligencer in an 1877 article entitled “A Beautiful Opium Eater,” 
circulated through the American and European press. Her doctor’s wife, Mrs. Stone, took Ella 
into their home in hopes of “restoring her once more to her proper sphere.” All efforts at 
rehabilitation failed, however, and Ella’s concerned friends took her kids. When deprived of her 
drugs, Ella would say “give me morphine, give me something that I may quench this terrible 
thirst, or let me die!” The Intelligencer surmised that only the coldest of hearts could endure such 
suffering, which it claimed was so severe it could make an angel cry. Towards the end of her 
addiction, Ella secluded herself in her room and took morphine until she poisoned herself to 
death.1 
Ella Henderson was the kind of addict most often reported about in the late-nineteenth 
century press. She had been prescribed morphine by a trusted physician, enabled to continue its 
use by that same doctor, and then developed an addiction that ultimately led to her death. That 
narrative captured the public’s imagination. Not only did it highlight a threat to the middle-class 
home—one aimed at daughters, mothers, and grandmothers—but it also indicted the medical and 
pharmaceutical communities as culprits. Those professionals were increasingly portrayed as 
 
1 “A Beautiful Opium Eater,” The Daily Intelligencer (Seattle, WA), December 8, 1877. 
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reckless. The publicizing of addicts such as Ella Henderson and the apparently unscrupulous 
doctors pointed to a dramatic change in America’s relationship with drugs.  
From the 1860s to the first decade of the twentieth century, drug reform developed into a 
powerful political force and a topic that inspired a great deal of activism. That was primarily due 
to the fact that intravenous morphine significantly challenged the nineteenth century medical 
community’s cavalier style of testing narcotics for the pharmaceutical marketplace. As doctors 
pursued a trial-and-error style of vetting drugs, the peripheral damage had been largely 
contained. That changed after the Civil War when doctors began prescribing a more potent form 
of morphine injected through a hypodermic needle. These advancements allowed physicians to 
treat pain far more effectively, but also laid the foundations for an opioid epidemic that would 
define the latter two decades of the nineteenth century.  
As the press highlighted the rise of opiate addiction, often through compelling narratives 
like Ella Henderson’s, physicians were increasingly cast as negligent, callous, and 
unprofessional. In the media’s storyline, doctors thoughtlessly overprescribed narcotics and 
ignored the consequences, which manifested in the form of addiction—a social disease that the 
American public then had to address. While there was some truth to the accusations, the media’s 
assertions were overly simplistic and mostly inaccurate. The truth was more complicated and 
pointed to a reality far more difficult to correct.  
In an era lacking a centralized and government sponsored agency capable of testing the 
safety of new drugs, doctors pursued a practical and experimental approach in which the 
consequences and benefits of new drugs were determined by how they performed in the daily 
practice of medicine. That had been the case with opium, cannabis, chloroform, laudanum, and a 
host of other narcotics. It was an imperfect system, to be sure, but it was professional custom and 
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it had worked well enough in the mid-nineteenth century. In the social, political, and economic 
turbulence of the immediate post-bellum years, however, the hypodermic syringe exposed the 
dangers of that approach and generated broad social concern, anxiety, and anger.23 
This new medical delivery apparatus was introduced to a profession trained to rapidly 
implement modern remedies and report the results obtained from daily practice. As they had 
done for generations, then, the American medical community eagerly injected patients with 
morphine for a wide variety of ailments and commenced noting the results. Did it work to 
mitigate the symptoms of neuralgia? Could it cure asthma? Might it be a logical treatment for 
alcoholism or—interestingly—opioid addiction itself? With hypodermic needle in hand, 
physicians sought the answer to those questions. The resultant tragedies created by this relatively 
unregulated medical experimentation, unlike in the past, generated higher rates of narcotic 
addiction and inspired a widespread sense of legitimate anxiety, one increasingly stoked by a 
sensationalist press that had gained significant ground in shaping post-bellum Americans’ 
perception of reality.4 
In the process, that spirit of “further experimentation,” actively cultivated by Dr. William 
O’Shaughnessy, Dr. Jacques-Joseph Moreau, Bayard Taylor, Fitzhugh Ludlow, and the press 
 
2 For a closer look at the nineteenth century medical profession and its lack of resources, the prevalence of 
superstition in interpreting disease, and the push for more powerful cures, see: Charles E. Rosenberg, The Cholera 
Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866 (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1962); 
Owen Whooley, Knowledge in the Time of Cholera: The Struggle Over American Medicine in the Nineteenth 
Century (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013); William G. Rothstein, American Physicians 
in the Nineteenth Century: From Sects to Science (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University, 1985). 
3 Michael J. Brownstein, “A Brief History of Opiates, Opioid Peptides, and Opioid Receptors,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences in the United States of America, Vol. 90, No. 12 (June 15, 1993), 5391-5393; 
Gregory D. Busse, D.J. Triggle, Morphine (New York: Chelsea House, 2006).  
4 With the exception of David T. Courtwright’s Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) there has been little sustained analysis of the opioid crisis that 
characterized the turn of the twentieth century. His conclusion, summarized best in his suggestion that the drug crisis 
inspired narcotic legislation that was largely unnecessary and aimed at the social control of marginalized Americans. 
See also: David Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973).  
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that supported them, began to lose favor. As the media introduced the American reading public 
to women like Ella Henderson, support for tighter regulatory control over the medical profession 
and the pharmaceutical industry grew. No longer ambivalent about drug experimentation, 
municipal, state, and federal politicians—representing their alarmed constituents—began to 
elevate opioid policy to the forefront of American politics. Uncertainty regarding the true extent 
of the crisis, however, abounded. There were no reliable statistics pointing to the exact number 
of drug addicts in the United States. Nonetheless, the public, with the help of the media, came to 
believe there were millions of them and that perception fueled the notion Americans faced an 
unprecedented opioid epidemic.  
In the wake of changing public opinion on drugs, the use of narcotics in any way 
considered recreational or unnecessary was not only considered socially unacceptable, but 
increasingly criminal. A variety of factors inspired that pivot, but it was primarily due to the 
ways in which the hypodermic syringe intersected with a set of aging medical practices that had 
developed in a time characterized by less powerful narcotics. As doctors worked to modernize its 
practices in an age of seemingly epidemic levels of drug addiction, the newspaper industry 
continually indicted physicians for causing the problem they worked to solve. Ultimately, the 
profession slowly reformed, but the damage had already been done and a new generation of 
journalists and politicians championed the ongoing transfer of America’s drug problem from the 
private to the public sphere—from a clinical setting to a political one.  
The Proliferation of Hypodermically Injected Morphine 
 The problems facing American doctors in the 1860s resembled those encountered by their 
early-nineteenth century counterparts. Both generations struggled to determine how to best treat 
pain with a lack of reliable medicines. During the American Civil War, intravenous morphine 
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seemed to resolve the problem. Its instant narcotic effect appeared to do what pharmaceutical 
compounds of opium and cannabis could not: reliably numb pain in doses prescribed with 
confidence and accuracy. At first, physicians used it in cases of unique muscular disorders, like 
neuralgia or arthritis, and in prolonging surgeries by coupling it with chloral. In that sense, they 
used the new drug just as they had previous ones. Opium and cannabis tinctures had been 
similarly used but with less success. As they gained confidence from initial results, the 
profession then began to use morphine in more diverse ways. That, of course, mirrored the 
strategies that guided the use of cannabis in the mid-nineteenth century. From asthma, bronchitis, 
and nausea to alcoholism, opium addiction, and mental illness, the use of intravenous morphine 
proliferated to become a common remedy. Physicians, ignorant at the time of the total power  
morphine possessed, this widespread use of the drug planted the seeds of an epidemic that rather 
quickly came to define fin-de-siècle American society.5  
 Although the medical community embraced intravenous morphine use, the practice 
generated early anxiety in the press. In November, 1869, the Cincinnati Enquirer argued that this 
popular new treatment involved an injection that “can be made instantaneously, without the 
knowledge of the victim.” It also “left no mark upon the skin” and involved only the “slightest 
prick of pain” while delivering “morphine enough to produce death.” The article concluded, “For 
this latest result of infernal scientific ingenuity, there is one beneficial use, it appears, that may 
save it from utter condemnation”—it produced pain relief “even under the most aggravated 
 
5 For the most in-depth view of the role morphine played in the practice of mid-to-late nineteenth century medicine, 
it is most helpful to consult medical primary sources. See: “The Hypodermic Use of Morphia,” The British Medical 
Journal, Vol. 1, No 328 (April 13, 1867); R. Gillard, “The Treatment of Acute Rheumatism by Morphia Injection,” 
The British Medical Journal, Vol. 1, No. 572 (February 4, 1871); W.J. Mickle, “On Morphia in Some Cases of 
Insanity,” The British Medical Journal, Vol. 1, No. 701 (June 6, 1874); “Hypodermic Medication,” The British 
Medical Journal, Vol. 2, No. 782 (December 25, 1875); “Morphia Poisoning,” The British Medical Journal, Vol. 1, 
No. 1106 (March 11, 1882); Talfourd Jones, “Hypodermic or Subcutaneous Medication,” The British Medical 
Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1291, September 26, 1885; John Kent Spender, “Remarks on ‘Analgesics,’” The British 
Medical Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1372 (April 16, 1887).  
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suffering, when the heaviest doses of opiates, administered in the ordinary way, fail to produce 
it.” That, of course, was an undeniable benefit: it relieved pain more effectively than any other 
known medicine in an age feeling a great deal of it. As a minority warned of its potentially 
destructive qualities, the breadth of American pain—and the lack of effective options available to 
treat it—led to a relative dismissal of those concerns.6 
Within an environment long challenged by “the most aggravated suffering,” the 
introduction of the drug inspired hope and pointed to the unfolding of a truly enlightened era in 
medical treatment; one in which precise and uniform doses of smaller amounts of masterfully 
distilled opium finally delivered narcotic results the community had been in search of for over a 
century. Physicians quickly put it to use. As early as 1858, Edinburgh physician, Dr. Alexander 
Wood, wrote an article entitled “On a New Method of Treating Neuralgia by the Direct 
Application of Opiates to the Painful Points.” Neuralgia, a beguiling nerve disorder, responded 
well to the subcutaneous injection of opium. By the 1860s, in fact, the medical community had 
followed Dr. Wood’s suggestion of using hypodermic morphine to treat neuralgia and it had 
become a common treatment.7 
Knowledge about the use of hypodermic morphine travelled through a transatlantic 
information exchange—just as it had with cannabis and opium. Dr. Fuller, a physician at St. 
George’s Hospital in London, said “I have seen it produce effects as satisfactory as they were 
astounding.” He observed patients who had not slept for days lulled rapidly to sleep by the 
“internal administration” of opioids. Medicating the energy depleting symptoms of diseases like 
neuralgia—which consisted of the loss of appetite, weight loss, insomnia, and “nervousness”—
 
6 “De Quincey’s Hideous Fantasy of Making Murder,” The Cincinnati Enquirer, November 10, 1869. 
7 A. Ruppaner, “Hypodermic Injections in the Treatment of Neuralgia and Other Diseases of the Nervous System: 
(A) That the Case be a Proper One for Treatment,” Massachusetts Medical Society. Medical Communications 
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was no small feat and it allowed practitioners to better treat the underlying causes of sickness. In 
that sense, the early and more liberal dosages seemed not only appropriate, but the only ethical 
response to the widespread pain they encountered.8 
Even as the profession experimented with hypodermic morphine, the ongoing issues 
associated with overdoses, accidental poisonings, and suicides involving the older powder 
morphine continued to exist in the backdrop. In 1866, for example, the ten-year-old son of a 
Brandon, Wisconsin doctor, died from an accidental morphine poisoning. He had suffered from a 
common sickness for which his medically trained father gave him magnesia—a decision that 
seemed to put him on the path to recovery. When his parent’s left, the boy’s six-year-old sister 
“got hold of a bottle of morphine and administered several doses to him.” He died five hours 
later. These situations, while tragic, were complicated scenarios to interpret. It was true that 
morphine caused the death, but it also pointed to a need for the drug to be better stored in the 
home. Thus, the cases reported were tragic, but seemingly preventable; the cause of human error, 
a flawed system, and the unfortunate byproducts of the way progress was made through trial-
and-error.9 
The next year, in a similar case, Brooklyn resident Mrs. Matilda Webster, a forty-five-
year-old housewife and mother of eight children, similarly died of an accidental poisoning. She 
had been “for some time in poor health” and was often seen by a doctor in her home. After 
receiving a prescription that contained morphine, she sent her twelve-year-old daughter to a 
nearby pharmacist to collect her medicine and the pharmacist misread the script, which had been 
 
8 A. Ruppaner, “Hypodermic Injections in the Treatment of Neuralgia and Other Diseases of the Nervous System: 
(A) That the Case be a Proper One for Treatment.” The argument that the medical community minimized concerns 
about morphine’s addictive potential is drawn from the lack of primary sources discussing it, especially in 
comparison to the abundance of articles pointing to its overall value.  
9 “A Case of Poisoning,” The Daily Milwaukee News, September 6, 1866. 
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written for a “sleeping powder.” He instead gave the girl two grains of morphine. “The heavy 
dose the unfortunate woman took soon after,” The Brooklyn Daily Eagle reported, “and never 
woke thereafter.” In this case, a child was once again involved in a tragedy compounded by the 
misreading of a script at the pharmacy.10 
Before the Civil War, physicians and pharmacists were rarely implicated in these deaths. 
They were viewed as isolated tragedies that did not necessarily speak to systemic problems. That 
began to change in the post-war years. The Brooklyn Union reported in October of 1867 that 
“another drug clerk has blundered, and another man has been killed by too strong a dose of 
poison taken as medicine.” The author wondered who was to blame and reported that “public 
opinion fastens first on the drug clerk.” Others, however, did not rush to judgement and waited to 
see how poorly the script had been written by the physician and if the “figures were as plain as 
they should have been with a true regard to the average stupidity of drug clerks.” It was an 
environment characterized by a certain looseness; an accommodating culture that avidly reserved 
judgment until the facts were fully compiled. That was the spirit that continued to guide 
community. In the popular press, however, quick judgement was not so dutifully withheld.11 
 The Brooklyn Union blamed the drug itself. “It is a deadly poison,” it argued, and was “of 
little use in ordinary cases, which does more harm than good.” Those who had trouble sleeping, 
experienced bouts of nervousness, excitement, or pain, were “generally troubled with some 
disease which morphine would not help.” It concluded that Americans had “no business taking 
it” and doctors had no “business prescribing it to them, except in extreme cases which ought to 
be very extreme.” On the other hand, the tendency to blame morphine itself did appear to be 
 
10 “Fatal Mistake by an Apothecary—a Double Dose of Morphine Given—Death the Result—Arrest of Guilty 
Clerk,” the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 14, 1867. 
11 “The Morphine Case,” The Brooklyn Union, October 14, 1867. 
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somewhat misguided. If the misreading of scripts led to premature death then the issue had less 
to do with morphine and more to do with questions of competence within the pharmaceutical 
industry. Similarly, cases involving children finding morphine in the home pointed to issues 
involving access to powerful drugs once they left the pharmacy. Few of the cases offered 
irrefutable evidence that the prescription itself constituted an emergent problem that required 
governmental intervention.12  
 Still, the proliferation of the hypodermic needle created an environment of increased 
public scrutiny and physicians received a great deal of focus. While the press fixated on doctor’s 
roles in the burgeoning epidemic in ways that were often unfair, there was ample evidence the 
medical community used the needle rather freely. In 1865, Dr. D.L. McGugin reported that he 
had recently treated a Civil War soldier, who suffered from delirium tremens and could not 
sleep, with a hypodermic injection of morphine. He allegedly cured the patient, who soon left his 
care. Shortly afterwards, he saw another veteran of the war, troubled by a “delirium” that could 
not be contained with any known treatment. The doctor injected him with morphine, which 
“calmed the delirium” within an hour and “quiet repose followed.”  
The use of hypodermic morphine to ease post-traumatic stress or to quiet delirium 
tremens pointed to an alarming trend that could easily be seen as misuse. If a physician took a 
shortened perspective and understood their task to involve only the rapid remediation of the 
ailment presented, the use of morphine seemed logical. That was especially true if one 
considered its addictive power—even when administered hypodermically—to be no greater than 
the opium, cannabis, and morphine of the mid-nineteenth century. The profession also produced 
very little information regarding successes gained in follow-up visits. Data resulting from long 
 
12 “The Morphine Case,” The Brooklyn Union, October 14, 1867. 
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term and more holistic care did not often appear in medical journals. The results of 
experimentation, then, seemed to come from quick visits, in which the ailment was identified and 
rapidly treated. The patient was then discharged—oftentimes with a prescription for morphine to 
be injected hypodermically at home by the patient.13 
For every incident in which use of the drug seemed questionable, there were scores of 
cases in which morphine use appeared appropriate and exceedingly helpful. That was especially 
true in the prolongation of anesthesia during surgery. The Medical and Surgical Reporter 
suggested in 1865 that when injections of morphine were added to the commonly used 
chloroform, patients often remained unconscious throughout the entire procedure. In a medical 
landscape in which those being operated on frequently awoke in the middle of extraordinarily 
painful surgeries, writhing in pain and threatening the success of the procedure, surgeons readily 
embraced the power of morphine. They also used injections in the post-operation phase to reduce 
pain and assuage the impact of the shock that often followed. At England’s Middlesex Hospital 
“all the amputations, ovariotomies, herniotomies” had been followed with “a third to half a grain 
of morphia subcutaneously.” That style of use provided a level of unparalleled comfort to men 
and women who had just endured one of the most traumatic experiences the nineteenth-century 
had to offer.14  
Defining the scenarios in which the drug proved most beneficial was, of course, the result 
of trial and error and it was difficult to strike a logical balance. The Surgeon General of North 
Carolina, Dr. Edward Warren, delivered a lecture to the Baltimore Medical Association in 1867 
and argued that “in the early stages of pneumonia, pleurisy, bronchitis, enteritis, phlebitis, and 
 
13 Dr. D.L. McGugin, “Hypodermic Medication: The Instrument,” Medical and Surgical Reporter, Vol. 12, Issue 18,  
February 11, 1865.  
14 “Prolongation of Anaesthesia by Subcutaneous Injection of Morphia,” Medical and Surgical Reporter, July 25,  
1865; 13, 4. 
102 
 
inflammations generally…the subcutaneous injection of morphia plays an important role in 
scientific therapy.” Like in cases of alcoholism, depression, or post-traumatic stress, the use of 
intravenous morphine in bronchitis was likely an overreaction. Yet, he made those 
recommendations in the accommodating medical culture prior to the opioid epidemic, in which 
the breadth of the consequences that intravenous morphine use could engender were relatively 
unknown. So, again, in that mindset, being able to immediately arrest the symptoms of a sickness 
as common as bronchitis with minimal effort, seemed a reasonable and advisable form of use.15  
There were also borderline cases, like back pain, that would confound the medical 
profession for decades to come. A Pennsylvania doctor wrote in 1869 that he stood in awe of the 
“great advantages arising from the use of the hypodermic syringe” and commented that it was “a 
blessing” for “suffering humanity.” Even though others warned that intravenous morphine use 
could cause death, he embraced it. The doctor then used it in the case of William H., aged fifty, 
who suffered from sciatica—or lower back pain. After receiving a “full dose of morphia” via 
hypodermic syringe, his pain disappeared within minutes. The doctor repeated the cycle over the 
course of two days and the patient, allegedly cured, left his facility. He also left convinced that 
the most effective cure for lower back pain came in the form of an injection of morphine into his 
veins. The doctor’s confidence in that treatment, which fueled his prescriptions, which were then 
filled by a local pharmacist, only corroborated that notion.16 
That same Pennsylvania physician treated Mrs. S, forty-eight years old, who had a breast 
removed from cancer a year prior to him examining her. The pain that visited her in the 
aftermath of that operation had not ceased over the course of the year and so the doctor injected 
 
15 Edward Warren, M.D., “Original Department. Lectures. A Lecture on the Subcutaneous Injection of Morphia,” 
Medical and Surgical Reporter (1858-1898), March 2, 1867; 16, 9. 
16 “Hypodermic Injections,” Medical and Surgical Reporter, (1858-1898), July 17, 1869; 21, 3. 
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her with morphine. Thereafter, when treated with injections, her excruciating pain was finally 
relieved with “entire satisfaction.” For that doctor, who would have been otherwise incapacitated 
when it came to efficacious pain-relieving treatment, morphine gave him the power to heal those 
who had long suffered, like Mrs. S. It would have been easy, at that point in time, to view 
hypodermic morphine as a miracle medicine, shunned only by those backwards doctors still 
intent on plant-based pastes and folk cures.17 
In these ways, the path to America’s first opioid epidemic was largely paved with well-
meaning and seemingly effective uses. As the journals indicated, the crisis was also not confined 
to the United States. British, Irish, French, and German physicians similarly struggled with the 
consequences of the perceived overuse of morphine. The problem, however, was that established 
custom within the medical profession encouraged what could be perceived as excessive 
morphine use. Indeed, those practitioners existed in an environment in which powerful new 
drugs were often deployed to treat ailments society had long suffered from—neuralgia, tetanus, 
bronchitis, seizures, etc. Had there been better options proven to treat those illnesses, the 
profession no doubt would have used them. There were not. Also, hypodermic morphine worked 
wonders on common sickness in short-term care situations. The prolonged use, in a milieu in 
which morphine was legal, laid the groundwork for larger social problems.  
Dr. John Kent Spencer recommended using intravenous morphine to treat “obstinate 
vomiting” amongst pregnant women. In the case of “Mrs. E,” a twenty-four-year-old woman 
who was six months pregnant and had struggled with episodic and intense vomiting throughout 
her pregnancy, Dr. Kent offered the drug intravenously. Mrs. E. was then able to hold down food 
and showed improvement and so he continued the treatment which restored her appetite during a 
 
17 “Hypodermic Injections,” Medical and Surgical Reporter, (1858-1898), July 17, 1869; 21, 3. 
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difficult pregnancy. His use of the narcotic in limited and targeted ways may have stabilized her 
pregnancy and saved the life of the baby.  
As was often the case, however, Dr. Kent then provided an example where he used 
intravenous morphine in a manner that may have been ineffective. He introduced “Mrs. T., a 
middle-aged married woman” who suffered from “brandy-sickness, the result of secret 
drinking.” He began by giving her a grain of opium, which relived her “quasi-delirium,” but did 
little to address her vomiting spells. The physician then injected her with a quarter grain of 
morphine and she immediately began to take food again and generally regained her appetite. He 
noted, however, that the same cycle of events would undoubtedly reoccur because “her habits 
[were] incorrigible.” Having found success using hypodermic morphine to treat Mrs. T’s 
alcoholism, Dr. Kent most likely continued its use.”18  
Throughout the 1860s, American and British physicians continued using intravenous 
morphine in a wide variety of medical settings. Although addiction rates had yet to spike, 
producing cases like Ella Henderson’s, there was evidence that the seeds of a potential morphine 
crisis had been planted. In 1866, an Oregon, Missouri newspaper printed a story regarding a Mr. 
Fagan, whose daughter had recently died of a morphine overdose when the local pharmacist 
filled an order for that drug instead of quinine. The girl’s little brother, Johnny, was also 
prescribed morphine for a fleeting sickness. He allegedly resisted it claiming “it killed sissy, and 
it will kill me.” His family assured him it was not the medicine that killed his sister, but a 
mistake in the filling of the prescription. Knowing he would be forced to take the medicine, 
Little Johnny replied “I wish you would let me see my pony before I take it, because I do not 
 
18 “The Hypodermic Injection of Morphia as a Remedy for Obstinate Vomiting,” Medical and Surgical Reporter,  
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believe I will ever see him again.” His family, unconcerned, placated him and took Little Johnny 
to see his pony. He then took the medicine and, one hour after taking it, he “was a corpse.”19 
 The story of Little Johnny was a folkloric tale that mirrored the narratives of Greek 
tragedies and illustrated the power of a growing storyline in mainstream culture surrounding the 
dangers of morphine use in everyday life. For every case of physicians successfully treating the 
pain accompanying breast cancer surgery, the prolongation of anesthesia, or the stabilization of a 
pregnancy, there appeared to be an equal number of gut-wrenching suicides, tragic cases of 
misread scripts, and rampant overdoses. In the early phase of morphine’s introduction to 
American medicine, the benefits seemed to outweigh those anecdotal cases of addiction and 
seemingly avoidable tragedies, however. That situation began to change in the 1860s as the 
profession transitioned from powder morphine to the intravenous application of the drug.  
The Reality of an Opioid Epidemic 
In the fall of 1899, “a strange epidemic” struck the town of York, Pennsylvania. There, “a 
morphine epidemic…brought shame and even death to prominent people” in the city. In one of 
the court sessions that year several women, “formerly reputable, were proven guilty of 
immorality” and divorces were granted to their husbands. Locals alleged that several of the 
town’s pharmacists maintained standing orders of morphine for citizens. In many cases, those 
pharmacists were proven to be morphine addicts themselves. One of them, Robert Noll, had 
recently injected a young man named Henry Ross, who immediately died of an overdose. Noll 
then skipped town and was wanted by the authorities. “One of the saddest cases here,” the article 
concluded, was “that of a mother and daughter, both of whom [were] victims of the drug.” In 
 
19 “When Mr. Fagan’s Little Girl Died,” The Lincoln County Herald (Troy, MO), August 10, 1866.  
 
106 
 
York, Pennsylvania, according to the story, morphine had nearly single-handedly upended an 
entire American town.20 
The narrative of the fallen woman would become a centerpiece of opioid crisis reporting, 
one that drove the storyline for decades. The middle-class woman, once respectable and chaste, 
then reduced to unfathomable lows by morphine became the face of the crisis. These “fallen 
women” were similar to Ella Henderson who, by merely trusting their local physician, entered 
the world of deadly drug addiction. They had been tricked by American doctors, who were then 
presented as reckless and cruel figures with undeserved power. The consequences of their liberal 
prescriptions of morphine, according to countless tales, proved to be devastating. In these 
narratives, morphine addiction rapidly evolved into a public menace, attacked the average 
middle-class American family, addicted mothers and daughters to one of the most potent drugs 
available, and left incomprehensible wreckage in its place.  
While it was true that an unprecedented number of women seemed to develop morphine 
addictions in the late-nineteenth-century, the drug did not discriminate along gendered lines.   
In 1871, Henry B. Castle, fifty-one years old and a notable resident of Cleveland, walked to a 
dock off the city’s Superior Street and jumped into the river. A private watchman observed it, 
found a rope and threw it to him, but he would not accept it and drowned. Castle had immigrated 
to Cleveland from Canada, where he then became a successful businessman. In 1870, one year 
before his death, he lived with his wife Mary, son Orville, and two domestic aides in a house 
valued at $35,000—or $715,000 adjusted for inflation. It was later reported by his brother that, 
for six years before his death, he developed a hopeless addiction to morphine “by injection under 
the skin.”  
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Much like Ella Henderson, Mr. Castle began taking morphine to treat chronic pain from a 
mysterious sickness. Before he began using the narcotic, Castle had developed a reputation as a 
man who not only “had business perplexities” but also “the highest pride.” The morphine slowly 
took that from him. He used it regularly and excessively and “sought encouragement, and got it, 
from those whom science should have held up a warning finger to.” In his final hours, Castle 
exhibited a “bewildered brain” not controlled by “will or purpose.” It was a tragic mindset that 
led him to “wheresoever insane caprice or intent” dictated. In one of his bouts with mental 
illness, an episode likely onset by the symptoms of longtime morphine addiction, he hurled 
himself into the Cuyahoga and refused to be rescued.21  
While these stories did not prove the existence of a drug epidemic that had spread beyond 
the medical community’s ability to contain it, but they slowly transformed the public’s 
perception of morphine use. The stories of men like Mr. Castle highlighted issues related to easy 
access to potentially destructive drugs. Consequently, the medical community came into clearer 
focus. The Chicago Tribune argued in April of 1872 that doctors were responsible for the 
creation of “nineteenth-twentieths” of the “opium eaters” in the United States. Those “habitual 
givers of narcotics” could be blamed for “all the misery, the wasted life, the early death” that 
accompanied addiction to opium and morphine. Sure, the Tribune contended, it was “sometimes 
pleasant to benumb the senses with opium and morphine,” but those drugs primarily covered up 
the source of the real disease by lessening its symptoms. It encouraged physicians, instead, to 
focus their skills on uprooting the disease itself and less on treating its symptoms. It was an aged 
argument at that point, one that neatly highlighted the enduring power of that persistent and 
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nuanced question: to what extent should physicians, when presented with cases they could not 
feasibly cure, focus instead on easing pain and reducing the bodily impact of the disease’s 
symptoms? It was in those cases—assuaging the excruciating symptoms of common ailments—
that physicians found the bulk of their workload.22  
The root cause of the nation’s alleged drug problem became an issue of perception. So, 
too, did theories on the true dimension of the epidemic (if one existed). A New York journal 
argued that, as of 1875, the United States harbored 100,000 “confirmed opium eaters” and it 
immediately wagged it finger at “careless physicians.” These doctors allowed their patients “to 
acquire the habit” because of the “deliberate preference of many for opium eating to dram-
drinking.” Whatever the full extent of the problem might have been, it was indisputable “that an 
immense amount of opium [was] consumed in this country.” The article concluded there was no 
cure for addiction once firmly rooted, but that greater control over the writing and filling of 
prescriptions could stall the “acquisition of the deadly habit in many cases.”23 
It was a strong reaction to the relatively miniscule number of opioid addicts, which—if 
the estimate that there were 100,000 addicts could be trusted—represented less than one tenth of 
one percent of the total United States population in 1875. Those figures lent credibility to the 
assertion that opioid addiction was a manageable clinical problem best dealt with in medical 
facilities. Moreover, it might also help explain why, in a cost-benefit analysis of morphine’s 
benefit versus its consequences, the medical profession continued using it as they had been 
trained to. If the social consequences of addiction were rare occurrences, then it was reasonable 
to treat bronchitis, alcoholism, and—strangely—opioid addiction itself, with hypodermic 
morphine.  
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In lieu of official statistics offering valuable perspective on the true extent of the 
problem, Americans had little choice but to rely on newspaper reporting and the accumulation of 
anecdotal information. Despite its sensationalist tone, however, the press often provided in-depth 
reporting revealing an alarming lack of organization in the medical and pharmaceutical 
communities. One reporter embedded himself in the crisis as it unfolded in the Virginia Valley. 
There, he discovered Mr. Tyree, a “druggist,” who was “waiting on a bevy of dashing girls.” 
There were four of them and they “seemed to be ‘sweet sixteens.’” As they left the store Mr. 
Tyree told him, “there they go; they are some of your opium eaters.” The writer was perplexed, 
“What! Those pretty things?” he asked, incredulously. Yes, Mr. Tyree explained, the girls had 
just started using opium and now spent six dollars weekly to indulge their habits. As he moved 
through the valley, the stories the writer heard confirmed that—at least in the Virginia Valley—
there was an entrenched epidemic.24 
In one of those small Virginia towns a pharmacist asked the reporter if he saw the 
“handsomely dressed English lady” standing on the other side of the street from them. After the 
reporter noted he did, the druggist outed her as one of his best customers. According to the 
pharmacists’ story, the well-dressed British woman had started taking morphine two years prior 
to her being spotted on the street that day and frequently sent her servant for a quarter grain dose 
a day. She had since graduated to four grains. The reporter asked if there were many similar 
cases in the town and the clerk confessed to having “15 regular lady customers” who took more 
than two grains of morphine daily. He also noted that twelve men regularly ingested between two 
and six grains per dose. “You think the evil here is on the increase?” the reporter asked. “My 
goodness! Yes,” the pharmacist answered. One of the last druggists the reporter visited in 
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Virginia, who wished his name to be kept secret, checked his books and reported that he had sold 
79,593 doses of morphine in the past year. If the pharmacist’s numbers were trustworthy—and 
their specificity suggests they may have been—then there appeared to be sizable opioid problem 
in the American countryside. 
The issue also seemed to be as pronounced in the North as it was the South. In Rochester, 
New York, the use of the drug was similarly on the rise in the 1870s and a local pharmacist 
claimed it was not uncommon for “some ladies” to take more than 1 ½ ounces per day. “One 
lady is reported as taking half a pint of laudanum daily, and another consumes from 120 to 180 
grains every week,” wrote The Edinburgh Evening News. Opium addicts also included many 
“high society” men and women, individuals who were “as closely wedded to the drowsy drug as 
are the habitues of our bar-rooms to their cups.” The more respectable opium-eaters never visited 
the drug stores in person and instead sent children or servants to procure it. “In some instances,” 
the paper continued, “where husbands have forbidden druggists to sell opium to their wives, the 
women resort to all sorts of strategy to obtain the pernicious drug.”25  
While the apparent epidemic reached much further than the middle-class household and 
did not discriminate along gendered lines, it was true that many privileged women found 
themselves addicted to morphine. It was also a fact that the press, looking for stories that 
captured the collective imagination, seized upon that gendered imagery to enhance the narrative 
of drug addiction in America. This style of reporting thrived in a situation in which late-
nineteenth century state and federal agencies failed to gather information pointing to the actual 
number of drug addicts in the United States. Similarly, there was little data outlining who used 
the American healthcare system most. From anecdotal newspaper reports, however, middle-class 
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households seemed to be most reliant on physicians and, consequently, more exposed to 
experimental medical practices. It made sense, then, that addiction rates spiked within that 
demographic.  
Thus, the often sensationalist reporting on the crisis continued unchecked by verifiable 
fact. A correspondent for the Cincinnati Inquirer argued that there had been “no deaths equal to 
that of the lady who dropped dead from disappointment because she could not get her opium.” 
The British and Irish presses widely reprinted the article, entitled “Opium Eating in Virginia.” 
According to the story, the relatively small town of Staunton, Virginia, the location in which the 
unfortunate woman fainted, went through 100 pounds of opium per week, which “is pretty heavy 
for a city of 8,000 or 10,000.” A large quantity of the drug was “bought by country people, for 
the craving for it all down the valley is strong, if not stronger than it is in the city.”26  
While the media accounts obviously harbored an alarmist mentality, the stories appeared 
to be realistic at the time and stoked real anxiety. Indeed, the figures from the Virginia Valley 
suggested that the nation had far more than a mere 100,000 opioid addicts. Those figures also 
indicated that the problem was just as prolific in the American countryside as it was in 
Philadelphia, New York City or London. Adding to the alarm, it was exceedingly difficult to 
determine what constituted an addiction. Not only did individuals tend to hide their overuse, but 
the morphine crisis was not completely defined by physical dependency. It was also propelled by 
accidental poisonings, overdoses, suicides, and general abuse. Those tragedies, many of them 
having little to do with addiction, nonetheless contributed to the sense that the United States 
suffered from a significant drug problem that threatened to grow in intensity.  
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The reporting also highlighted a variety of problems in the way the United States 
distributed opioids. While druggists in Virginia lamented the rise of an epidemic they claimed to 
witness firsthand, they nonetheless felt obligated—either from a sense of professional duty or 
profit—to continue dispensing the substance without prejudice. The substance was legal and so 
they sold it to sixteen-year-old girls without a prescription and to scores of men and women they 
recognized as exhibitors of drug seeking behavior. Worse, many of them did not keep records of 
transactions and so the drugs flowed, unaccounted for, throughout the countryside. The statistics 
from Virginia suggested it was impossible that 100 pounds of opium, consumed by a town of 
10,000 people, could solely be attributed to a handful of isolated addicts—nor by a small group 
of women. The media’s focus, however, remained on that aspect of the story. The Ladies’ 
Repository argued in 1872, “We [ladies] get a habit of taking mental poison, as we do stimulants 
and narcotics” and even claimed that reading novels was “very much like dram-drinking and 
opium-eating.” It seemed that women of the era had developed “a habit of tickling the palate 
with indigestible dainties” and “villainous compounds that ought never be taken into a 
Christian’s stomach.”27  
As the medical and pharmaceutical community, the popular press, and a growing number 
of Americans sought an answer for the rising drug crisis, many competing theories emerged. It 
was alleged that younger, urban, and middle-class women pursued morphine highs due to the 
boredom of home-life. The British press claimed that “fine dames and demoiselles were found to 
be addicted to tippling laudanum and morphine” because the potent drugs worked “almost 
magical effects on the mind.” The drugs were delivered by “a fashionable chemist” near Hyde 
Park in London who oversaw a “handsome trade in the retail of peculiar little bottles of opium 
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essence.” He delivered the opium to his customer “in her brougham” where she could “drink the 
contents, and then enjoy a solitary drive, lost in the fascinating dreamland conjured up in her 
brain by the pernicious poison she had swallowed.” It was an escape for modern women, or so 
the press insinuated, and that detour from reality was enabled by a pharmaceutical industry that 
bordered, at times, on functioning as a primary purveyor of narcotics in a recreational drug 
market.28 
In these cases, the recreational use of opium and morphine overlapped with reports of  
addictions created by physicians through their treatment of underlying conditions. The women 
who took opium and then enjoyed a solitary drive lost in thought resembled the experiences 
pursued by those who wrote hashish confessionals, which circulated at the same time. That 
reality pointed to the ongoing interaction between medical experimentation and a more 
recreational use. Also, newspaper reports suggested that American and British pharmacies 
readily supplied both styles of users, which accelerated concerns about practices within the 
medical and pharmaceutical professions. At the same time, social theories regarding the origins 
of the drug problem spread.  
The rising narcotic crisis was variously blamed on moral erosion, a tendency towards 
diversion and entertainment over self-mastery and restraint, boredom, genetic defection, laziness, 
modernity, Godlessness, etcetera. In one case, the growing narcotic crisis was blamed on fashion, 
which tended to “crush out every atom of independence” and encase “its votaries in fetters 
stronger than brass, and as irksome to some of them as the chain that bound Prometheus to the 
rock.” The article concluded, “No one outside the aristocratic circle can guess the misery which 
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such habits must produce, superadded to the changeless misery of living a life regulated every 
hour by the remorseless rigid demands of a thing called etiquette.”29 
 While the medical community worked to solve a crisis it had been blamed for creating, 
their efforts were less publicized than the relentless stories regarding the horrors of morphine 
addiction. As the epidemic continued, tales of drug-related woe became more detailed, personal, 
and tragic. In one of the more severe cases involving morphine and the imagery of the fallen 
woman, the Washington Post covered the case of Andrew McGort’s petition for divorce from his 
wife Sarah F. McGort. Sarah had become a morphine addict and thereafter took many trips to 
Richmond, Virginia (ostensibly to visit her sister). When she left for the city and failed to return, 
Andrew filed for divorce. The documents were sent to a lawyer named Wilkinson in Richmond, 
who found “the fallen wife in a tenement of one of the most notorious bagnios in Richmond and 
almost without clothing.” Worse, Sarah “made no defense to the action” and, as an excuse, only 
said that she could make more money “by that life” than she could any other way. In court, 
Andrew testified that his wife was a victim of “the terrible opium habit” and that was, he 
thought, “the cause of her degradation.” He further noted she would “sell her clothes and lead a 
life of shame to secure money for the purchase of morphine.” Sarah did not pursue this life 
because she could not otherwise indulge her taste for the finer things in life, like many women 
apparently did, but rather because of her unquenchable thirst for opium and morphine. “She 
would even sell the clothes she wore,” the story reiterated, “barely retaining enough to cover 
herself.” The Post suggested that a more terrible commentary on the state of the opium habit 
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could not have been found. The emphasis on clothes, or the idea of selling them to gain 
morphine, stood in as a euphemism to conceal the prostitution.30 
 Newspapers continually covered the many morphine related tragedies and their reporting 
offered unique glimpses into the drug economy of the late-nineteenth century. James Sheffield, 
for example, committed suicide in July of 1871. His behavior leading up to death offered several 
warning signs that apparently went unnoticed. In one case, a witness testified that the last words 
were “Good bye; I am going to take poison.” Other witnesses reported seeing him on the 
Monday prior to his death in a “state of intoxication, and appearing as if he had been beaten.” He 
behaved erratically and, according to several witnesses, announced that “he intended to shoot 
someone.” Joseph Rowan, a drug clerk, testified that Sheffield had purchased twenty grains of 
morphine from him the day before he died. Rowan said he thought Sheffield to be “under the 
influence of liquor at the time” and corroborated other accounts claiming he “looked as if he had 
been badly beaten.” Nonetheless, Rowan sold a clearly intoxicated man, who appeared to have 
recently been in a fight, twenty grains of morphine in the evening hours. Sheffield was forty-one 
years old at the time of his suicide.31  
In a singularly tragic case, Dr. James Connolly, an Irish surgeon in New York City, killed 
his children and became “The Mad Irish Doctor” of the city.  He had developed such a problem 
with alcoholism that he was removed from his house on Eleventh Street and forced into an 
inebriate asylum. He returned happily cured and then relapsed. On June 18, 1871, after having 
allegedly taken heavy doses of morphine the preceding two days, Connolly locked himself in his 
room at about four o’clock with his two children, aged two years and seven months old. The 
neighbors were first to report that it sounded as though “some violence was being perpetrated” in 
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Connolly’s home. The police forced the door open and found Mr. Connelly and his two children 
“all dead—literally bathed in blood.” Horrifyingly, “the throats of the children had been cut with 
surgical skill” and the physician’s own throat was cut from ear to ear. The “desperate 
determination of the suicide-assassin was evinced by several stabs in the region of the heart.” His 
true motivations—and if morphine exacerbated his mental illnesses—could not be determined. 
The police and the paper suspected so, however, and so his behavior became an example of what 
unchecked morphine addiction, combined with alcoholism, could wreak.32 
These types of stories continued to crossed the Atlantic as well. The Lancet, a prestigious 
British medical journal, expressed alarm over “the increasing prevalence of opium eating on the 
American continent” and noted the efforts of the State Board of Health of Massachusetts. The 
board had recently issued a survey to gain a better understanding of opiate use. One hundred and 
twenty-five physicians responded to the questionnaire and forty reported that “they did not know 
any cases of opium eating, or that it was used for other than medicinal purposes.” The remaining 
eighty-five “stated that the habit prevailed considerably in their various districts and localities, 
and was increasing in extent.”33   
By the 1870s, the medical community, the press, a growing number of social 
commentators and political figures, and the reading public, seemed to accept the notion that the 
United States suffered from a significant drug problem. An increasingly alarmist media then took 
the often-complex reality underlying that alleged crisis, amplified the tragedies it had 
engendered, and worked to destabilize a medical profession it blamed for negligence. The 
medical and pharmaceutical community had enabled individuals like the Mad Doctor of New 
York, who killed his family, assisted in helping unstable Americans commit suicide, and led 
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women like Sarah McGort into a life of prostitution. Whether or not those individuals’ opium 
habits began with a physicians’ prescription was unclear, but the profession nonetheless suffered 
from the association.  
The Ongoing Search for a Solution 
 
The growing presence of morphine-related tragedy forced a conversation within the 
medical community about how and when morphine should be prescribed and dispensed. The 
Lancet argued that the problem involved the “opiate treatment of certain nervous and chronic 
disorders, with injudicious and often unnecessary prescription of the drug.” The publication 
confessed it did not know how to answer the question definitively, conceding it was most 
“difficult to devise a remedy for what threatens to become a corroding cancer in the national life 
of this great republic.” Indeed, it was a complex problem. Morphine had revolutionized the 
treatment of pain and for every tragedy it enabled, there were many who had been relieved of a 
level of suffering that had been impossible to treat a generation earlier. In that sense, the drug 
had become, and would continue to be, a staple of medical practice.34  
The most effective response to the crisis came from the medical community itself. It 
began to reconsider its use of morphine while also expanding its knowledge of addiction. Dr. Ed 
Levinstein delivered a paper to the Medical Society of Berlin in 1876 and argued that the 
excessive use of morphine created an addiction very similar to alcoholism. He likened “a 
morphinic delirium” to delirium tremens and introduced one of his patients, a thirty-year old 
married man, who developed the habit of injecting fifteen grains of acetate of morphine daily to 
treat rheumatism. After five years, he developed what Levinstein called “morphinism,” which 
manifested as “insomnia, irritability, neuralgic pains, muscular contractions, and dryness of the 
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tongue.” His wife, also thirty, similarly developed a morphine habit to “assuage certain hepatic 
cholics.” She used the drug, allegedly, to “get tranquility of the mind” and to “conquer violent 
moral emotions.” After diagnosing them both with a new disease—morphinism—Levinstein 
tapered their use of the drug and restored them to good health.35 
Just as the medical community used a trial-and-error approach to determine which cases 
morphine proved most effective, it did the same with incidences of morphine dependency. While 
many advocated for a gradual lessening of the patient’s addiction as opposed to a moral 
interpretation of the problem, it was a difficult balance to strike. Dr. Henry P. Wenzel of 
Theresa, Wisconsin, for example, argued addiction was the result of the fact that his generation 
lived “in a fast age, and the motto is hurry.” Even the sons of Esculapius [the Greek god of 
medicine] were “in the throng of neck-breaking progress.” The Scientific American averred that 
“from an ethical standpoint” there was but one viewpoint to have on “inebriety”: an “unsparing 
condemnation of the practice, and earnest endeavors on the part of society to reclaim those 
addicted to it.” Science, on the other hand, had to draw a “broad distinction between drunkenness 
as a vice and drunkenness as a disease.”36  
 As those within the medical profession made advancements, like labelling morphine 
addiction a disease to be treated under the term “morphinism,” others remained skeptical and 
continued to rely on perceptions that its use was a matter of choice and was inspired by a 
reaction to social pressure, moral weakness, etc. They represented a minority, however, and the 
disease concept of addiction began to reign in mainstream medical circles. Dr. George M. Beard 
delivered a paper to the American Association for the Cure of Inebriates in 1876 and equated 
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addiction to a nervous disorder, like neuralgia or dyspepsia. He reiterated the words of an 
American physician of the period, “he who drinks because he cannot help it, being led by an 
irresistible impulse is a sick man and needs not a temperance pledge, but a physician.”37  
 Despite these interpretive gains, however, alarming trends continued to set the profession 
back. As the medical community’s reputation continued to suffer for its alleged role in spreading 
a morphine epidemic, physicians turned to a celebration of the medicinal value of cocaine. 
Backlash quickly followed. “An old doctor” from St. Louis, Missouri, informed a reporter in 
1885—while holding up a bottle of “colorless water-like fluid”—that “with this fluid and with an 
hypodermic syringe it would hardly be too much to say that I could change St. Francis of Assisse 
[sic] into Charles Guiteau.”38 He continued to emphasize his point, “I could take the purest and 
best man or woman in the city of St. Louis, and, after a course of treatment reaching not over two 
weeks, change him or her into a beast, unworthy, base, and wretched.” He concluded by arguing 
it was “the devil’s own drug.”39 Cocaine, a new and allegedly Satanic concoction, had—like 
opium, cannabis, and morphine before it—crossed the lines separating limited medicinal use 
from a more recreational style of consumption. Worse, however, it combined with the 
democratization of the hypodermic needle to significantly accelerate the nation’s drug crisis.   
Cocaine use did not spread as widely as intravenous morphine. It did, however, play a 
crucial role in nurturing the image of doctors as out of touch with the dangers of modern 
“medicine.” First, the medical community’s use of the narcotic confirmed the idea that the 
profession still adhered to practices that the general public increasingly saw as dangerous. While 
that portrayal, a continuation of the narrative established during the morphine epidemic, was 
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unfair, there were also a multitude of cases that provided evidence for those who wanted to 
demean the profession. Thus, as news of the community’s supposed mishandling of the 
morphine crisis reached apex, physicians were then charged with taking a dangerously liberal 
approach to the dispensation of cocaine.  
Sir Robert Christison, a Scottish physician and toxicologist, argued in the 1880s that 
cocaine proved an ideal remedy for treating exhaustion and fatigue. He noted that it especially 
restored strength after “severe exercise” and encouraged two pupils, after they returned from a 
sixteen-mile walk, to forego water or food in favor of cocaine. They were, he claimed, 
completely relieved of fatigue and even walked another hour before supper. Dr. Christison also 
suggested cocaine was a good fit for treating “female nervousness” and for the suppression of 
appetite. In cases such as this, in which cocaine was prescribed for casual use, it certainly 
appeared the profession had yet to learn any lessons from the morphine epidemic.40 
The news that physicians had addicted themselves to cocaine—just as they had 
intravenous morphine—further undermined public trust in the everyday practice of medicine. In 
Chicago, the newspaper press reported that Dr. Charles Bradley had become “a cocaine slave” 
and eagerly printed the “thrilling recital of his downfall.” Bradley, once “accomplished and 
prosperous physician” in the city “ruined himself and his family by becoming a slave to 
morphine and cocaine.” His case attracted “considerable attention, not only among the medical 
fraternity, but from the general public, owing to its remarkable and sensational features.” Dr. 
Bradley’s case read like the sensationalist reports that emerged from the morphine epidemic and 
further corroborated the startling theory that many physicians themselves had become addicted to 
drugs. Bradley confessed that he became so “absorbed” in his “scientific experiments with 
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cocaine” that he failed to realize the “insidious and dangerous nature of the drug” until it was too 
late.41 
The public impression that the medical profession had lost control of the nation’s narcotic 
crisis created a growing sense that the problem had to be transferred to the political realm. On the 
other hand, just as intravenous morphine proved immensely valuable in appropriate scenarios, so 
too did medicinal cocaine. Evidence of incidences in which doctors properly deployed the drug 
countered the widespread claim they were essentially incompetent. As with morphine, use of the 
drug depended on context, dosage, and the long-term management of the patient. Doctors, in 
fact, often used cocaine quite effectively as a local anesthetic in ophthalmological procedures, in 
which they cautiously dropped it into the eye. The drug also proved productive, according to 
medical journals, in cases of trachelorrhaphy, or the stitching of a laceration of the uterus.  
Additionally, dentists used cocaine to arrest pain resulting from toothaches, and some 
doctors found, when injected hypodermically, cocaine could also ease stomach pain. Other 
physicians employed it as ear drops to treat infection. Then, it followed the trail of all new and 
promising drugs when physicians used it in cases of muscular disorders like neuralgia. Cocaine 
also appeared to treat dysphagia, or difficulty swallowing, alleviated the symptoms of 
menstruation, and eased pelvic spasms in women; it was also an effective anesthetic in the 
removal of cancerous tumors, a quick way to quell the vomiting associated with pregnancy, a 
treatment for hemorrhoids, and etcetera. In short, like opium, morphine, and cannabis before it, 
there was enough evidence redeeming the use of cocaine to justify its continued use.42 
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The problem with cocaine—just as it had been with morphine—had less to do with the 
drug itself and instead often involved nuanced issues like dosage and the duration of use. In 
1890, shortly after the popularization of medicinal cocaine, the Societe de Biologie in Paris 
reported cases of “chronic poisoning” by physicians. One man, forty-eight years of age, had been 
prescribed morphine for colic in 1878. In 1886, his physician switched the patient to the use of 
cocaine. The story suggested, first—and alarmingly—that the man had continued his use of 
morphine for eight straight years. Secondly, instead of seeing a physician who tapered him off 
that level of usage, he found one that recommended cocaine instead. After two months of 
consistent cocaine use, he began “to have many and various hallucinations—he saw things 
moving around him, heard strange sounds which frightened him; and was in a state of abnormal 
excitability.” This man, eight years after being given morphine for colic, began presenting with 
drug-induced mental illness and no follow-up on his case could be found in the record.43 
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In the ensuing battle over who was better suited to manage the nation’s drug crisis, the 
medical profession continued to lose—fairly or unfairly. The relentlessly sensationalistic news, 
which fixated on drug-related tragedy and drama, underwritten by burgeoning local political 
action, proved no match for an insular community of often aging physicians. Already covering 
the morphine epidemic with sensationalist flair, it was relatively easy for media attention to pivot 
towards a focus on cocaine as well. In a syndicated article entitled “The Cocaine Habit,” a South 
Carolina newspaper argued that use of the drug was “a comparatively new addition to the evils 
by which humanity is beset” and argued that it promised to “excel even morphinism in the 
insidiousness of its growth, in blasting destructiveness and the number of its victims.” In 1902, 
the New Orleans Times-Democrat suggested that “never a vice was killed, though, that another 
did not spring up in its place” and that cocaine had “superseded opium.”  
As the medical community sought to address the growing problem with intravenous 
morphine addiction, doctors’ use of cocaine as a potential therapeutic continued to raise concerns 
about their approach to vetting new narcotics for the marketplace. Moreover, the medical 
community, which expressed itself primarily through journals, failed to counter the often-
misguided portrayals of its work. Thus, the situation often centered on the social power of 
messaging more than it did a nuanced conversation on modern medical practices. Instead, the 
profession’s alleged misuse of cocaine continued to nurture theories of widespread medical 
incompetence; one that gave credence to media narratives and that justified political 
intervention.44 
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  As the profession struggled with the use of cocaine within the context of an opioid crisis, 
it did develop a new empathy in approaching morphine addiction. While that modified approach 
did not dramatically change the rhythm of the opioid epidemic, it led to a gradual reformation 
within the practice of medicine. By framing morphine dependency as a disease, some physicians 
pursued a more thoughtful approach to its use. That was especially true when it came to the 
counterintuitive practice of treating disease by implanting a new one in the form of a chemical 
dependency. Moral prejudice was difficult to eradicate, however. One doctor compared inebriety 
in the upper-classes and lower-classes and found lower-class Americans were less prone to the 
“functional nervous disorders” that caused addiction while the “vice of drunkenness” abounded 
in its “most revolting aspects.” In other words, middle-class Americans often developed an 
accidental and organic form of addiction that could be treated in the clinic. They had trusted their 
local physician and accepted treatment for chronic pain or nervousness and, through that faith, 
developed a dependency. They were, in this telling, mere victims of a system that had not 
responsibly regulated itself.45 
Within the lower-classes, however, it was an altogether different story. Those individuals 
did not seem to suffer from fundamental psychological or physiological issues other than a desire 
for perpetual intoxication. They had not been duped, like the middle-class had, but had instead 
manipulated the system intentionally to get what they craved—inebriation. Both the popular and 
academic presses reinforced the need to be able to distinguish a debauch from a victim. Often, 
the formula seemed to be rooted mostly in social prejudice, and poor whites, immigrants, and 
anyone of color represented the debauch while the middle-class white American stood apart as a 
victim. The tendency to united prejudice and professional theory nurtured an unfortunate 
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storyline that would hold significant sway for the remainder of the twentieth-century and 
dramatically influence the trajectory of public policy.  
The Scientific American suggested the best response to the crisis was to simply wait it out 
and let evolution deselect those involved in it. The publication theorized that degenerates would 
soon become unable to procreate because of substance abuse, thus eliminating their influence on 
humanity. It argued that “the excessively feeble and nervous stocks must perish…and thus, by a 
process of successive eliminations, a race may be developed that shall be every way adapted to 
the complex conditions of high civilization.”46 For any advance made within the medical 
profession to combat the epidemic, other theorists—like eugenicists, in this case—also 
contributed to the conversation. The crisis then became something of a national debate that 
extended far beyond the clinical setting and entered the arena of pseudo-science, spiritualism, 
literature, entrepreneurism, and politics.47 
 That reality did not stunt the medical community’s efforts at reconsidering the nature of 
opioid addiction, however. J.B. Mattison, of Brooklyn, argued that “the vast majority of opium 
habitues become such not from choice, not from merely vicious indulgence—an idea mistakenly 
held by many both in and out of the profession—but from a physical necessity.”48 To him, the 
source of addiction began with a painful ailment eased by the use of morphine. After that 
legitimate use, the drug often “forged around its unsuspecting victim a chain so powerful that 
self, unaided, was powerless to break it.” In the last ten years, Mattison claimed, he had treated 
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many cases of opium addiction and the diversity of the users surprised him. He had even treated 
other physicians, typically men of “iron will,” who proved no match for the power of the drug.49 
Innovative new terminology continued to function as a key way to combat the crisis. 
Instead of presenting those addicted to morphine as “opium-eaters,” the medical community 
advanced its experimentation with more clinical labels like morphinism or morphiomania. The 
shift was subtle, but it placed the blame on the drug itself and removed the “eater” from the 
equation. Dr. Seymour John Sharkey, an English neurologist, argued in 1887 that new diseases, 
especially those considered a vice, required changes in the English language. He argued that “we 
now find ourselves face to face with a new vice, which some French writers have named 
morphinomanie, and which the Germans call Morphiumsucht.” Sharkey called users 
morphinomaniacs; others in the field preferred morphinism. He wrote that “most people will be 
startled to hear that London society resorts freely to the use of morphia injections for the purpose 
of killing time or of producing certain vague and pleasurable sensations similar to those which 
are derived from tobacco-smoking.” While Sharkey considered moderate doses of morphine to 
be medically beneficial, the drug was “only safe in the hands of medical men who appreciate its 
dangers; abuse almost certainly follows if its administration be left to the patients themselves.”50  
  The fact that the opioid crisis, specifically the rise of “morphiomania,” was not a 
uniquely American problem validated opinions that morphine addiction had become a major 
global issue. The international reach of the crisis also undercut notions that American physicians 
and pharmacists were solely to blame. Morphine addiction seemed to be a broader crisis 
highlighting systemic problems within the practice of Western medicine. Considering that the 
British and American medical community collaborated in the development of a trial-and-error 
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style of vetting new medicines for public use, it made sense they would also share any 
consequences resulting from that shared approach. An Australian paper based in Sydney reported 
that in France morphine use had spread from rich to the working classes and that they were 
trading in their “pipe, pouch, and matchbox” for a “prickling needle, a syringe, and a small phial 
of morphine.” The Parisian elite felt “some feelings of shame at their degradation,” but, 
according to sources, they rarely missed opportunities to indulge in morphine. Even at the opera, 
“there [were] ladies” who would “retire to the back part of the box, and indulge in the puncture 
and the pump.”51  
 Outlying newspapers, like the Indiana State Sentinel, published articles on the morphine 
crisis abroad. It noted that “morphiomania” had become “a great scourge in Berlin” and that it 
began with the overuse of morphine to treat “bodily suffering and sleeplessness.” Those afflicted 
included men and women from all walks of life, “tradespeople, merchants, judges, barristors 
[sic], soldiers, students, doctors, and clergymen.” By the time most patients sought treatment, the 
addiction had deepened to a level difficult to treat. The article repeated what had become a 
common tale in the press: “First, these subcutaneous injections offer the quickest and easiest 
means to allay pain and bring rest to the sufferer.” Afterwards, however, the patient became so 
“accustomed to these skin injections that they [became] indispensable.” The article appeared in 
Fort Scott, Kansas, Oakland, Washington, D.C., Wilmington, North Carolina, Staunton, Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, and Marion, Ohio.52  
 From rural Indiana and the Virginia Valley to Berlin and Paris, France, morphiomania 
appeared to tighten its hold. The trend of blaming physicians was also apparent in Europe. 
“When physicians discovered that pain could be subdued by inserting under the skin a small 
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pointed instrument provided with a tube containing morphia,” a British reporter expounded, 
“they little thought they were paving the new way for a vice.” Those who took it fell into “a 
delicious langur” where “happy thoughts and bright imagination” filled the body. The piece 
concluded by arguing that “the heritage of insanity, of inebriety, of imbecility, will in the future 
be traced back to those tiny tubes.” Morphine, which was once looked at as “a blessed means of 
relieving pain” had been unleashed by an overly optimistic medical profession that failed to 
understand that “blessings and curses go hand in hand in a crooked world.” This “later born 
sister fiend,” it wrote, “is morphiomania.”53  
 Connecticut physician T.D. Crothers announced, in 1892, his “emphatic dissent against 
the common use of the word habit, in describing the opium disease.” He asserted that healing 
from morphine addiction required an extensive knowledge of physiology and psychology, skills 
beyond what could be expected of everyday citizens. It was a clinical issue. Crothers railed 
against the notion that those addicted to drugs reached that point through personal choice. He 
claimed that most attempts at resolving entrenched drug addiction was due to overreliance “on 
the old superstition of a moral origin, and some wilful [sic], wicked impulse.” Not only had 
many doctors created drug addictions through their liberal approach to prescriptions, but they 
then pivoted to a condemnation of the addict afterwards.54 
 Crothers had theoretical problems of his own, however. He claimed that signs of 
addiction could be observed early in life and used one of his colleague’s sons as a case study.  
He believed the two-year old boy already exhibited traits consistent with alcoholism. The doctor 
claimed the child ate and drank excessively from all placed before him. He “ate exclusively of 
such foods as he liked, for days living on potatoes or bread alone, then changing to soups or 
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liquids.” As the boy grew, he had trouble focusing as a student, “drank too much cider when he 
visited the country, and only seemed to take interest in eating or in taking in the odors of 
perfumes or drugs.” 
At the age of fourteen, the boy “became very licentious” and was sent to a boarding 
school. At eighteen, he drank beer every day and associated “with low characters” and, by the 
relatively young age of twenty, he had been institutionalized as a drunk. While the boy’s father 
blamed his son’s friends for his alcoholism, Crothers argued that the signs had been evident early 
in the boy’s life. Crothers was so confident in his analysis that he urged colleagues to look for 
“impulsive and unregulated tastes for foods and drinks, morbid selfishness and changeableness 
of plans and purposes, great irritability and sensitiveness, emotional disturbances, conditions of 
depression and exhaustion, insomnia, and always neurasthenia.” Given that broad methodology, 
a great percentage of Americans would have likely showed traits of addictive behavior.55  
There also remained legitimate fears about drug addiction within the medical community 
itself, which was an alarming proposition considering the reality at the time. Crothers reported 
that, based on a survey of 3,244 physicians “residing in the Eastern, Middle and some of the 
cities of the Western states,” 21 percent of the medical profession used “spirits or opium to 
excess.” Six percent of them used morphine openly and ten percent were found to use opium or 
other drugs “secretly.” In a separate study of 170 physicians, seven percent were found to use 
opium or morphine and six percent were “secret drug takers.” Crothers argued that “from the 
personal observations of a number of physicians who have a large acquaintance with medical 
men, from 8 to 10 per cent are either secret or open drug and morphine habituès.”56 
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 These kinds of stories, in this case generated by a fellow physician, did not help the 
medical community’s reputation. The internal divide over whether compulsive inebriation was a 
disease or evidence of moral blight also slowed reform measures within the profession. In the 
meantime, other agents began to address the problem. In the early-1900s, as the opioid crisis 
peaked, a rehabilitation industry emerged to treat drug and alcohol addiction. It was a free-
market response to the crisis that appropriated medical language and practices for profit.  
In Pittsburgh, the Rational Treatment Association, LTD, offered a cure for the “alcohol, 
morphine, and tobacco habit” and provided a space where “habitues” would be “treated by 
competent physicians without going to an institution.” They would return home cured “without 
publicity—without loss of time from business—without excessive cost—without FAILURE.” 
The Keeley Institute developed into one of the most prolific early-twentieth century 
rehabilitation centers and funded facilities across the United States. It offered services to all 
Americans suffering from “liquor and morphine diseases, cocaine, chloral, and drug addictions” 
and boasted that over 400,000 men and women had been cured of “drug slavery.” The institute 
operated a four-week program for alcoholism and a four-to-six-week cure for drug addiction. It 
also offered to treat women in their homes or outside the institute if they desired that approach. 
“Why be a slave” it asked, “when you can be free?” Dr. Keeley, founder of the institute, was a 
native of New York and trained at the Rush Medical College in Chicago. He had made “inebriety 
his life-study” and, as a surgeon in the Civil War, began studying it “practically as other doctors 
studied surgery.” He refused to reveal his method and “the formula [had] always been a 
secret.”57 
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At the Pittsburgh Sanitarium, which opened in 1898, physicians administered Dr. R. 
Parks White’s Improved Vegetable Cure, which allegedly treated alcoholism, morphine “and 
other drug addictions, and the tobacco and cigarette habits.” The Dr. Long Co., in Atlanta, 
Georgia, guaranteed a cure that could would be instantly noticeable for only $10.00. At the more 
prestigious Ocean View Sanitarium, in Provincetown, Massachusetts, which served primarily as 
a “private home for invalids,” doctors began to accept “nervous cases, convalescents, and a few 
selected cases of drug addiction.” The facility overlooked a picturesque harbor, promoted 
bathing in the sea, and declared that insomnia was “almost unknown” within its walls. Dr. 
Crothers, a tireless reformer within the medical community, tried his hand at rehabilitation as 
well and promoted Antikamnia Tablets, produced by the Antikamnia Chemical Company based 
in St. Louis, Missouri. He claimed that he had used them with “excellent results to quiet the pain 
following the withdrawal of morphia.”58 
The Oppenheimer Institute, in New York City, declared “the medical profession has, 
after many disappointments and failures, succeeded in educating the public to understand that 
victims of alcohol and other drugs are not to be regarded as criminals.” Instead, they were to be 
seen as “patients worthy of the utmost consideration, care and sympathy.” The advertisement 
continued: “this is an age of specialism” where results came from “careful and systematic work” 
carried out by “those who have followed one idea through good and bad report to the conclusion 
which leads to accurate results.” Ironically, Oppenheimer reiterated the ethos of the nineteenth 
century medical community, which had long trumpeted the notion that all gains in medicine were 
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made by following one idea extensively while reporting both successes and failures along the 
way.59 
While the medical community struggled to find a consistent voice regarding America’s 
alleged drug crisis and for-profit rehabilitation centers proliferated, the epidemic increasingly 
developed into a political issue. At the New York statehouse in Albany, The Assembly of Public 
Health passed a bill on February 8, 1900, that banned “the sale of drugs, whether in original 
packages or otherwise, in department stores.” Four days later, the same Assembly worked to pass 
a bill that would establish a “reformatory asylum” for the habitual users of drugs and alcohol. 
The institution planned to accommodate “300 inmates, each to be studied individually and 
compared to their peers.60  
While the bill banned so-called “incurables” from entering such facilities, those who 
showed promise were to be confined for up to five years where a system of “discipline and 
labor” aided their recovery. Those committed would be sent by magistrates. Legislators believed 
this system would “result in a better knowledge of alcoholism and narcotism [sic] and other 
methods for prevention.”61 The day after the proposal for a reformatory asylum, the bill to ban 
drugs sold in department stores advanced to a third reading on a vote of 65-40. While it had its 
opponents, including state representative Mr. Green, who considered it “entirely radical” that, 
under the bill’s provisions, a department store could not sell “cough-drop packages,” the law 
seemed destined to pass. Those in favor argued that it was a public health measure aimed at 
preventing children in New York City from selling drugs on the streets obtained from popular 
department stores.62 
 
59 “Advertisement 25—No Title,” Medical News, June 27, 1903. 
60 “Anti-Department Store Drugs,” New York Times, February 8, 1900.  
61 “Plan to Cure Drunkards: Mr. Weekes Will Offer a Bill…” New York Times, February 12, 1900.  
62 “Department Store Drugs,” New York Times, February 13, 1900.  
133 
 
Those who adopted a more legislative reform approach argued that their “cousins across 
the water did not prescribe or swallow one-fourth as much medicine” as the United States did. 
They suggested that “the common-sense practitioner knows by experience that the constant, 
frequent prescribing of innumerable drugs only ends in detriment to his patients.”63 A journalist 
for the New York Times reported that one employee of a city drugstore said that he had tasted 
every narcotic in stock and that the practice was “probably not an uncommon one.” The writer 
added that “many a victim of drug poison which is slowly corroding all that is best in him, 
physically and morally, can trace his deadly habit to that unfortunate day when he began 
indiscriminate tasting, when he first ate from the tree of knowledge.”64  
 Even in small towns like Union Springs, Alabama, a movement against morphine gained 
ground in 1905. The city passed a “cocaine and morphine law” to counter the “promiscuous sale 
of these baneful drugs.” That was especially true of cocaine, which had become “widespread 
among the negroes” and threatened a “rapid deterioration of an already poor class of laborers.” In 
adopting the ordinance, the City Council had done “the proper thing” and urged the town’s 
“officers and all good citizens to see that the law is enforced.”65 The City Council in Austin, 
Texas, passed the Paregoric Bill, which prohibited the sale of laudanum, morphine, cocaine, and 
opium without a prescription. It further stipulated that physicians were not to prescribe those 
substances to habitual users.  
 On the eve of America’s first attempt at comprehensive narcotic reform—the Pure Food 
and Drug Act on 1906—a sizeable municipal and state level movement towards anti-drug policy 
had already taken shape. While the medical community worked to reform its practices, the opioid 
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epidemic had already entered the popular vernacular, gained an outsized presence in the national 
media, and inspired political activists. From the close of the Civil War to the early 1900s, drug 
abuse and inebriety rose to become a preeminent American socio-political problem. Turning the 
opioid epidemic back to the medical clinic would prove an impossible task. As the public 
searched for a culprit on which to convincingly blame the nation’s drug problem, the average 
American physician had been indicted. While convincing arguments could have been made—
both then and now—that it was an unfair categorization, the narrative held real sway and had the 
effect of transforming the issue of drug abuse from a clinical problem to a political one.  
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Chapter Four 
The Making of a Prohibition State: The Social and Political Response to an Opioid Crisis 
On the afternoon of Feb 5, 1901, a group of women approached a drug store owned by 
Charles G. Foucek at Eighteenth Street and Central Avenue in Chicago. They were in a “well 
organized band” and “most of them wore automobile coats, under which they concealed their 
instruments of destruction.” As they quietly entered the store, Foucek greeted them as he did all 
his customers—with a pleasant eagerness to help. This would not be an ordinary encounter, 
however, as one of the ladies, presumably the leader of the band, quickly “upbraided [Foucek] 
for dealing in traffics of the devil” and another asked if he was not aware that “all the ills of 
humankind” could be cured through prayer. “Hurray for Dowie!” the women allegedly screamed 
before removing canes, umbrellas, and actual pitchforks from their overcoats, which they then 
used to assault Foucek. He took cover behind the counter and “the women turned their attention 
to the shelves and showcases and began to strike left and right.” In makeshift counter-attack, the 
clerks of the store filled buckets of water and began dumping it on the women, who promptly 
fled, but not before leaving a trail of destruction.1 
 The group of “middle-age and well dressed” women, true believers in turn-of-the-century 
faith healer John Alexander Dowie, were conducting an anti-drug crusade. The group visited 
four other stores that afternoon, threatened the managers with violence, and destroyed valuable 
product. As word spread, frightened pharmacists looked for immediate ways to defend 
themselves. They used what was on hand: ammonia, a charged soda suddenly opened and 
pointed at their targets, and buckets of water. By late afternoon, pharmacists had armed 
themselves with loaded guns while waiting anxiously for more attacks. Headlines claimed the 
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women were “On the War Path,” that “Chicago Faith Purists Begin Anti-Drug Crusade” and that 
they were armed with “pitchforks and canes.” These “female disciples of Dowie” did not hesitate 
in carrying out their mission. As far away as Buffalo, newspapers printed the story of the “the 
women who adopted Mrs. Nation’s methods and partially wrecked five druggists’ establishments 
on the West Side of the city.”2 
 The pharmacy attacks that February illustrated the growing intensity of the anti-drug 
movement in the United States, which came, in part, as a reaction to the ongoing opioid 
epidemic. That crisis, which had significantly eroded faith in the medical profession and the 
pharmaceutical industry, began to inspire the kind of social backlash exhibited by the women in 
Chicago. As part of the reaction to the opioid epidemic, the media, the general public, and 
political reformers broadened the definition of what constituted a dangerous narcotic. For 
decades, the focus was fixed on morphine, thus creating the sense that the crisis was manageable. 
By the opening decades of the 1900s, drug concerns broadened to include cocaine, smokable 
opium, cannabis indica, chloral, hashish, marijuana, and heroin. The seemingly endless deluge of 
new and dangerous drugs—some of them being the same drugs with different names—nurtured 
the idea that narcotics were an overwhelming menace that threatened the country on multiple 
fronts.  
 In response, the movement for the political reform of narcotic policy accelerated at the 
turn-of-the-century and included a wide conglomeration of concerns. In the face of what seemed 
to be an intractable problem, municipal, state, and federal governments reacted by pursuing drug 
reform measures to better protect the public. The work of grassroots activists, state and federal 
politicians, lobbyists, philanthropists, anti-drug vigilantes, judges, ministers, and diplomats 
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overlapped, ultimately facilitating a profound rethinking of the country’s relationship with 
narcotics. Their combined efforts inspired a drug reform revolution that transformed American 
politics, reshaped public opinion, and placed historic oversight on the medical profession and the 
nation’s pharmaceutical economy. No longer confined to the reified pages of medical journals, 
considerations of how to best control the spread of narcotics in the United States developed into 
a pressing national concern. 
The Government Response to the Domestic Drug Crisis  
As medical and political reformers continued to critique common practices within the 
profession, political interventions became increasingly common. Oregon introduced a bill in 
1887 stating that “no person shall offer for sale opium, morphine, eng-she or cooked opium, 
chloral hydrate or cocaine who has not previously obtained a license from the country clerk.” 
The license cost one dollar and would be valid for one year. The only individuals who qualified 
for the license, however, were physicians or pharmacists. The drugs in question were also not to 
be prescribed except “for the cure of disease.” The punishment for violating the law was either a 
fine between $50-$250 or a prison sentence ranging from thirty to ninety days in jail. California, 
an early leader in anti-opium legislation, followed by passing restrictions on cocaine in 1892. 
The State Assembly of New York drafted its own anti-cocaine and anti-morphine bill in 1893, 
which prohibited the sale of both without a physician’s prescription. At the Texas statehouse in 
Austin, in 1895, politicians and reformers pushed for the passage of a similar bill outlawing the 
sale of cocaine and morphine without a prescription. The Nashville City Council followed in 
1900 with a similar law and, one year later, the Tennessee House passed it nearly unanimously. 
Kentucky, Nebraska and Alabama soon followed with similarly worded laws.3 
 
3 “The Morphine Law,” The Daily Astorian, May 27, 1887; “The Candidates for Mayor: Nominees of Five Parties 
Who Want to be Chief Magistrate,” The San Francisco Examiner, September 27, 1892; “Blanket Ballot Bill: To Be  
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While the flurry of new state laws aimed at curtailing access to drugs did not directly 
address perceived failures within the medical profession, they made it clear that local 
government intended to address the nation’s alleged drug problem with political solutions. It was 
not a widely disputed fact—even amongst practicing physicians—that the medical community 
had significantly contributed to spiking addiction rates in the United States. Consequently, as 
politicians sought answers to address what had become a public problem, few turned to the 
somewhat discredited medical profession. Thus, within that power vacuum, local politicians 
introduced laws that not only curtailed public access to “dangerous” narcotics, but also sought to 
place strict limitations on the discretion typically granted to physicians in prescribing them.  
At the same time that state governments began regulating the sale of drugs, government 
agents commenced the raiding of opium dens and, to a large degree, those moves represented the 
end of an era in which drugs could be freely attained through a loosely organized and unchecked 
pharmaceutical culture. Indeed, the process of more strictly curtailing access to narcotics began 
in the wake of the Civil War, in the 1860s, as public opinion turned against seemingly 
unnecessary or excessive dispensations of drugs. In the 1870s, as the morphine crisis accelerated, 
there were a variety of responses to the question of how to best manage its spread. The medical 
community consistently worked to change certain practices within the profession indicted with 
causing the problem, but it was a slow process that yielded unconvincing results in the short-
term. Consequently, the state took more definitive action and pursued a fairly uncontroversial 
enforcement strategy—the heavy policing of American opium dens.  
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139 
 
Opium den raids also presented a new kind of drug user to the American public, one far 
less sympathetic than middle-class women inadvertently addicted to morphine through a 
physician. Those pulled from dens were considered the dredges of society and shown little 
mercy. According to media reports, they were misfits, rebels, and criminals. In an 1877 article, 
“Opium Smoking in Nevada,” it was reported that “the class who patronize these resorts” were 
“outside the pale of society—men and women who [had] lost all self-respect and [sought] the 
comforting influences that steal over them after their indulgence, and possibly to obtain some 
moments of forgetfulness and calm contentment.” They were “gamblers and lewd women” and 
they could be found in opium dens in “great numbers.”4 
In an 1894 opium raid, the St. Louis, Missouri Police Department arrested “eleven 
fiends” in one afternoon at 717 Walnut Street. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch confessed the city 
had known about the dens for years, but police chose “not to molest Chinese proprietors as they 
carried on their business quietly.” The city changed course because the Chinese had become 
“bolder in opening their doors to the general public.” St. Louis mothers, who recently organized 
an awareness campaign, inspired the new vigilance. “So as Jeu-Jeu’s had become particularly 
bold in his operations,” the department decided to conduct a Friday night raid. From “ill-smelling 
holes,” police pulled Jeu-Jeu, John Hong, Joe Ling and Jo Jas, all Chinese men. Accompanying 
them were May Bennett and William Seymour, both white, and Delia Walker, Ida Johnson, 
Bessie Payne, Ida May Bolnies, and Blanche Blackwood, who were black residents of the city. 
The “Chinese paid costs,” the paper exclaimed, while “the negroes got a continuance,” and May 
Bennett and William Seymour were “too sick to appear in court.”5 
 
4 “Opium Smoking in Nevada,” Quad-City Times (Davenport, IA), September 25, 1877.  
5 “Found Women and Men,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 11, 1894. 
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Those found in the dens were typically from America’s marginalized classes—poor, 
immigrant, and people of color. The Chicago Tribune reported on September 30, 1907 that “of 
nineteen colored men arrested in the city’s opium dens, saloons, and other resorts on Saturday 
and yesterday, seven [had] police records and were wanted for crimes in other cities.”6 The 
arrests, in this case, were made under city’s “vagrancy act,” which police believed was “the most 
effective way of preventing crime” and promised that more arrests would “be made at once in 
saloons, cheap billiard halls, and other rallying places of the idle and criminal classes.”7  
This raid-and-arrest style of enforcing the law complemented, in uncoordinated ways, the 
more institutional approach that sought to create new pharmaceutical industry oversight. In some 
cases, the strategies overlapped. In 1908 San Francisco, for example, the California State Board 
of Pharmacy conducted “a sudden swoop” of San Francisco’s Chinatown as part of a “campaign” 
for the “prevention of the sale of opium without a prescription.” So, in addition to the raids 
conducted by the San Francisco Police Department, Chinatown also began to endure similar 
sweeps carried out by the unsuspecting California State Board of Pharmacy. The fact that opium 
dens were not pharmacies did little to slow the drive nor did it create significant create backlash.8 
The opium dens raids benefited from the media’s coverage of a similar crackdown on 
those sites in China. Those stories also provided an ongoing global context for the drug crisis 
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that validated domestic concerns. In a 1901 expose on the opium problem in China entitled 
“Macao’s Big Opium Farm,” the author suggested that the opium den provided a gateway to 
morphine use. The piece also argued it was nearly impossible to break an opium habit and that 
“some of [the addicts] pretend to be permanently cured, but upon investigation it [was] usually 
found that they [had] changed from opium to morphine.” Those Chinese men and women who 
took morphine pills were “as many as the opium smokers.” It further noted that “in some cities 
along the Yangtse the hypodermic method of injecting morphine” had become commonplace. 
Injections were delivered by “professional morphine peddlers” who traveled with “hypodermic 
syringes up their sleeves” and offered subcutaneous delivery for one cent a piece.9 
By the opening decades of the twentieth century, there were several competing 
approaches to solving America’s perceived narcotic crisis. On the West Coast, state government 
had successfully wrestled the drug problem from the medical community. Not only had states 
like California and Oregon passed laws limiting the public’s access to narcotics sold at the local 
pharmacy, but they also instituted a hardline raid-and-arrest style of policing opium dens and 
marketed it to the reading public. Those early laws regulating the statewide flow of morphine 
and cocaine complemented another local push for pure food and drug legislation. At that point, a 
layered (and oftentimes confused) approach to managing the broader drug crisis emerged. On 
one hand, states experimented with an early form of anti-drug policing through the continually 
raiding of opium dens. Those efforts existed parallel to a local, legislative, and administrative 
attempt to politicize the dispensation of cocaine and morphine. At the same time, these efforts 
intersected with a grassroots movement for the purification of the nation’s drug and food supply, 
 
9 “Macao’s Big Opium Farm,” The Atlanta Constitution, January 13, 1901.  
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which had been active in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Even in areas not related 
to the prescription of so-called “dangerous drugs,” the medical profession seemed to struggle.  
In St. Louis, Missouri, in October 1901, May Baker, the 4-year old daughter of Minnie 
Baker, a widowed single mother who also ran a confectionary shop in the city, died in the middle 
of the night of lock-jaw. The day before, Minnie’s eldest child, six-year old Bessie Baker, passed 
away from the same sickness. The children’s physician, R.C. Harris, told the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch that Bessie’s only remaining child—Frankie—had also developed lock-jaw and would 
likely share the fate of her siblings. Experts cited contaminated anti-toxins produced by the city 
chemist’s office as the culprit. Other deaths soon followed until, at the height of the outbreak, 
thirteen children lost their lives in St. Louis that fall. 
A horse named Jim proved to be the cause of the crisis. In the 1890s, scientists 
discovered that immunized animals produced antibodies that fought against certain diseases like 
diphtheria, a bacterial infection that haunted turn-of-the-century children. As this new treatment 
reached market, St. Louis, like other major cities, fully adopted its use. Jim, a reliable equine 
donor, had—unbeknownst to his handlers—recently contracted tetanus and it toxified his 
sample. During the decade leading up to October of 1901, this horse-extracted antidote had 
reliably worked in cases of diphtheria; that is until news broke that the city of St. Louis 
distributed contaminated antitoxins that were confidently injected into sick children, unwittingly 
causing their deaths. Reports of the tragedy spread through the syndicated press and fueled an 
already heightened anxiety over drugs, poisons, and accidental deaths. The New York Times 
covered the tragedy extensively with a series of articles titled “Lockjaw in Diphtheria Cure: 
143 
 
Eight Deaths in St. Louis from the Antitoxin,” “Another St. Louis Antitoxin Victim,” and 
“Antitoxine and Lock Jaw: Scientific View of Fatal Diphtheria Cases in St. Louis.”10  
Shortly after the St. Louis tragedy, Dr. Thomas C. Smith, secretary of the Medical 
Society of the District of Columbia, endorsed a congressional bill regulating virus, serums, and 
toxins. He wrote to Congress, “although the preventative and curative powers of virus, serums, 
toxins, and analogous products, when properly prepared, has long since been established,” he 
nonetheless agreed that “certain unfortunate accidents which have resulted from their 
administration, notably those which recently occurred in St. Louis, Mo., have tended to discredit 
their use.” With the support of the mainstream medical community, Congress unceremoniously 
passed the Virus-Toxin Law—later known as the Biologics Control Act of 1902. It was an 
uncontroversial law, but nonetheless proved to be the moment in which the federal government 
began asserting legislative control over the medical profession and the pharmaceutical 
marketplace.11 
The Biologics Control Act, now largely forgotten, served as a crucial foundational piece 
in the construction of an American Prohibition State. Within a highly decentralized medical 
community resistant to oversight, passing the law was no small feat. It might be argued, in fact, 
that because it dealt with vaccines—and not opioids or cocaine—it entered the political arena as 
 
10 “City Anti Toxin Given to Babes Caused Deaths,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 30, 1901; “Deadly Antitoxin:  
St. Louis Patients Dying and Others Affected,” The Minneapolis Journal, October 31, 1901; “Serum Taken From  
a Horse to Prevent Diphtheria the Cause of Deaths,” The Cincinnati Enquirer, October 31, 1901; “Coroner Will  
Make an Investigation: To Inquire into Deaths of Children Who Succumbed to Anti Toxin Treatment,” The St.  
Louis Republic, October 31, 1901; “Seven Are Dead: Fatal Effects Follows Treatment with Anti-Toxin to  
Prevent Diphtheria,” The Saint Paul Globe, November 2, 1901; “Caused Lockjaw: Diphtheria Anti-Toxin Given to 
Children: Eleven Dead,”;  “Lock-Jaw in Diphtheria Cure: Eight Deaths in St. Louis Supposedly from Antitoxin,” 
New York Times, November 2, 1901; “Another St. Louis Antitoxin Victim,” New York Times,November 6, 1901; 
Antitoxine and Lockjaw: Scientific View Fatal Diphtheria Cases in St. Louis,” New York Times, November 15, 
1901.  
11 “Medical Society on the Antitoxin Law: In Favor of Restriction of the Sale of Virus, Serums, Etc.,” The Evening  
 Times (Washington, D.C.), May 2, 1902. 
144 
 
a kind of Trojan Horse. The law also led to the creation of a board within the Department of 
Treasure immediately empowered and funded to enforce the new standards. In that sense, the bill 
blazed a trail for the far broader and more controversial Pure Food and Drug Act and thus 
provided an example of coalescing policies that laid the foundation for a platform of continued 
regulation. Whether it came in the form of state laws regulating morphine and cocaine, law 
enforcement raids on opium dens, the diphtheria crisis in St. Louis, or the movement for pure 
food and drugs, the control of narcotics became one of the most prominent political issues of the 
early-twentieth century.  
A mere four years later, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act, a revolutionary 
piece of legislation that transformed the food industry and the pharmaceutical economy in one 
fell swoop. Often attributed to a single novel—Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, which exposed the 
horrors of Midwestern meatpacking—the process that led to its passage came as the result of an 
extensive and lengthy political campaign. The campaign began in 1898, when politicians, 
lobbyists, and representatives of the industries to be affected met in the National Hotel in 
Washington, D.C.  to confirm a set of political and economic principles regarding food and drug 
reform and then drafted them into widely distributed pamphlets. They conferred again in 1899 
and then in 1900, where representatives lobbied, networked, and perfected pitches for a truly 
monumental reshaping of the government’s role in the pharmaceutical and foodstuff 
economies.12 
Indicating the deep level of support the movement gained in the latter years of the 
nineteenth-century, the 1900 conference included representatives from “46 states and territories 
and some 300 delegates were in attendance.” Speakers focused on the latest issues preventing 
 
12 “National Pure Food and Drug Congress,” American Journal of Pharmacy, February 1899.  
145 
 
passage of earlier iterations of a pure food and drug law and highlighted talking points—like the 
fact that eleven states already passed their own versions of the law. Leaders of the movement 
argued that the language of state laws differed from region to region and the result of putting the 
lives of Americans in harm’s way by sewing confusion. They also suggested that the subsequent 
incoherence validated the old snake oil salesman of the previous generation by enabling the 
laissez-faire economy in which they thrived. “Give us,” Mr. W.B. McMeechin appealed at that 
1900 gathering, “a national law on the subject.”13  
 McMeechin got that national law when President Theodore Roosevelt signed the Pure 
Food and Drugs Act on June 30, 1906. It went into effect on January 1, 1907. The bill ratified 
similar movements at the state level and confirmed Congress’s power to oversee interstate 
commerce to exert stricter controls on the flow of drugs across state lines. Along with the 
Biologics Control Act, it more firmly established the legislative foundations of the Prohibition 
State; or, at the very least, corroborated the notion that the national government could be 
empowered to control the dispensation of the nation’s narcotic supply—a controversial notion in 
1906. Perhaps most importantly, the bill led to the creation of one of the first drug control 
bureaucracies—the Chemistry Bureau of the Department of Agriculture—which evolved into the 
Food and Drug Administration.  
 When combined with the state laws intended to control morphine and cocaine and the 
raids on opium dens, the Biologics Control Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act represented a 
government seizing control of drugs away from the medical community. While seemingly 
unconnected, those movements combined to create the building blocks of the Prohibition State. 
Indeed, the two acts marked the federal government’s entrance into drug reform legislation. In 
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the process, it complemented and stabilized more aggressive anti-drug movements at the state 
level. Having secured those victories, government officials then looked at the reformation of 
American foreign policy around the issue of narcotic control. By 1909, the United States’ 
approach to the nation’s drug problem had been remarkably transformed. From San Francisco to 
The Hague, a new strategy towards managing the flow of drugs took shape.  
 Just before passing the Pure Food and Drug Act, the federal government began 
developing drug restriction policies within its newly acquired foreign territories. These territories 
served as a laboratory for the federal government to test policies that would eventually be 
implemented domestically. After the United States took possession of the Philippines at the 
conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, opium and alcohol prohibition quickly 
became one of the central features of America’s New Imperialism. At the end of a tour of 
Southeast Asia in 1900, missionaries argued that “the baleful effects of liquor and opium on the 
natives of every country visited” presented a dire situation. Consequently, “strong pressure” had 
been put on President McKinley to “prohibit its sale in lands over which the country exercises 
control—notably the Alaskan Territory, Hawaii, and the Philippines.” These new holdings 
proved an ideal site for the immediate implementation of a prohibitionist agenda. Not only was it 
a landscape void of the strong liquor and pharmaceutical interests that characterized American 
politics, the Philippines also lacked an entrenched system of democratic politics that required 
decades of lobbying to achieve the implementation of even basic consumer safeguards. Even in 
that environment, however, anti-opium policy proved hard to establish.14 
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The Federal Government takes its Anti-Drug Crusade Global 
In 1903, the War Department announced that the Philippine government would create an 
“opium monopoly” that would then be sold to the highest bidder. “The contemplated action of 
the scheme,” according to the press, was to create a situation in which the use of opium would be 
restricted to protect the Chinese, “who had used it all their lives,” and Americans and Filipinos, 
“many of whom [were] falling victims to it.” The Chinese protested against this idea first. They 
considered the monopoly to be a centralization of power that would drastically cut into their 
profits; the second from the American and Filipino evangelical community, who wanted to see 
all sale and use strictly prohibited.15 
In response to this resistance, Governor Taft appointed an opium commission tasked with 
investigating “the laws and conditions with regard to opium in all Oriental countries.” Major 
Edwin C. Carter, Bishop Charles Henry Brent, and Dr. Jose Albert would visit Japan, Formosa, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Java, and Burma to determine the most effective way to eradicate the use 
of opium in the Philippines. A year later the committee delivered its verdict: that all opium sales 
should be brought under a governmental monopoly “at once.” After the passage of three years, 
the plan suggested, federal authorities would be in a position to totally prohibit it. Opium could 
still be used as medicine and, generously, “confirmed habitues” who were over the age of 
twenty-one years old could get a “smoker’s license.” The committee also recommended that anti-
opium lessons be a part of primary education, that all opium addicts be allowed to receive 
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treatment at local hospitals free of charge, and that any Chinese citizen found smoking it in the 
Philippines be deported.16 
The questions that animated the Opium Wars between Britain and China in the mid-
nineteenth-century reemerged, however, to slow the progress of establishing a federal monopoly 
over the Filipino opium economy. Missouri Representative John Joseph Cochran argued that the 
bill establishing the market essentially legalized the sale and use of opium and that the United 
States would profit from such an economy. Cochran’s resistance touched on the infamous history 
of Great Britain’s profit from the importation of opium into the Chinese market and he did not 
want the United States to follow that model. Nebraska Representative Gilbert Hitchcock 
introduced a counter bill that would prohibit the importation of opium to the Philippines except 
for medicinal use, a strategy modeled after legislation being shaped locally in the United States. 
Congress ultimately decided to leave the issue to the Filipino government and to the counsel of 
the commission established by Governor Taft.17 
The Opium Wars between China and England lingered in the backdrop of the 
negotiations. If the United States seized the opium supply of the Philippines for profit—even if it 
did so with the interest of destroying that supply—then it was no better than England. Reformers 
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in England and the United States had long chastised the country for fighting to keep opium 
markets open in the interest of revenue. In order to determine how the global opium supply 
should be managed, the United States created a coalition of nations who gathered to provide 
insight and reach conclusions. In May 1908, President Roosevelt, transitioning into his last 
months in office, sent a letter to Congress “counseling the immediate beginning of an 
international investigation into the opium question in the far east.” His request accompanied 
another: the granting of $20,000 to fund the United States’ participation in a global conference 
focused on the spread of opium. The conference, originally scheduled for New Year’s Day, 
1909, in Shanghai was postponed to February 1st due to the deaths of the Emperor and Empress 
Dowager of China. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the “limitation or total prohibition 
by the nations of the production and importation of opium” for any non-medicinal reason. Those 
gathered included Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Holland, Turkey, Persia, Japan, 
Russia, China, and Siam (Thailand).18 
Indicating a building anti-drug synchronicity, the conference, held just three years after 
the signing of the Pure Food and Drug Act, led directly to the passage of the nation’s first drug 
prohibition—the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act. That bill, which banned the same substance in 
the Philippines, not only gave the United States credibility in the international sphere of opium 
regulation, but it also codified the excessive policing of opium dens on the West Coast. By 
criminalizing smokable opium, rarely sold outside of dens, Congress joined the drive against 
America’s Chinatowns. It also highlighted overt connections between municipal, state, federal, 
and international drug policy. While Congress pursued the ban on smoking opium to bolster its 
anti-opium credentials in Shanghai, the bill also codified a rather illogically aggressive style of 
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law enforcement moving across the county from the West Coast. The American periodical 
Outlook nonetheless argued that Congress acted “in the nick of time to save our delegates at the 
Shanghai Conference from the mortification of being a less favorable light than their colleagues 
as to recent action in their own constituency in the warfare against opium.” The First Opium 
Conference in Shanghai essentially served as the Third Opium War and included many of the 
same players. This one, occurring over a half century since England and China warred over a 
drug market, was bloodless. “Except in reference to opium and morphia in the commercial 
treaties with China,” the American periodical Outlook explained, “no international action in the 
matter [had] been taken since the Opium War sixty years ago and more.”19 
 On the domestic front, political attention focused on the enforcement of the Pure Food 
and Drug Act. Chief Chemist at the Department of Agriculture, Dr. Harvey Washington Wiley, 
who had implemented the core values of the law, praised its success in 1909. As the first 
International Opium Conference left for Shanghai, Wiley spoke to the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science in Baltimore, Maryland. He argued the bill had altered the ethics of 
the food and drug industry and that “it was the universal opinion of all high-grade manufacturers 
and merchants in food and drug products that the majority of the trade [had] been directly 
improved.” Wiley noted that the stipulation forcing products to be named and labeled had the 
effect of revealing them as fraudulent and driving them from the legitimate market. That being 
the case, those who sold high-grade products no longer had to participate in “debasement” of 
products in order to remain competitive.20 
 Dr. Wiley also praised the legal evolution of the bill. He cited a decision from a United 
States District Court in Kansas City where the judge claimed the statute had been designed “to 
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protect consumers and not producers,” which represented a significant change in public thinking 
from just a few decades earlier, during a period when accidental poisonings and overdoses were 
glossed over. He continued by proclaiming it to be a “righteous statute, and within the powers of 
congress to legislate” before urging its continued enforcement. Additionally, a “rigid inspection 
of imported drugs” kept from the country all drugs that were “not up to pharmaceutical standard” 
and instituted a “careful control” at the federal level. The law had achieved, in a short period of 
time, results that exceeded the wildest expectations and led to a situation in which the country’s 
food and drug supplies had been cleansed, at least to Dr. Wiley’s mind. The New York Observer 
and Chronicle urged its readers to remember that “selfish interests sway many men, 
manufacturers or others, and for the sake of bigger dividends many merchants [were] willing to 
take the risk of sacrificing the public health.” It would take several years, in fact, for the 
Chemistry Bureau within the Department of Agriculture to gain the authority it needed to 
prosecute violations of the act and overcome the resistance from the cumulative power of the 
food and pharmaceutical industries.21 
There were signs, however, that progress had been made. Dr. L.J. Desha, chemist 
enforcing Pure Food and Drug laws in Tennessee, travelled to Chattanooga in 1912 to conduct 
fifty-hearings involving pharmacists who had violated the act. The vast majority of them failed 
to properly label popular “headache powders” that were alleged to contain “various forms of 
dope.” Investigators found in many cases that mail-order cures for morphine and opium 
addiction, and alcoholism, contained the actual drugs they were purported to cure. The United 
States Post Office then issued “fraud orders against the manufacturers.”22  
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 Although significant gains had been made in the nation’s attempt to arrest the non-
medicinal use of drugs, challenges remained. First, there were few signs that the morphine 
epidemic had been adequately addressed. The media continued to present numerous cases of 
accidental poisonings, suicides, and overdoses. In that area, the federal government had not yet 
been able to act. Perhaps more alarmingly, the racialization of the crisis, a longstanding tradition 
dating to the West Coast’s anti-opium den drives, accelerated in the early-1900s and coexisted 
with these rationalist institutional shifts.23 
 Indeed, during the rapid development of the Prohibition State, government began 
implementing and enforcing drug laws in socially discriminatory ways. By the 1910s, that 
tendency—always an underlying motive of the policing of opium dens in Chinatown—expanded 
to include African-Americans and Mexicans. The media also did not hesitate in stoking racially 
motivated drug anxieties. “One negro in every four uses cocaine,” declared the Times and 
Democrat of Orangeburg, South Carolina in the summer of 1910. The paper further argued that 
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“Negroes are very susceptible to the influence of cocaine and under its sway will commit acts 
from which they would shrink under normal conditions.” That narrative, which directly mirrored 
the ones already established with Mexican immigrants and marijuana and Chinese immigrants 
and opium, had persisted for decades. The Charlotte News contended that “the cocaine habit was 
most common among the river negroes, nearly all of whom are addicted to it.” It also reported 
that the “cocaine habit is fast driving out the morphine habit, which, however, never had much 
hold among the negroes.” By the 1910s, the problem showed no signs of easing. Reverend J.W. 
Ham of Atlanta, Georgia wrote that “most every Southern city has now the problem of cocaine 
dens to deal with.” If the problem persisted, he averred, it would “only be a short time before the 
use of cocaine among the negroes [would] be as universal as opium [was] among the Chinese.”24 
The racism that was increasingly becoming a part of the story of cocaine also more 
intensely defined the opium den raids on the West Coast. In Salt Lake City, Detective George 
Cleveland shot and killed sixty-two-year-old Louie Loy, who he suspected of running an opium 
den in the city. Loy, “a pioneer Chinese resident of the city,” had been born in China, 
immigrated to the United States, and lived in Salt Lake City for thirty-five years. When he fled 
the scene of a police raid and failed to acknowledge calls to stop, Detective Cleveland fired a 
bullet “that entered the Chinaman’s brain.” In San Francisco, in the fall of 1911, “two white 
girls, a white man, and six Chinese” were pulled from an opium den. The two girls were given 
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the choice of paying a $120 fine or serving sixty days in jail. The white man, Richard Bernstein, 
was a salesman for a San Francisco firm and he was given a similar choice: pay $40 or spent 
twenty days in jail. The six Chinese men obtained lawyers and had their sentencing hearings 
postponed. The conclusions of their cases were never reported.25  
Just as the political and institutional approaches began to coalesce to reshape American 
social reality, so too did the punitive styles of addressing the issue, which often veered directly 
into a method of racist enforcement. For decades, Chinese immigrants stood essentially alone as 
the target of these practices. By the 1910s, police included African-Americans and Mexicans 
with equal resolve. The El Paso Morning Times called the marijuana moving northwards with 
Mexican immigrants “The Mexican Opium” and argued that it produced effects similar to that of 
Chinese opium— “mental delusions and hallucinations” that most frequently ended in 
“homicidal or suicidal mania.” The marijuana anxieties that would begin to continually haunt the 
American mind coupled with similar characterizations of African-Americans and cocaine use 
and Chinese immigrants and the smoking of opium.26 
These multifaceted and seemingly disconnected attempts to control the flow of drugs 
both domestically and internationally coalesced to become a broader war on drugs. Many of the 
strategies occurred simultaneously. For example, it was impossible to separate the relatively 
localized raiding of opium dens from the International Opium Conference in Shanghai in 1909, a 
gathering that pressured Congress to pass the Smoking Opium Act. The connection of African-
Americans to rampant cocaine use aided in the passage of cocaine and morphine laws across the 
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United States; acts then celebrated by reformers who pushed for a national law mirroring those 
local ones. As anti-drug legislative victories mounted, there was a building sense that the nation 
was not just fighting a national drug problem, but had rather declared war on it. As a Second 
International Opium Conference approached in 1911, the Memphis Commercial Appeal noted 
“nations of the world will join hands in a world-wide war on drugs.” Because of this new 
“crusade, morphine, cocaine, and opium” would finally be destroyed. The article further argued 
that “our Christian people” had been so dedicated to fighting for alcohol prohibition that they 
had, “to present time, permitted the drug evil to grow to such an extent that society is 
threatened.” After England protested that the revenue from the sale of morphine and cocaine in 
the United States exceeded the profits it collected from opium, the United States committed to 
inaugurating “a war against the three fatal drugs,” one that would “be waged relentlessly.” 
Indeed, the State Department instructed delegates arriving at The Hague to push for a “world-
wide fight” against narcotics.27 
At the Second International Opium Conference, held July 1-9, 1913, the inauguration of a 
World War on drugs seemed less certain than presented in the press. While thirty-five countries 
signed an agreement to battle the spread of opioids, several were reticent to act, including 
Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Romania, 
Montenegro, and Serbia. Turkey, Greece, and the Balkan countries were in a state of war and 
could not take on the responsibilities the Americans called for. Switzerland claimed that 
cooperating would not enhance the countries interests and claimed it had no identifiable traffic in 
drugs. Austria-Hungary, Norway, and Sweden refused because those countries believed it would 
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require new legislation, a burden they were hesitant to pursue. Because Austria refused to sign 
the agreement, Germany remained neutral; and because Germany hesitated, the British had 
serious misgivings.28 
The international hesitation did little to quell the United States’ growing support for an 
international battle against drugs, however. In a 1913 article titled “China’s War on Opium,” the 
New York Times praised the country’s efforts at cracking down on narcotics. The paper thought it 
“one of the most hopeful and significant signs” of modernization because opium had done “more 
than any one thing to retard China’s progress.” General Chang of the National Opium 
Association of China even travelled to London “to lay before the British Government and its 
people a plain statement of facts” to gain support for anti-opium legislation. A year later the 
paper reported that “China, Too, Has a Drug War,” and noted it was being waged more 
ruthlessly than in the United States. “The new Chinese government,” it continued, “is acting 
energetically to stop the use of opium, as well its production and importation.” In waging this 
war, the Chinese had resorted “to Oriental measures of severity,” especially in their provision 
that anyone under the age of forty found in possession of opium “shall be shot.” It further 
suggested that “New York’s campaign against the sellers and users of narcotics” had made 
trouble, “but for a real drug war one must go to China.”29  
From Shanghai and the Hague, through major new prohibition bills passed by Congress, 
and to the grassroots movements that compelled them and continued to thrive, the anti-drug 
agenda gained a strength that it had not previously enjoyed. Many publications argued that the 
conventions even created monumental change. The American Review of Reviews argued that “the 
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full significance of this admirable step toward a higher social efficiency” could not be 
appreciated unless one kept in mind “the corresponding movement on the international scale.” 
As of 1915, American Review reported that thirty-four nations had joined the United States in 
pursuing drug prohibitions and concluded that “what the United States has done in Cuba, in 
Porto [sic] Rico, and the Philippines it is doing in a wider sphere through its moral leadership of 
the great movement to save mankind from a degrading vice.” The federal government, once 
ambivalent towards the issue, resituated itself to become a moral leader in an international fight 
to control the drug supply that purportedly threatened its society.30 
Mrs. Vanderbilt’s War, the Harrison Narcotic Act, and the Expanding Prohibition State 
 
Anne Harriman Sands Rutherford Vanderbilt, wife of William Kissam Vanderbilt, heir to 
the family fortune, declared her own war on drugs. On January 21, 1914, the press claimed that 
Mrs. Vanderbilt believed the New York City Police had been negligent in arresting the drug 
problem and so she announced a personal campaign. It was a movement against “the sale and use 
of cocaine and heroin.”31 Her battle also brought attention to a new narcotic that had been 
overshadowed by morphine, cocaine, and opium—heroin. The Evening World of New York City 
exclaimed “Crusade on Drugs Backed by Rich Society Woman” and reported that she was 
“furnishing the sinews for a nationwide investigation of the whole subject preparatory to a 
campaign for legislative and other action to restrain the evil.”32 
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The Washington Post reported on January 22nd that Vanderbilt, in her role “as a leader of 
society,” had “began, through her agents, a war on the drug evil.” She launched her campaign by 
employing a team of investigators to analyze the problem on the streets of New York City. 
Vanderbilt had allegedly been “stirred” by reports “of the promiscuous sale and use of cocaine 
and heroin” and concluded this phenomenon had been enabled by the “failure of the police to 
enforce the laws or of the courts to inpert [sic] them.” She instructed her lawyer, Ernest K. 
Coulter, to “superintend an investigation into the situation” and then to start “a hard-hitting 
campaign against the evil, not only in this state, but in all others.”33 
 Anne Harriman—or “Mrs. W.K. Vanderbilt”—had built a name associated with the 
progressive causes of her time. She constructed model tenement housing to inspire better 
building projects, helped create the Big Sister’s Movement, and generally worked to eradicate 
poverty. Advocates of her work claimed Vanderbilt’s latest effort would be one of her “most 
daring campaigns” yet and that she “would carry this drug war through to the end.” A New York 
Magistrate told Ernest Coulter “to assure Mrs. William K. Vanderbilt, Sr. that he would 
cooperate with her in every way in her campaign against the promiscuous sale and use of 
cocaine.”34  
Her well-funded operation spurred the police to immediate action. The Chief Magistrate, 
now under Vanderbilt’s influence, claimed the laws needed to fight the war would “be wide 
reaching and should include heroin as belonging to the habit-forming drugs.” O.F. Lewis, the 
general secretary of the Prison Association of New York, offered his support as well, along with 
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New York’s new health commissioner. She also had the support of the 40,000 pharmacists who 
made up the state’s pharmaceutical association. At their 1914 meeting, Dr. William C. Anderson 
introduced a resolution commending Vanderbilt’s effort and added that before anything could be 
done to address the growing drug problem, the United States Congress had to pass legislation 
“affecting the traffic in all states.” Headlines across the country proclaimed, “Mrs. W.K. 
Vanderbilt Starts Crusade against Cocaine and Heroin Sellers.”35 
 Just days after announcing her “crusade” on the drug “menace,” The Washington Post 
reported that her fight against the “indiscriminate sale and use of habit-forming drugs” would be 
carried “to Congress, where national legislation to prevent the evil” would be strongly urged. 
Ernest Coulter argued that even preliminary reports of the problem in New York City had 
convinced him that only national legislation curtailing sale and use would suffice. “Since Mrs. 
Vanderbilt started her crusade,” the Post continued, Coulter had received numerous letters from 
“judges and municipal and state authorities in other states offering their heavy cooperation.” 
From as far as Moscow, Idaho, mayors sent notes bemoaning the spread of drugs in their 
communities and urging her to carry on the battle.36 
A week after her declaration of war, the New-York Tribune claimed that “a definite 
move” had been made on “the drug evil” after Coulter gained the cooperation of local federal 
agents who told him their hands were “absolutely tied through a lack of sufficient laws to cover 
the evil.” Those agents could only act at the federal level where it was demonstrated that opium 
was “to be used for smoking purposes.” That, at the time, constituted the only real restriction on 
drug use at the national level—the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act, passed hurriedly to gain 
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firmer standing in Shanghai in 1909. The agents claimed national drug laws were tragically 
limited and needed “radical amendment.”37  
In March of 1914, along with William Kissam Vanderbilt’s first wife, Miss O.H.P. 
Belmont, Anne Harriman Vanderbilt extended her drug war to Chicago too. On the Chicago 
front, Frederick H. Robinson, president of the sociological fund of a New York medical journal, 
led the charge. Robinson announced that the women intended the campaign to last a year and 
that it would be entirely funded by Mrs. Vanderbilt and Miss O.H.P Belmont. Back in New York 
City, three theaters played a new film called “The Drug Terror,” billed as the “Greatest Motion 
Picture Ever Shown.” It claimed to expose the underworld and was shown “in conjunction with 
Mrs. W.K. Vanderbilt’s Remarkable National Crusade against the Alarming Cocaine Habit.”38 
The film toured the United States, arriving in Rock Island, Illinois, in April 1914. The 
local paper claimed “for the first time in the history of the world the public is being given a 
chance to see in all its blackness a true picture of the nation’s scourge—the cocaine habit, 
through the six-reel photodrama, ‘The Drug Terror.’” The film allegedly showed “in perfect 
detail the conditions that caused Mrs. Vanderbilt to start her great campaign for the saving of 
drug-entrapped human souls.” The Chicago Tribune suggested that “every local citizen who 
loves his county, self, relative, friend, or neighbor should see the thrilling photo drama.”39 
Mrs. Vanderbilt’s drug war shone an even brighter light on the problem than the Pure 
Food and Drug Act, the First International Opium Conference in Shanghai, the Smoking Opium 
Exclusion Act, or the Second International Opium Conference in The Hague. The investigators 
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she hired argued that 4.5 percent of the United States—or 4.5 million Americans—were addicted 
to drugs compared to only 4.45 percent of the Chinese population addicted to opium. The St. 
Louis Star and Times, in bold headline font, informed its readers, “American Drug Fiends 
Outnumber Chinese.” It further lauded Mrs. Vanderbilt’s efforts at urging the passage of a 
national law that strictly regulated the transportation of cocaine across state lines as a crucial 
modern development.40 
As Mrs. Vanderbilt’s war expanded to new fronts, the New York State Assembly passed 
the Boylan Law, which restricted opium, chloral, morphine, and “other habit-forming drugs.” 
The act stated that only small amounts of certain drugs could be prescribed and could not be 
refilled unless the doctor approved. Later that year, Mrs. Vanderbilt attended a meeting 
discussing the need for a “Farm Colony” in New York to house the addicts that had been 
revealed since the passage of the Boylan law.  
In response to the publicity and growing public concern generated by Vanderbilt’s war on 
drugs, Congress passed the Harrison Narcotic Act in November of 1914. The Harrison Act—
America’s “New Dope Law”—was billed as modern legislation that would “greatly decrease the 
use of drugs and tend to lessen crime in the country.” After March 1, 1915, all sales of morphine 
and cocaine without a physician’s prescription were considered illegal and punishable by the 
law; a law that specifically included opium, cocoa leaves, and all “compound, manufacture, salt, 
derivative or preparation made from such drugs.” Included on the list were remedies which 
contained more than two grains of opium, one-fourth grain of morphine, one-eighth grain of 
heroin, or one grain of codeine.41 
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It was not a total prohibition, and physicians continued to prescribe the drugs. They were, 
however, ordered to pay a one-dollar per year licensing fee. If they refused, those physicians 
were then subject to no more than a $2,000 fine, five years in prison, or both. To hasten 
enforcement of the law, Congress immediately made $150,000 available to enforce it through the 
Internal Revenue Service. The bill also required that all medical transactions, from the retail 
filling of the prescription, to the wholesalers who supplied it, and down to the compounders, had 
to be properly documented and reported to the government so that it could keep inventory on the 
national supply. The Evening Sun of Baltimore believed that “anyone, no matter how clever” 
could not evade the law for very long without facing a federal prison sentence. That reality was 
largely due to ways the government worked closely with “reputable” pharmacies who helped “in 
seeing that the Harrison Law is not violated.”42 
 In the meantime, pharmacies adjusted by advertising general compliance with the law. In 
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, Obrien, Apothecary, bought space in the local paper to say that 
“The Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act goes into effect March 1st, 1915” and that the law would “be 
welcomed by every reputable druggist, but will deal a death blow to the unfit.” In that sense, it 
was a more aggressive elaboration of the Pure Food and Drug Act and represented the power an 
incrementalistic approach to drug reform. Indeed, few, if any, connected the Harrison Narcotic 
Act to the Pure Food and Drug Act that preceded it nearly a decade earlier. Fewer still connected 
it with the Smoking Opium Exclusion. In reality, the Harrison bill was a hybrid of the two—a 
consumer protection that required pharmacists to register with the government and a prohibition 
on non-medicinal opioids and cocaine. Whereas the Pure Food and Drug Act sought merely to 
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inform the public and gain a modicum of control over the pharmaceutical market, the Harrison 
Act aimed to directly regulate it.43 
 The federal government made a show of vigorously enforcing the law. In May of 1915, 
federal authorities issued sixteen warrants that included 100 people who were charged with 
“conspiracy to violate the Harrison anti-narcotic act.” They were issued by an Assistant United 
States District Attorney and an Internal Revenue agent. On one night in Chicago, “physicians 
and druggists from all sections” of the city “had been arrested” and taken to a regional 
commissioner, who had kept his office open late into the night to process bond money. The bail 
for doctors stood at $5,000 and for pharmacists it was $2,500. The news spread across the 
country and the New York Tribune exclaimed that “Chicago Gets 100 in Drug Crusade.”44 
 Two weeks later in the same city, police arrested H.L. Eberhard, who managed the drug 
department of Siegel, Cooper, and Company. Along with Eberhard, they detained W. Henry 
Matthes, employed by the Auditorium Pharmacy, Joseph Trinens, a pharmacist employed at 65 
West Monroe Street, and Dr. W.H. Martin of 321 North Clark Street. They were all released 
after posting $2,500 bail. At the same time, a judge released Dr. A. Baxter Miller, of 77 East 
Washington Street, after his lawyer successfully argued that the illegal prescriptions for drugs 
bearing his name had been forged.45 
 These men were not what most Americans would consider drug dealers. Joseph Trienens, 
for example, was the son of German immigrants who made his way from being a clerk in a 
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Chicago drugstore to owning it by 1920. He had four kids and, at various points in life, took in 
his brother, widowed sister-in-law, niece, and widowed daughter and grandchild. Despite his 
1915 encounter with the law, he remained in the drugstore business and retired in the 1930s in a 
house worth $16,500 ($250,000 adjusted for inflation) with his wife of many decades, Annie 
Bullock. W. Henry Matthes, the other pharmacists arrested in the group, had a similar story. He 
was also the son of German immigrants. He married Amanda Blettner in 1899 and they had one 
son, Henry A. W. Henry. Like Joseph Trienens, Matthes also worked his way up from an 
apprenticeship in a drugstore to owner of one. He retired with his wife in a house worth $16,000 
($240,000 adjusted for inflation). They were middle-class professionals and first-generation 
Americans who made good on the promise of their adopted country. For a brief moment in 
history, however, they were charged as illicit drug dealers under new federal law. 
 A year after its passage, the United States Department of Revenue claimed that the 
Harrison Act had done more than expected. Collector Joseph P. Scott argued that the law had 
“decreased the use of drugs by making them scarcer,” a result that required ongoing 
collaboration. Agents were not randomly policing pharmacies, he argued. Rather, the bill had 
effectively marginalized those who sought to evade the law, rewarded those who followed new 
protocols, and created a situation where the industry basically policed itself. When pharmacists 
observed one of their colleagues shirking legal responsibilities, the narrative suggested, they 
reported him or her to the authorities. Because government intervention had worked, the illicit 
supply of opioids had been greatly reduced while also maintaining sufficient amounts for the 
medical community to address legitimate needs. The new conditions made the price of the drug 
“beyond the means of many a poor drug fiend.” Scott also signaled the government’s intentions 
for the future: “the effect of the Harrison Act will be one of gradual extermination. Within a few 
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years the price of drugs will be so high and their quantities so small that there will be practically 
no drug fiends left.” This was what Taft’s committee intended to do in the Philippines. It failed 
there, and, over time, it could be convincingly argued that it failed at home too.46 
 There were also those who believed it did not go far enough. That sentiment continued to 
inspire legislative evolution. At a 1916 meeting, the American Pharmaceutical Association 
declared the federal law too weak and vague. They decried a recent Supreme Court ruling where 
justices decided that, of those in possession of opium, only subjects actively selling it could be 
subject to arrest and conviction. Those deemed mere users of the drug—maintaining addictions 
and not seeking profit from an illicit supply—could be in possession of small amounts. Charles 
B. Towns, one of the authors of the bill, noted that the “national law should be equally effective” 
as state laws in prohibiting possession of drugs “if any actual reform is to be accomplished.”47   
  In three crucial cases, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the 
Harrison Narcotic Act, which not only preserved the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act and the 
Pure Food and Drug Act, but also paved a legal trail for the continued and incremental growth of 
the Prohibition State. In United States v. Doremus, the court ruled that “while Congress may not 
exert authority which is wholly reserved to the states, the power conferred by the Constitution to 
levy excise taxes, uniform throughout the United States, is to be exercised at the discretion of 
Congress.” More important to the continued development of the Prohibition State, the justices 
concluded that the fact Congress “may have been impelled by a motive, or may accomplish a 
purpose, other than the raising of revenue” could not invalidate laws like Harrison. That 
stipulation undercut notions that the government could only intervene in American life in the 
interest of raising revenue or in the interest of interstate commerce. According to this reading of 
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the constitution, Congress could pass legislation with a moral goal that had little to do with 
revenue raising or interstate regulation. Similarly, the Harrison Narcotic Act could not be 
considered unconstitutional by the mere fact that such laws might “affect the conduct of a 
business which is subject to regulation by the state police power.”48  
 That ruling had clear ramifications for the prohibition of alcohol. Had the Supreme Court 
ruled that Congress had no power to govern in the interest of a motive other than raising revenue, 
it would have created a precedent that would have made the Volstead Act—passed the same year 
as the Doremus ruling—significantly more challenging. The case involved a physician—
Doremus—who “unlawfully and knowingly” distributed “one-sixth grain tablets of heroin” to 
Ameris, a patient, “not in the course of the regular professional practice” of the physician “and 
not for treatment of any disease which Ameris was suffering.” Rather, Ameris was a known 
heroin addict and popularly understood to be a “dope fiend” and the drugs prescribed him “for 
the purpose of gratifying his appetite for the drug as a habitual user thereof.” That verbiage, too, 
was significant, as it took a measure of discretion away from the physician when prescribing 
medicine. It was thereafter a federal offense to prescribe a patient opioids or cocaine in order to 
“maintain” an addiction. Of course, what constituted maintaining an addiction versus relieving 
pain also became a discretionary matter and would create controversy within medical circles for 
decades to come.49 
 The next case, Webb v. US, involved a practicing physician at Goldbaum’s pharmacy in 
Memphis. He—Webb—became known for prescribing morphine for habitual users of the drug in 
order to stabilize their addictions. The court concluded that Webb and Goldbaum, although 
wholly cooperative with the registration requirements of the Harrison Narcotic Act, nonetheless 
 
48 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).  
49 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).  
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continued to indiscriminately supply morphine to customers in Memphis with no intention of 
breaking their habits. The ruling noted that Goldbaum “purchased from wholesalers thirty times 
as much morphine as was bought by the average retail druggist doing a larger general business, 
and he sold narcotic drugs in 6,500 instances.” Goldbaum and Webb also wrote and filled 
repeated prescriptions under fictitious names for the same patient.50 
 The rulings represented a stunning validation of the national government’s approach to 
drug control. As cocaine spread throughout the medical community alongside morphine in the 
latter two decades of the twentieth century, the federal government could do little more than 
observe. Twenty-five years later, Congress had essentially seized control of the drug reform 
agenda. It placed broad restrictions on the pharmaceutical industry through the Biologics Control 
Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act, before pursuing a new opium control foreign policy that 
resulted in the nation’s first outright prohibition of a drug. Finally, the Harrison Narcotic Act 
nationalized those early state laws aimed at prohibiting the non-medicinal use of morphine and 
cocaine. This profound legislative pivot created a new Prohibition State that, even with the 
Harrison Narcotic Act, had not yet peaked.  
Conclusion 
Four months after the Supreme Court ruled the Harrison Act constitutional, a Republican 
majority passed the Volstead Act, placing a historic prohibition on alcoholic beverages. It passed 
287-100 and was vetoed by President Woodrow Wilson on procedural grounds, but, the House 
and Senate quickly overrode his veto. Volstead, like Harrison, then made its way to the Supreme 
Court, which ruled on seven alcohol prohibition cases on June 7, 1920 and grouped them into 
what is known as the National Prohibition Cases. Relying on legal precedent established in part 
 
50 Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919).  
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through rulings on recent drug laws, the court ruled that the Volstead Act was constitutional as 
was the enormous power granted to the federal government to enforce it. 
The legislative and legal foundation of the Prohibition State had been fully established. A 
mere twenty years after the true believers in the philosophical wisdom of John Alexander Dowie 
raided pharmacies in Chicago, a veritable revolution in drug reform policy had occurred. The 
pharmaceutical practices the women loathed had been reformed through state laws, the Pure 
Food and Drug Act, and the Harrison Narcotic Act. A new foreign policy centered on the control 
of the world’s opium supply allowed the United States to mold a new international drug policy 
just as Great Britain once had. The United States declared war on drugs in the opening decade of 
the twentieth century and, as of 1919, that conflict had been won, at least legally and politically. 
The medical profession would never regain the control it once had over its profession and the 
pharmaceutical industry, despite valiant efforts, would fail to free itself of the historic regulations 
placed upon it during that period. The issue of access to drugs had been fully publicized and 
politicized and it was a trend difficult—if not impossible—to reverse.  
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Chapter Five 
And Then Came Reefer Madness 
In the spring of 1887, in one of the first stories involving “marihuana” to hit the 
American press, The Memphis Appeal reported that Jose Molinez, a young resident of the 
Mexican state of Zacatecas, died while under the influence of cannabis. After hearing his “girl 
had been untrue,” he began smoking “several enormous cigarettes of marihuana” with suicidal 
intent. Afterwards, and for reasons that are not clear from the story, Molinez laid down in a pool 
where “venomous insects…while he was insensible, destroyed his life.”1 One month earlier, 
American newspapers reported about another incident in Zacatecas, in which a corporal in the 
Second Cavalry “got drunk on the marihuana,” took out a light artillery rifle and forty cartridges 
and fired on his fellow soldiers and their superiors. After he killed three and wounded five 
others, “the troops, finding it impossible to capture him, managed to kill him.”2 These two 
reports linking cannabis to violence and temporary insanity foreshadowed media coverage that 
became commonplace in the early-twentieth century and culminated with the film Reefer 
Madness in 1936.3 
Time and again during this period, the American public encountered sensational stories 
about the menace that cannabis use posed to society. By the 1920s and 1930s, the accumulation 
of those stories shaped a new political reality in which anti-cannabis legislation seemed urgent 
 
1 “A Mexican Priest Flogs the Corpse of a Dead Wizard,” The Memphis Appeal, April 25, 1887. The same article 
appeared in Austin American-Statesman, April 17, 1887; The Austin American-Statesman, again, on April 24, 1887; 
Jacksonville Republican (Jacksonville, AL) May 7, 1887; The Courier-Journal (Louisville, KY), May 7, 1887.  
2 “Scraps and Facts,” Yorkville Enquirer (York, South Carolina), March 30, 1887. The story also appeared as “Drunken 
Work of a Bloody Corporal,” in The Evening Bulletin (Maysville, Kentucky), March 21, 1887; The Times and 
Democrat (Orangeburg, South Carolina), March 30, 1887; Troy Messenger (Troy, Alabama), March 31, 1887; Austin 
Weekly Statesman, April 28, 1887.  
3 “A Mexican Priest Flogs the Corpse of a Dead Wizard,” The Memphis Appeal, April 25, 1887. The same article 
appeared in Austin American-Statesman, April 17, 1887; The Austin American-Statesman, again, on April 24, 1887; 
Jacksonville Republican (Jacksonville, AL) May 7, 1887; The Courier-Journal (Louisville, KY), May 7, 1887 
3 “Scraps and Facts,” Yorkville Enquirer (York, South Carolina), March 30, 1887.  
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and long overdue. How did these alarmist narratives, entirely detached from the science framing 
cannabis as a relatively benign substance too weak for medical use, become so prominent in the 
early-twentieth century? This work suggests that the public alarm about marijuana use, which 
manifested in the “Reefer Madness” narrative, resulted from a complex set of factors, including 
longstanding social anxiety about an evil side to human nature, fears that marijuana use 
unleashed that darker aspect of human behavior, concerns about the spread of drugs due to an 
opioid crisis that still challenged the medical community, and social prejudice against Mexicans.  
By the time the “Reefer Madness” narrative gained prominence in the media, the public 
had already been exposed to a morphine crisis, the spread of cocaine, and the rise of heroin use 
on the streets of the United States. In response to this larger narcotic crisis, one centered 
primarily on opioids, the American public abandoned any sense of tolerance towards drug use. 
At the peak of this intolerance, marijuana, the Mexican name for cannabis, began entering the 
country from the Southwest and was immediately associated with Mexican immigrants. 
Consequently, this “loco-weed,” a raw and less powerful form of cannabis than what Americans 
found in medicinal tinctures sold in pharmacies, received a disproportionately intense response.  
A far more pronounced sensationalism distinguished coverage of marijuana from that of 
morphine, cocaine, and heroin. In the late-nineteenth century, it was difficult to deny that 
middle-class women, for example, were addicted to intravenous morphine use. While the press 
may have overcovered those incidences, fundamental truths guided reporting. That was not 
always the case in stories of alleged marijuana addiction. The idea that cannabis caused short 
term hallucinations had existed for centuries, but there was no evidence that those delusions led 
to rape, murder, and an inexplicable desire to upend civilized society. The media nonetheless 
began to report those theories as fact. It became a “loco-weed”—a portal to instant madness. 
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Indeed, the stories also seemed to draw on the Gothic fiction of the Romantic era, featuring 
novels like Frankenstein and The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and blurred the lines 
between fiction and reality. Ultimately, the coverage of marijuana during this period sought to 
sway audiences by appealing to long held anxieties and emotions regarding substance abuse. A 
clear recitation of the facts regarding the substance and its impact became a very secondary goal.  
The literature on Reefer Madness in the United States is often as sensationalistic as the 
stories that propelled the phenomenon itself. Popular explanations harbor a distinct conspiratorial 
tone. The marijuana hysteria, journalists have suggested, came as the result of a corporate coup 
of public policy or were due to the delusions of a single man—Bureau of Narcotics Chief Harry 
Anslinger—who forced the nation into marijuana prohibition. Moreover, these popular accounts 
have gained credibility and acceptance in the absence of sustained scholarly analysis of the 
subject.4 
The historical literature on “Reefer Madness” in the United States is underdeveloped. 
With the exception of Isaac Campos Homegrown: Marijuana and the Origins of Mexico’s War 
on Drugs, there is little scholarly focus on the cannabis-related hysteria that swept the United 
States in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. Campos locates the origins of cannabis anxiety in 
the Mexican press of the early-twentieth century and argues that the sensationalist coverage 
migrated northwards and ultimately influenced American perceptions of the drug. Campos work 
complicates and complements an established narrative that the twentieth century response to 
 
4 For an example of the popular and more journalistic accounts of Reefer Madness that have influenced the 
narrative, see: Larry “Ratso” Sloman, Reefer Madness: A History of Marijuana (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin 
Press, 1979); Alexandria Chasin, Assassin of Youth: A Kaleidoscopic History of Harry J. Anslinger’s War on Drugs 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016); Johann Hari, Chasing the Scream: The First and Last Days of the 
War on Drugs (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015).  
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marijuana was entirely rooted in a xenophobic reaction to Mexican immigration to the United 
States in the 1910s.5 
While this work does not challenge the claim that anxiety over Mexican immigration 
fueled Reefer Madness in the United States, it nonetheless seeks to put the topic in deeper 
historical context. For example, Eastern physicians claimed the recreational use of cannabis 
caused insanity as early as the fifteenth century. In England, cases of temporary insanity due to 
alcoholic intoxication proliferated in the early-to-mid nineteenth century just as “hasheesh” 
confessionals portrayed cannabis as an agent that produced a profound loss of senses. These 
examples then intersected with a style of literature that increasingly focused on the possibility of 
losing one’s mind and inadvertently unleashing a darker side of humanity on the general public. 
Then, in the late-nineteenth century, British officials argued that recreational cannabis use 
amongst Indian laborers led to an unprecedented number of mental patients in Indian asylums.  
 This work concludes that the narratives responsible for Reefer Madness in the United 
States were the result of a global collaboration. It suggests that in early-twentieth century 
America, those storylines collided with a sensationalist press, an already established drug 
epidemic, and a wave of Mexican immigration, and attained new power. Although it relied 
heavily on centuries old theories about intoxication, madness, and the capacity for evil all 
humans were assumed to have, the marijuana madness of the mid-twentieth century reinforced 
public support for a vigorous Prohibition State, which proved especially important in the 
aftermath of the end of alcohol prohibition.  
 
5 Isaac Campos, Homegrown: Marijuana and the Origins of Mexico’s War on Drugs (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2012); The scholarship on marijuana panic in the United Kingdom puts the topic in larger 
context. See: James H. Mills, Cannabis Britannica: Empire, Trade, and Prohibition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003); James H. Mills, Cannabis Nation: Control and Consumption in Britain, 1800-1928 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013).  
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Pre-Victorian Alcoholic Violence, Hasheesh Visions, and Cannabis Induced Colonial 
Insanity 
 
In 1787, The Times of London offered a meditation on excess and sin. “Vice is decked in 
all the gaudy apparel of fine taste,” it opined, pointing out that “here”—in the metropolis, where 
vice commonly dressed up as sophistication—there were “numbers of unhappy prostitutes.” In 
their “reflecting moments,” the women sincerely regretted that loss of virtue they could never 
regain. They were unable to maintain any consistent devotion to improvement, however. As the 
Times put it, they were “incapable of bearing the force of their sober reflection” and thus sought 
to drown the unpleasantness of that clarity by indulging in “every species of excess.” When their 
spells of “temporary insanity” ended, “terrible [were] the thoughts these unfortunate beings 
experience.” It was a classic tale central to Christian ideology and it spoke to the travails of 
overcoming the human condition, which was often guided by original sin. The narrative served 
as an early rendition of the plot to Jekyll and Hyde where “sober reflection”—Dr. Jekyll—
appeared as a form difficult to maintain; one that gradually gave way to that monster Hyde, or a 
plunge into “every species of excess.”6 
 In a pre-Victorian society, in which the spiritual and material world seamlessly 
interacted, great importance was placed on mental stability, temperance, and a sense of diligence 
in performing good works. Social critics, clergy, and the legal system consistently presented the 
mind as a fragile and unpredictable agent capable of producing all varieties of social evil. These 
notions characterized public thought in the western world as it transitioned from the eighteenth to 
nineteenth centuries. In the United States, for example, the Salem Witch Trials, which had 
occurred less than a century before, still weighed on the minds of early American commentators. 
They grappled with its legacy and attempted to learn from it. What did it signify? To them, it 
 
6 “To the Reformer,” The Times (London, Greater London, England), October 22, 1787. 
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pointed to that deathless societal instinct to privilege folkloric impressions of the world and 
express them in a kind of mass delusion which often led to grave consequences.  
After outlining the array of horrific executions following those famous trials, a writer for 
The Rural Magazine; or Vermont Repository, argued in 1795 that “such was the credulity, 
delusion, and infatuation of those times that in the year 1690 a scene opened up and plunged the 
whole province into horror and bloodshed.” To the author of the piece, who went simply by the 
letter H., it was an example of the unbelievable horror that could come from a false mental 
formation allowed to take hold of the community. The whole scene, to this writer, was a classic 
moral panic with devastating consequences. “The business of witchcraft was begun at Salem,” H. 
continued, and then it proliferated until “the most intimate friends, children and parents, wives 
and husbands, became accusers and witnesses against each other.” Even worse, “the magistrates, 
courts, clergy, and people, were carried away with infatuation: delusion, iniquity, and revenge” 
That fixation then “carried the accusers to the prisons, and the prisoners to the gallows.”7 
 H. and The Rural Magazine were one of several publications in the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries still processing the social lessons of that event. Embedded in those 
startling moments seemed to be a moral about maintaining mental stability and the importance of 
isolating and marginalizing irrational or delusional thoughts before they could take hold. H. 
noted that “when their reason returned, they were astonished at their former madness and 
outrage” and even the “courts and clergy had no more wisdom than themselves.” H’s writing 
mirrored The Times’ analysis of unhappy prostitutes, who fell into the comfort of sin; a sin that, 
after passing, gave way to tremendous guilt and bewilderment. It was, it seemed, an inherent part 
of what it meant to be a human; to err—oftentimes violently and reprehensibly—before taking 
 
7 H. “Spirits, Ghosts, and Witches,” The Rural Magazine; or Vermont Repository. Devoted to Literary, Moral, and 
Political Improvement; Rutland, June 1, 1795: 317. 
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up the work of making amends and setting it right. H. finally arrived at a startling conclusion: the 
Salem Witch Trials and its lessons had still not been “eradicated from the minds of the gloomy, 
fearful, and ignorant.” In the year 1748, in Wurzburg, Germany, an elderly lady had been 
convicted of witchcraft and burned at the stake. A similar event, which H. did not elaborate 
upon, had also occurred in the United States.8 
 In an age allegedly reborn with notions of enlightened liberty, with a successfully 
separated church and state, another primal force seemed to linger beneath the surface and it 
reminded all that the human condition did not change so suddenly. Illustrating that tendency in 
1797, The Methodist Magazine reported “an extraordinary circumstance” which it claimed could 
be depended on as “an absolute fact.” It involved a twenty-year-old Scottish girl who had a 
dream about a local woman the town considered to be a witch. She dreamt the witch had put a 
spell on her and the next day she began to suffer from inexplicable convulsions that plagued her 
for weeks. The story was to be continued, but it never was.9  
 In Germany, Scotland, England, and the United States, occasional stories of witchcraft 
illustrated the staying power of widescale social fantasy. To many writers, that was certainly the 
case with those who failed to learn the lessons of the Salem Witch Trials. They were deemed 
stubborn, delusional, and dangerously superstitious. The idea of resisting that line of thinking 
became more of an imperative and critics felt it required the development of a mind devoted to 
suppressing the hidden and animalistic aspects of human nature. An American magazine—The 
Portfolio—argued in the summer of 1810 that “there is no property of human nature that excites 
risibility on fairer terms than our total blindness to those follies and vices which form the dark 
 
8 H., The Rural Magazine, 317. 
9 “Witchcraft,” The Methodist Magazine, Containing Original Sermons, Experiences, Letters, and Other Religious  
Pieces, Philadelphia, March 1797.  
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shades of our character.” That darkness of personality threatened to “diminish and oftentimes 
ruin the value of our good qualities” while exciting the “pity of our friends and the ridicule and 
contempt of our enemies.”10 
 It was a pre-psychiatric age; or, perhaps better put: a full generation before a pre-
psychiatric age. Whether it came in the form of the Salem Witch Trials, the deathless idea that 
individuals could be possessed by the devil and required exorcism, or even that it was possible to 
transform into werewolves, folk beliefs about the nature of sanity and identity dominated from 
medieval times well into the twentieth-century.11  
It counterbalanced any sense of unfettered social progress. Even in industrializing and 
urbanizing New York City in 1897—a full century after these reconsiderations of witch trials—
those ideas could still emerge. That year, James Rubinstein, a resident of the city, considered 
himself to be a werewolf and took to walking “on all fours” while barking and howling at the 
moon. He was eventually reported and taken to Belleville Hospital for treatment. The newspaper 
considered it a delusion and explained to its readers that “a werewolf was in legendary lore 
supposed to be a human who, having given some offense to some supernatural being, was 
metamorphosed by the latter into the shape of a wolf.” The person retained “their soul” and its 
“human attributes, passions, hopes and desires,” but in physical form, they existed as a beast. It 
also argued that “in the middle ages the belief in the existence of werewolves was general” and 
that “seemingly well attested instances were cited, and in some parts of Germany that belief 
[had] come down to this day.”12 
 
10 “The Table D’Hote, No. V: Self-Delusion. Etymology,” The Port-Folio (June 1810): 519. 
11  H. Westernik, “Demonic Possession and the historical construction of melancholy and hysteria,” History of 
Psychiatry, September 2014; William Menzies Alexander, Demonic Possession in the New Testament: its 
relations, historical, medical, and theological (SI: Forgotten Books, 2015); Nancy Caciola, Discerning Spirits: 
Divine and Demonic Possession in the Middle Ages ( Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Sarah Ferber, 
Demonic Possession and Exorcism in Early Modern France (Ann Arbor, Michigan: ProQuest, 2013). 
12 “Rubinstein’s Delusion: He Thinks he is a Werewolf and Acts Like One—Overwork the Causes,” Wilkes-Barre 
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 In the early-nineteenth century, the critiques of “delusions” and a call for greater mental 
self-control easily commingled with a nascent movement for alcohol temperance. It is difficult to 
accurately reconstruct the extent of alcohol related violence and crime in pre-Victorian society, 
but the news coverage suggests it was a significant problem. In an 1811 story resembling the 
Drunken Corporal of Zacatecas, a Scottish man, “formerly in the army,” attempted to kill his 
wife and, after failing, “put to death one of his children, a fine boy of four years of age, by 
repeated wounds in the head and body.” He was arrested and after consulting his lawyer claimed  
“he was at the time in a state of intoxication, which, in his case, always [created] a temporary 
insanity.” The notion of temporary madness, thereafter, gained social acceptability and while it 
had been defined legally, the basic storyline remained relatively consistent with Christian notions 
of momentarily straying from God’s will only to return with a deep sense of remorse and 
shame.13 
 Tales of alcoholic violence dominated British news in the early-nineteenth century just 
like drugs and madness would the American press of the early-twentieth. In Truro, England, in 
1815, John Sims, a soldier, killed a police officer who tried to disarm him during a fight. The 
victim, Burnett, according to the judge’s record, was, “in the capacity of a Peace Officer” using 
his “utmost endeavours [sic]” to prevent Sims from “committing that mischief” which he, 
through his “intoxication and temporary insanity at that time was capable of doing.” The judge 
regretted that Sims seemed wholly unprepared to deal with the consequences of his crime, but 
the “circumstances of [his] intoxication” was no “extenuation” of his guilt. The judge felt it was 
 
Times Leader, The Evening News, Wilkes-Barre Record, October 21, 1897. 
13 There is a deficit in the literature on pre-Victorian alcoholism and its social impact. For a cursory view, see:  
Thomas L. Reed, The Transforming Draught: “Jekyll and Hyde,” Robert Louis Stevenson and the Victorian Alcohol   
Debate (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006); Henry Yeomans, Alcohol and Moral Regulation: Public Attitudes,  
Spirited Measures, and Victorian Hangovers (Bristol: Policy Press, 2004); “Private Correspondence,” The      
Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh, Scotland), September 23, 1811. 
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his duty, which he considered painful, to deliver the sentence Sims himself had “drawn down 
upon [his] own head.” Sims was then encouraged by the judge to make peace with a God that he 
had so “grievously offended.”14  
 The notion of temporary insanity became an explanatory tool most used in incidences of 
suicide where there was a short trial (as suicide was considered a crime) and the only victim was 
the person who had been indicted. In the summer of 1817, Captain George Washington 
Hutchins, had recently “thrown himself overboard from the sloop Friendship.” After questioning 
all those onboard the ship the court, “it satisfactorily appeared” to the court and jury “that the 
death of Captain H. was solely owning to temporary insanity.” In other words, these 
investigations were pursued to ensure it was merely an outbreak of inexplicable madness and 
not, for example, a homicide, accidental poisoning, or a reasoned decision to take one’s life. 
Average and seemingly well-adjusted citizens did not, after all, throw themselves off ships to 
their own deaths. It was, to them, common sense to label it an outburst of madness and in a 
judicial environment based on intuition and instinct, temporary insanity became a broad and 
elastic term.15 
That was evident on a Saturday night in March of 1825, when the Honorable J.H. 
Stanhope, of Waterford, Ireland, was found hanging from the rafters in an outbuilding used for 
cattle on the property of the Earl of Mansfield in Northern England. A Coroner’s jury was 
immediately summoned and they met at Fox-under-the-Hill Public House in Highgate at ten 
o’clock Monday morning. J. Wheeler, Stanhope’s aide, reported that he had last seen the Colonel 
at four o’clock that Saturday and, when he did not appear for dinner at seven, he went searching 
for Stanhope. As the family ate dinner without him, many suspected he had gone back to town in 
 
14 “Second Day,” The Royal Cornwall Gazette, Falmouth Packet, and General Advertiser, April 22, 1815. 
15 “Wilmington, (NC) June 14,” The Evening Post (New York, New York), June 23, 1817. 
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order to address paperwork associated with a house he had purchased that day. Lord Mansfield 
ordered carriages to check the town for his whereabouts and when they returned without leads, 
the mansion at Caen Wood began to panic. A search party formed and eventually found him “not 
quite cold,” but lifeless.  
Stanhope, a war veteran and a Member of Parliament for Dartmouth, had hanged himself. 
After gathering all information, the Coroner’s office determined that he suffered from a 
momentary insanity caused by the lingering pain of an old war injury. While fighting the French 
in the Basque Region in 1813, he had been shot through the shoulder during the Siege of St. 
Sebastian. The wound had never properly healed and, years later, excruciating pain suddenly 
seized his body. In the weeks before his suicide, he began to lose sleep because of the pain and 
often sat motionlessly throughout the day for hours. The Coroner thus concluded that “the pain 
and nervous irritation, created by the wound, acted upon by mental causes” most likely induced 
temporary insanity. His wife, the eldest daughter of Lord Mansfield, had also died two years 
earlier and that, friends observed, was when the pain from his war wound began to significantly 
flare. He was thirty-nine years old when he died and even though his death was most likely due 
to mental illness brought on by heredity, grief, or pain, it was ultimately attributed to temporary 
madness.  
These varied tragedies, likely caused by depression, personality disorders, post-traumatic 
stress, and chemical dependencies, were neatly arranged under the idea that individuals were 
prone to a short-lived and difficult to explain form of madness that often led to violence—visited 
on oneself, family, or strangers. Whether or not the person demonstrated signs of actual mental 
illness was not determined by a doctor, but rather by untrained judges and juries. Their 
willingness to determine that “temporary insanity” played a part in the crimes depended largely 
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on social standing of the perpetrator, the severity of the crime, and whether or not it was a case 
of suicide. In the case of suicide, juries nearly always and unanimously declared it a situation of 
temporary madness.16 
While the practice was widely accepted in British and American courtrooms, it was not 
completely without critique. In 1830, London’s The Examiner questioned the court’s leniency on 
the topic. “Nothing can be stupider than this common indulgence for intoxication,” it began 
before asking “what consolation is to an individual that his head has been broken, or ears of his 
wife or sister polluted by the obscene [sic] ribaldry of a ruffian in a state of frenzy from 
drunkenness?” The paper continued by declaring that “the excuses allowed for inebriety” were 
“encouragements to inebriety.” It concluded that if the drunken individual “choses [sic] to part 
with his reason, he should be made answerable for all the consequences of his temporary 
insanity.” Even with this critique, the notion that an intoxicated person driven to violence was 
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momentarily insane was not questioned. The counterpoint centered on the question of who was 
responsible for his madness. Was it society, the alcohol, or the man or woman themselves? The 
notion that they were transformed—like a witch or a werewolf—into a social aberration was 
accepted as a given.17 
The Dublin Penny Journal told the story of a once prosperous lawyer who was known to 
dress well and exhibit good character. Until he became an alcoholic, that is. Thereafter, he 
gradually transformed into a different being. He went from a stylish middle-class professional to 
a person who wore clothes “besmeared with mud, from his rolling in the streets, or torn to 
ribbons in his furious fits.” The young boys of the town—for their own amusement—often 
followed him and “provoked a feeble and unavailing retaliation” while “females fled his 
approach, for his besotted faculties were void of even the slightest sense of decencies required by 
civilized life.” Often, locals lifted him up, “bruised and bleeding from the floor of the shop or the 
pavement of the street” after he had fallen “from excess of drunkenness.” Eventually, he died, 
“half-mad, half drunk.” It was, again, the transmutation of a functioning citizen into a social 
menace; one who attempted assaults on local children who tormented him for his appearance; a 
sad case who had to be lifted off the floor of the taverns and streets he often collapsed in.18 
The prevailing understanding was that intoxicants transformed personalities and 
facilitated those dreaded detours into the dark enclaves of the unchristian mind (where original 
sin ruled). This distrust of intoxication, however, was not necessarily unique to Britain, the 
United States, or even to alcohol. In Irish physician William O’Shaughnessy’s celebrated piece, 
“On the Preparation of Indian Hemp, or Gunjah,” first published in 1843, he noted a similar 
eastern distrust of cannabis that had centuries of precedent. In O’Shaughnessy’s work, he 
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extensively quoted Egyptian historian Al-Maqrizi, who wrote at the turn-of-the-fifteenth-century 
that cannabis caused “general corruption of sentiments and manners” and argued that “every 
base and evil passion was openly indulged in” after even mild consumption.19  
Al-Maqrizi also described the contrary effects of the substance, writing that, at first, it 
exhilarated “the spirits, [caused] cheerfulness, [gave] color to the complexion, [brought] 
intoxication, [excited] the imagination into the most rapturous ideas, [produced] thirst, 
[increased] appetite, [excited] concupiscence.” After these emotional and physical highs, 
however, consequences emerged just as they did in alcohol intoxication. “The spirits [sank], the 
vision darkens and [weakened]; and madness, melancholy, fearfulness, dropsy, and such like 
distempers, [were] the sequel—and the seminal secretions [dried] up.” He further argued that 
continued use led to “weakness of the digestive organs,” “flatulence, indigestion, swelling of the 
limbs and face, change of complexion, diminution of sexual vigor, loss of teeth, heaviness, 
cowardice, depraved and wicked ideas; skepticism in religious tenets, licentiousness, and 
ungodliness." In short, Middle Eastern views of cannabis from the eleventh through the fifteenth 
centuries resembled conclusions drawn about the overconsumption of alcohol in early-nineteenth 
century London.20 
In the 1820s, Thomas De Quincey’s essays on drug abuse—later compiled into the wildly 
popular novella Confessions of an Opium Eater—popularized the notion that drug use inspired 
the birth of a darker side of the personality. In one of the first reviews of the work—in The 
Freeman’s Journal of Dublin, Ireland—the paper claimed “of the incidents in this narrative, we 
cannot pretend to offer any abstract; they detail the circumstance under which a sufferer was 
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induced to seek relief and afterwards enjoyment from opium.” It then reiterated a theme that 
surrounded issues of substance abuse and noted that “a terrible retaliation followed. Opium 
possessed him like an evil spirit, and it made the night the time of its most exquisite 
inflictions.”21 
Opium, like alcohol, led to a form of insanity that overthrew De Quincey’s rational and 
scholarly mind. It struck at night and took control of the body and mind like the devil often did. 
Similar to those who alleged that witches lived amongst them, De Quincey had nightmares that 
haunted “him with horrors, of which no language but his own [could] give an adequate idea.” De 
Quincey, in a nod to St. Augustine’s Confessions, outlined the damage opium did to his life, 
mind, and body and, in doing so, created a new genre of literature: the drug confessional. After a 
resurgence in the mid-nineteenth-century, this style of confessing to one’s misdeeds—in this 
case pursued in a form of intoxicated insanity—became a significant subgenre in American 
literature. In the stories, hashish, opium, chloral, alcohol, and even sometimes tea and coffee, 
served as a kind of supernatural agent—an avatar for the devil—that derailed the user. In the 
confessional, however, the writer (like St. Augustine) survived the delusions and then detailed 
them after having been restored to good health and rationality. Like the lyrics to “Amazing 
Grace,” written a few decades earlier in 1779, the writers were grateful that “a wretch” like them 
who had “once been lost” finally was found. In the beginning of the confessional they were blind 
and by the end they could see again.22 
Twenty-years later, Jacques Joseph Moreau and his Les Club des Hachichins ingested 
cannabis and documented their reactions in emulation of De Quincey. These experiments led to 
the 1845 publication of Moreau’s most significant work Hashish and Mental Alienation, which 
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cast cannabis as an “agent provocateur” capable of inciting activity in the brain that resembled 
mental illness. By doing this, he theorized, a sane person could manually trigger the mind into a 
form of temporary insanity that could then shed light on the causes of mental illness and 
potentially lead to better treatments.   
In American writer Bayard Taylor’s “The Vision of Hasheesh,” the author wrote that “the 
sense of limitation—the confinement of our senses within the bounds of our own flesh and 
blood—instantly fell away.” He then noted it was “difficult to describe this sensation, or the 
rapidity with which it mastered me.” In his state of “mental exaltation,” which he had been 
“plunged into,” “all sensations, as they rose, suggested more or less coherent messages.” His 
brain, however, showed them in “double form—one physical, and therefore to a certain extent 
tangible; the other spiritual and revealing itself in a succession of splendid metaphors.” It walked 
that thin line the genre had drawn between romanticizing the use of the drug, confessing the sin, 
and outlining the horrific highs and lows it inspired. Even though Taylor did not lose total 
control, he still entered a realm where it was clear to him the substance would “master” him if he 
continued to use it. In Fitzhugh Ludlow’s The Hasheesh Eater, he acknowledged becoming a 
“slave of the hasheesh” and “by the aid of this wizard of plants” he “fabricated” a “palace of 
alternating pleasure and torture.”23  
  The most famous portrayal of mental and bodily transformation—The Strange Case of 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde written by Robert Louis Stevenson—was published in January of 1886, 
sixteen years after Ludlow’s untimely death. It also arrived one year before American papers 
began printing the marijuana related madness in Mexico and it famously captured the horror of 
transmutation in the life of an everyday character: Dr. Henry Jekyll. The classic novel centers on 
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Jekyll’s ingestion of a substance he created to unleash that darker and less restrained element of 
his personality. Mr. Hyde is introduced as the bodily manifestation of that dark spirit all assumed 
lived within them. Moreover, it was a pharmaceutical product that brought him out. In the first 
description of Hyde, the observer claims “there is something wrong with his appearance; 
something displeasing, something down-right detestable. I never saw a man I so disliked, and yet 
I scarce know why.” Mr. Hyde gave a “strong feeling of deformity” and was an “extraordinary 
looking man.” Dr. Jekyll’s transformation into Mr. Hyde revealed to the world in human form 
what lurked in the imagination of a handsome and respected doctor. A friend who knew Jekyll 
throughout his life claimed that Mr. Hyde “seems hardly human! Something troglodytic” and 
that he was “the mere radiance of a foul soul that thus transpires through, and transfigures, its 
clay continent.” He told his friend “O my poor old Harry Jekyll, if I ever read Satan’s signature 
upon a face, it is on that of your new friend.”24  
 In the last chapter entitled “Henry Jekyll’s Full Statement of the Case,” the doctor 
confessed, “hence it came about that I concealed my pleasures; and that when I reached the years 
of reflection, and began to look round me and take stock of my progress and position in the 
world, I stood already committed to a profound duplicity of life.” He thus set about to sever 
“those provinces of good and ill which divide and compound man’s dual nature.” Here, then, is a 
return of that timeless concern about the double nature of humanity and the ongoing struggle to 
suppress that side in possession of humankind’s original sin. In Stevenson’s last chapter, Jekyll 
takes on the role of St. Augustine, Thomas De Quincey, Bayard Taylor, and Fitzhugh Ludlow. 
“Though so profound a double-dealer,” Jekyll continues, “I was in no sense a hypocrite; both 
side of me were in dead earnest; I was no more myself when I laid aside restraint and plunged in 
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shame, than when I laboured [sic] in the eye of day, at the furtherance of knowledge or the relief 
of sorrow and suffering.” The doctor engaged in a “perennial war” against himself, fought by the 
“moral and intellectual” side which “drew steadily nearer to that truth” which was “that man is 
not truly one, but truly two.”25 
 Stevenson wrote Jekyll’s confession during the onset of America’s first opioid epidemic 
and in the aftermath of the popularity of the hashish confessional. The influence of those social 
and literary trends was evident as he continues the narrative. Jekyll writes, “For any drug that so 
potently controlled and shook the very fortress of identity, might, by the least scruple of an 
overdose or at least inopportunity in the moment of exhibition, utterly blot out that immaterial 
tabernacle which I looked to it to change.” That “immaterial tabernacle” of social custom and a 
deep devotion to the ascendant manners of the Victorian period could be, Jekyll realizes, 
overthrown by ingesting a narcotic. “I had long since prepared my tincture,” he writes and—like 
an opium addict—“purchased at once, from a firm of wholesale chemists, a large quantity of a 
particular salt which I knew, from my experiments, to be the last ingredient required.”26  
 This drug, possessed with the power of giving birth to Mr. Hyde, worked just as opium 
did for De Quincey and hashish for Ludlow; it mirrored Arabic writers’ descriptions of how 
initial cannabis use caused great joy in those hours and days before the full consequences 
arrived. His “agonies began swiftly to subside” and he came to himself “as if out of a great 
sickness.” There was “something strange” in his sensation—“something indescribably new and, 
from its very novelty, indescribably sweet.” He felt “younger, lighter, happier in body” and then 
a “current of disordered sensual images” ran like “a millrace” in his “fancy.” He no longer felt 
the burden of responsibility. He also knew himself “at the first breath of this new life, to be more 
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wicked, tenfold more wicked, sold a slave to [his] original evil.” Dr. Jekyll had taken a drug that 
almost immediately shed off those manners he had learned through the civilizing process and 
returned to a state of original sin. In the Victorian Era, an immediate return to what Jekyll 
described as the “original evil” was a horrific idea.27 
 Jekyll then compares himself to an alcoholic. “I do not suppose that, when a drunkard 
reasons with himself upon his vice, he is once out of five hundred times affected by the dangers 
that he runs through his brutish, physical insensibility.” Neither had he. His “devil had long been 
caged” and it “came out roaring.” Ultimately, however, Jekyll was no longer able to control 
Hyde. It was like an addiction and Jekyll became “a creature eaten up and emptied by fever, 
languidly weak both in body and mind, and solely occupied by one thought: the horror of my 
other self.” It got worse as Hyde resisted Jekyll’s attempt to get rid of him. Hyde’s “terror of the 
gallows drove him continually to commit temporary suicide.” Hyde loathed how far Jekyll had 
fallen and resented the “dislike with which he was himself regarded.” He then completely took 
over through “ape-like tricks” and scrawled “in my own hand blasphemies on the pages of my 
books” after burning portraits of Jekyll’s father. Hyde was nihilistic and would have long ago 
“ruined himself in order to involve me in the ruin.” In a moment in which Dr. Jekyll had clarity 
enough to express his own thoughts, he wrote the confession that ended with the realization that 
he would have to “bring the life of that unhappy Henry Jekyll to an end.”28  
The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde captured the feelings of an era in which 
anxiety over the social control of public spaces peaked. Two years after the publication of the 
book, in fact, Jack the Ripper, notorious British serial killer, took his first victim. Literary critic 
Jenny Davison writes that actor Richard Mansfield, who played Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in a 
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travelling opera, was momentarily accused of the crimes by a journalist suspicious of how 
thoroughly he could transform into the character for the stage. The play, by all accounts, utterly 
terrified audiences who—at least in London—walked home from seeing it in a new reality that 
included Jack the Ripper. “Just as Mansfield’s performance blurred the boundaries between 
theater and real life, so too, did Stevenson’s tale seem paradoxically to invent the figure of the 
modern serial killer.” The serial killer also lived a double life; a respectable citizen and 
oftentimes loving parent and spouse by day and social pariah by night; maneuvering tactfully 
through the dark spaces of the city to indulge in unspeakable desires very much like a junkie.29  
Robert Louis Stevenson’s book, which elaborated on the opium and hashish 
confessionals, combined with concerns over insanity and the dual nature of men and women to 
exacerbate a well-established fear of duplicity in the public sphere. Hyde, like witches, 
werewolves, Thomas De Quincey, Fitzhugh Ludlow, and Jack the Ripper, transformed—
typically at night—into a monster. It was no surprise, in the late-nineteenth century, that the 
substance that transformed Jekyll into Hyde came from a pharmacy. More, that substance did not 
turn Jekyll into an entirely different person, but simply allowed another other aspect of his 
personality—darker and less responsive to custom—to reign over this body.  
In literary communities, in art, medicine, psychiatry, and law, Americans and Europeans 
probed the issue of insanity, its social implications and threats, how it emerged in the mind, and 
its legal viability in criminal cases. They did so with alcohol, opium, morphine, cocaine, and, by 
the 1880s and 1890s, cannabis. In London, for example, attention turned to the empire’s Indian 
colony and to reports that asylums were filling there with men driven insane by hashish use. In 
September of 1893, T.W. McDowall published “Insanity from the Abuse of Indian Hemp” in the 
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British Medical Journal recounting a recent lecture given by Dr. Thomas Ireland who argued 
that “the excessive use of Indian hemp, or cannabis indica, has long been recognized in Eastern 
countries as one of the most common vices, and as a very prolific cause of insanity.”30  
He further noted that use seemed to depend solely on gender and religion as almost all 
users were male and Hindu. In the question-and-answer period following the talk, Dr. Murray 
Lindsay was “greatly impressed” by the fact that nearly all cannabis users were male “because it 
was well known that in the United Kingdom the alcohol and opium habits were by no means 
confined to one sex.” Mr. Peele Richards asked if any legislative action had been pursued to 
arrest the problem and Dr. Tuke asked if the common problem of “running amok” amongst the 
Malay population could be attributed to the use of cannabis. Dr. Ireland responded that women 
did not smoke cannabis primarily because they did not have an opportunity to do so through lack 
of exposure, that “stringent legislation” been introduced in Trinidad “with the purpose of 
preventing the Coolies getting Indian hemp” and that, yes, the “persons who made homicidal 
attacks on others (running amok) were at the time under the influence of Indian hemp.”31 
This debate over “stringent legislation” passed in order to prevent working class Indians 
from possessing cannabis, which caused homicidal insanity, illustrates the global roots of Reefer 
Madness. A month later, the British Medical Journal published an article refuting the madness 
cannabis allegedly inspired. Dr. Thomas Ireland pushed back and lamented the fact that the 
writer—an interlocutor who referred to himself as Pyramid—had attempted “to throw doubt on 
the statement that the excessive use of Indian hemp is a potent cause of insanity.” Pyramid 
argued that cannabis use in Egypt was “almost universal” and, yet, there was “no country in the 
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world where lunacy [was] so rare.” Pyramid admitted that he came to this conclusion after 
travelling broadly and observing that the “number of idiots was surprisingly small.” Ireland 
thought Pyramid’s methodology was “much too loose” and that, even by Pyramid’s own 
admission, “other persons also acquainted with Egypt [did] not hold his opinion that the use of 
haschisch [sic] is a salutary practice.” Ireland also referred a paper that had recently been 
published in Zeitschrift fur Psychiatric in which a professor from Berlin found that one-third of 
the asylum admissions (120 out of 367) were due to the influence of cannabis. Only 13 were due 
to the abuse of alcohol.32 
Even though Egypt passed anti-cannabis laws that created a situation in which “its sale 
[was] menaced with imprisonment and even its indulgence with a fine,” several shops in Cairo 
still openly sold it and it was widely consumed. As Ireland wrote the retort, the British 
government planned a special Commission of “experienced officials” who would be 
“empowered to inquire into the effects of the use of cannabis upon the people of India.” He 
believed they would find that a person addicted to cannabis—in the form of local churrus or 
bhang was “the analogue of a drunken sot” in English culture. It was also “undoubtedly the 
cause of much noisy behavior and rioting in the bazaars.” Pyramid claimed that the insanity 
attributed to Indian hemp had actually been there before the smoking of cannabis and was thus 
being covered by it. Ireland found Pyramid’s theory to be the work of an individual suffering 
from “a very great ignorance on the subject” and concluded “whenever a man takes to over-
indulgence in cannabis there is good reason for questioning his sanity.”33 
 Three days before Ireland’s letter-to-the-editor, The Pall Mall Gazette argued that “the 
subject haschisch, or bhang [had] been a good deal before the public” and that every writer on 
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the topic seemed to take it for granted that “the use, or abuse, of the drug—for in this case the 
terms are apparently synonymous” was “invariably attended by the most frightful 
consequences.” No one seemed to be willing to take up the opposite argument and, as a result, 
defendants were “condemned in absentia without benefit of counsel” and judges were 
uninterested in mitigating any aspect of the following punishment. The paper noted that “in spite 
of what teetotalers may affirm to the contrary” it was nonetheless an “undeniable fact” that “all 
nations of the earth, whether civilized or uncivilized, [were] in the habit of employing stimulants 
in one fashion or another.” The paper opined that no legislation would be effective in prohibiting 
a population into abstemiousness and that if one drug happened to be removed from the market, 
people simply turned into another—and likely more dangerous—one.34 
 These debates in England highlighted the extent to which Reefer Madness was not a 
uniquely American nor Mexican phenomenon. Indeed, had the British government not 
intervened to study the issue and quell growing concerns that India’s laboring class had become 
prone to fits of homicidal insanity, it is very likely that the phenomenon of marijuana hysteria 
would have taken root in London and Calcutta much earlier than it did in the United States. It is 
also clear from William O’Shaughnessy’s experiments with cannabis in the 1840s that Indian 
doctors themselves believed that recreational cannabis use among the laboring class had the 
potential to cause sudden insanity. O’Shaughnessy’s research, in fact, suggests that idea had been 
prominent in eastern medicine since the fifteenth century.  
 The momentary outbreak of Reefer Madness in London in the 1890s influenced a similar 
trend in the United States. A Buffalo, New York paper published an article entitled “Hasheesh 
JimJam’s” on November 29, 1896 with the byline “Insane Asylums in Cairo are filled with its 
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Victims.” It argued that in 1896, 253 “lunatics” had been admitted and that it was an “undeniable 
fact that the habit was growing in Egypt.” The article categorized various forms of cannabis 
related insanity. First, there was “hasheesh intoxication,” which manifested as “an elated reckless 
state, in which optical hallucinations and delusions that devils possess the subject frequently 
exist.” Another form emerged as “acute mania” induced by cannabis use, which caused “fear of 
neighbors, outrageous conduct, continuous restlessness and talking and most insane ideas.” That 
particular condition had the ability to persist for months while a mere “hashish intoxication” 
passed within hours. Thirdly, hashish produced “weak-mindedness, with fresh outbreak of 
mania.” The symptoms included “victims being lazy, unconcerned about the future, and having 
no interest in anything but food and cigarettes.”35 
 During these lengthy discussions on the dangers of hashish use in the late-nineteenth-
century west, the British government created the Indian Hemp Drug Commission to further 
probe the issues. It concluded that moderate cannabis use caused no discernable effects, physical, 
mental, or moral. Excessive use damaged the body and frequently led to dysentery or bronchitis. 
It argued that the drug did tend to weaken the mind and could, at times, produce a distinct form 
of insanity, but it led mostly to “mental depravity and poverty, but rarely crime.” Importantly, it 
concluded, “the injury caused by excessive use is confined almost exclusively to the consumer, 
and scarcely affects society.” The Democrat and Chronicle pointed out that the report had been 
made by a government which “derives a part of its revenues from a tax on hasheesh and 
opium.”36  
 The new focus on hashish, insanity, and how it intersected with colonial policy had roots 
in the phenomenon of “running amok,” or losing one’s senses because of intoxication of one 
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kind or another and then perpetrating violence on the community. The term had a long history. In 
1801, The Observer of London reported that two slaves had been executed in the British colony 
of St. Helena for murdering two men and wounding several others “in the frantic and diabolic 
practice of running a muck.” These “infatuated wretches,” it continued, “impressed with revenge 
for real or supposed injuries, by the use of strong liquors work the passions to a state of frenzy.” 
Often armed with a “crease or dagger,” they frequently ran through high population areas 
“stabbing indiscriminately” at everyone they met. The Vermont Journal printed a story in 1821 
recounting the travails of a slave and his master in Havana, Cuba. The “driver” of a person of 
“considerable note” had been chastised by “his master for improper conduct” and as he 
“reflected upon his disgrace, he grew desperate.” He then grabbed a sword and attacked 
everyone he met, killing three, and wounding three others. After being captured, the man said 
that his only regret was that “he did not murder fifty” and that he was prepared to meet his fate. 
The title of the story was simply “Running A Muck.”37 
 A very similar story, which ran in November of 1828, reported that a black man in New 
Orleans “ran about the city with a dagger in each hand, menacing every person who attempted to 
stop him.” He was ultimately hit over the head with a brick, detained, and imprisoned.38  
By the 1870s, reporters began to connect incidents of “running a muck” with the use of 
hashish. The Elk County Advocate of Ridgway, Pennsylvania reported in 1874 that “running a 
muck by Orientals” could be attributed to a variety of causes “as, for instance, to the 
consumption of opium, hasheesh, (Indian hemp), etc. to religious frenzy, to a thirst for revenge, 
or to acute mental and bodily suffering of some description.”39  
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Early Reefer Madness, 1900-1920 
On January 20, 1901, the Democrat and Chronicle of Rochester, New York published a 
feature on Mexicans who baffled “the government by bringing in the marihuana which sends its 
victims running amuck when they awaken from the long death-like sleep it produces.” It marked 
the beginning of a twentieth century explosion of anti-marijuana writing. A widely reported and 
particularly influential story appeared in 1904, about Manuel Guerrero and Florencio Pino, who 
had spent weeks smoking “big cigarettes in which tobacco was mixed with the dangerous weed.” 
On a Tuesday afternoon, they smoked cannabis and then “went out into the street shouting, 
vociferating and attacking everybody.” They “marched hand in hand” and shouted that they were 
the bravest men on earth “and would kill anybody who dared to say a word to the contrary.” 
Then, Pino announced he was braver than Guerrero and the two attempted to kill each other. The 
story concluded with an ominous prediction, “it is feared that the two men, if they recover from 
their wounds, will lose their minds permanently, as is often the case with marihuana smokers.”40  
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That simple story, featuring Pino and Guerrero, went viral in the summer of 1904 and 
nearly two hundred papers reprinted it—many in Kansas, the first state in the nation to prohibit 
alcohol. The article created a sense of anxiety and strengthened alarmist concerns about 
cannabis. The two men compounded British fears of cannabis use by devolving into a form of 
temporary insanity and “running amuck.” The latter activity, which the English attributed 
primarily to Indian and Middle Easterners, had spread to Mexico and threatened to enter the 
United States’ southern border. The narrative also highlighted the extent to which these tales 
were transatlantic creations. The events told occurred in Mexico, not the United States, and 
featured anxieties once prominent in the English press—insanity induced by intoxication.  
Journalists and psychologists then inadvertently exported the theories to the United 
States. More, a significant portion of the stories—including the tale of Pino and Guerrero—
emerged from the American owned Mexican Herald, which served British and American 
business interests in Mexico City. On January 28, 1905, the Herald argued that the appointment 
of special inspectors in Mexico to “see that Indian women do not sell ‘marihuana’ or other 
dangerous plants in the markets of city” constituted a “move in the right direction.” The headline 
demanded attention—“Drugs Act Like Black Magic.” The Herald argued that use of marijuana 
caused “delirium, insanity or death” and reported “it is said that immediately after the first three 
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or four draughts of smoke smokers begin to feel a slight headache; and then they see everything 
moving around, and finally they lose all control over their mental faculties.” Additionally, users 
tended to “see herds of tigers, lions, devils, and un-heard of monsters coming to attack them.” 
Even worse, they “were not afraid at all” even as everything the smoker saw took “the shape of a 
monster, and men look like devils.”41 
From Pittsburgh, Raleigh, North Carolina, Hartford, Connecticut, Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania, and Poughkeepsie to Buffalo, Wichita, Chattanooga, and Vicksburg, Mississippi, 
the story connecting cannabis to black magic spread. The tale concluded by arguing, “people 
who smoke marihuana finally lose their mind and never recover it, their brains dry up and they 
die, most of the time suddenly.” These were ancient themes by the early-twentieth century and 
quite reminiscent of the Salem Witch Trials, the narratives of De Quincey and Ludlow, and the 
plot of Jekyll and Hyde. The theory that even limited cannabis use caused temporary insanity, 
which served as a prelude to a permanent loss of the mind, echoed the theories of late-nineteenth 
century British psychologists, Dr. Jacques Joseph-Moreau, and William O’Shaughnessy and 
indicated the deep historical roots of the budding Reefer Madness story.42 
In many cases, marijuana alarmists simply changed the headlines to stories that had 
already circulated through the press. The York Daily, for example, changed the headline from 
“Drugs Act Like Black Magic” to “A Weed Poison to Men’s Brains—Plant Whose Extract is 
Maddening—Imparts Killing Mania—Men Who Smoke Marihuana Cigarettes Have an Insane 
Desire to Slay, It Is Said.” An Oklahoma paper announced in 1907: “Marihuana Is the Name” 
and argued that “United States marshals in the Indian Territory [had] discovered a new kind of 
 
41 “Drugs Act Like Black Magic: Marihuana, Tolvache, and Carreras Mean Delirium, Insanity, and Death,” The 
Cincinnati Enquirer, January 28, 1905.  
42 Ibid.  
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‘dope’ which [promised] to cause even more trouble than morphine and cocoaine [sic].” Those 
who indulged were “beset with the most homicidal mania” and “wanted to kill.” The “homicidal 
mania,” very much like in earlier British cases involving temporary insanity inspired by alcohol, 
was typically followed with “stupor and remorse. “43 
Thirty years before Reefer Madness peaked in the United States, sensationalist marijuana 
headlines proliferated. “Insanity and Death in Use of Marihuana Weed of Mexico,” The Fort 
Wayne Sentinel howled. The Washington Post added: “Weed Sets Smokers Crazy: Marihuana 
Produces Insanity in Form of Murderous Impulse Until Effects of Fumes Wears Off.” The stories 
flowed through the syndicated press until, in the summer of 1907, Mexico declared war on 
cannabis. The New-York Tribune published a widely shared article reporting “the effects of 
smoking the marihuana weed” were so devastating that the government of Mexico planned to 
exterminate it throughout the country. The article then turned to the case of Malquiades Mireles 
as an example of why such extraordinary action proved necessary. In Monterey, Mireles smoked 
a marijuana cigarette and, before he had even finished it, was “seized with a fit of insanity” 
which caused him to “make a murderous assault on his wife with a knife.” He then stabbed a 
police officer, who overheard the man’s assault on his wife and responded, and ran for several 
blocks as police pursued. Mireles then turned to fight them and “was struck over the head with a 
club and knocked senseless.” In Guadalajara, “several hundred convicts in the prison” were 
“crazed by smoking a deadly drug known as marihuana, which was smuggled to them.” As a 
result, they formed together and incited a riot.44 
 
43 “A Weed Poison to Men’s Brains,” The York Daily (York, PA), April 4, 1905; “Marihuana is the Name—Said to  
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44 “Insanity and Death in Use of Marihuana Weed of Mexico,” The Fort Wayne Sentinel, June 5, 1907; “Weed Sets  
Smokers Crazy,” The Washington Times, June 6, 1907; “Death in Marihuana Weed,” New-York Tribune, June  
17,1907; “Convicts Crazed by Drugs,” The Washington Post, November 23, 1907.  
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  As Mexican immigration rose in response to revolution, refugees moving north brought 
marijuana across the border. Thereafter, the American press began characterizing the substance 
as even more dangerous than opium. The El Paso Herald argued in 1912 that “the marihuana of 
the Mexican” was “worse than the other drugs” but that all of them “wreck and ruin life.” The 
Herald, an early exporter of marijuana related anxiety, called the substance “The Mexican 
Opium” and claimed it produced “effects similar to those of the hasheesh of India or the opium 
of China.” The plant, it averred, caused “mental delusions and hallucinations that frequently 
[ended] in homicidal or suicidal mania.” The Arizona Republic also called it “stronger than 
opium” and compared it to the “hasheesh of the east.”45 
 The emergence of the Reefer Madness narrative had a complicated history and its success 
in swaying popular opinion depended on a variety of factors. First, the idea that intoxicants of 
any variety could cause temporary madness or permanent insanity had become something of a 
truism not just in the west, but on a global scale; an idea believed in China, Japan, India, 
England, France, the United States, and etcetera. The media’s insinuation that marijuana revealed 
a darker version of the user, one hidden under normal conditions from the public, highlighted the 
Victorian belief in double forms. Journalistic insistence on this aspect of the storyline 
represented an homage to Thomas De Quincey, the Hashish Club, Bayard Taylor, Fitzhugh 
Ludlow, and Robert Louis Stevenson. The presence of black magic and demonic possession, a 
persistent leitmotif, added a Biblical grimness of the kind that inspired the Salem Witch Trials.  
 As early as the 1910s, the emerging Reefer Madness narrative encouraged anti-marijuana 
laws at the local level. In June, 1915, the El Paso city council passed an emergency ordinance to 
prevent the sale of marijuana. The measure made “it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation 
 
45 “Hellhole of Temptation,” El Paso Herald, June 15, 1912;  “The Mexican Opium,” El Paso Herald, June 24,  
1913; “Stronger than Opium, the Arizona Republic, September 20, 1915.  
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or association of persons to sell, barter, exchange, or give away or have in his or their possession 
any marihuana, or Indian hemp.” In Santa Ana, California, a local sheriff pushed for a country 
law outlawing the substance. The local paper argued “the trouble with the weed is that it is just 
as likely to make a murderer out of the smoker as it is to make them a dancer.” The Deputy 
District Attorney planned an ordinance “making it a misdemeanor to have the seed, to grow the 
stuff or have it in possession either dried or undried, root, branch, leaves, flowers, pods or seed.” 
New York’s The Sun claimed “cocaine, opium, and morphine are nursery tonics compared with 
marihuana,” arguing “one who takes it becomes instantly mad and proceeds to do whatever is in 
the mind with an insane courage.” The publication enumerated the sensational claims beneath the 
headline “Worst Vice in the World.”46  
 By the 1920s, stories of marijuana induced madness dominated sensationalist press 
coverage. The Baltimore Sun argued in 1924 that “all the vicious tendencies in the makeup of 
humans” was brought “to the fore by indulgence in the dreaded marihuana weed.” In this telling, 
“victims of the habit” had the tendency “to lock themselves up in a small, tightly closed room” 
where they placed “a quantity of the weed in a pot over a bed of coals.” The subsequent “fumes” 
then drove “the occupants into a frenzy.” The article included a sketch of Mexican men packed 
into a small room overlooking a pot of marijuana, whose fumes drifted upwards. Inside the 
fumes was a portrait of the devil looking down on them. It added weight to the idea that “its 
hold, once its talons have been fastened on a victim” was “most tenuous” (like the Devil himself) 
and after using it once or twice, a deep addiction developed and it could only be treated by 
physicians. It was worse than liquor, which had “less tendency to arouse a man to fight” 
 
46 “Marihuana Sale Now Prohibited,” El Paso Herald, June 3, 1915; “Jackson Wants County Law So He Can Land  
 on Marijuana Garden,” Santa Ana Register, July 28, 1915; “Worst Vice in the World,” The Sun (New York,  
 NY), August 26, 1915.  
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Cannabis, on the other hand, brought “all the vicious tendencies to the fore” and furnished 
“untiring energy and fearlessness to make them more troublesome.”47 
  “The use of the drug is not limited to Mexicans,” the story continued, “although by far 
the greater number of smokers of that race.” It further noted that “a few negroes and quite a 
number of white youths are marihuana fiends.” There is little doubt that an influx of Mexican 
immigration after the revolution in 1910 spurred the sense that cannabis had become uniquely 
menacing, but that anxiety fit relatively neatly within a western tradition of shackling feared 
“others” with the entirety of America’s problem with drugs. The American and British press had 
similarly demeaned Chinese men and opium dens during spikes in immigration after the Civil 
War. Then, they pivoted to a repudiation of Indian and Egyptian men and their alleged cannabis 
use in the 1890s. From there, the narrative attached Italian, Polish, and Russian men and 
morphine and cocaine use at the turn-of-the-century. Finally, it pivoted to focus on Mexican men 
and marijuana in the early 1900s. The tendency, in fact, would characterize America’s response 
to drug use for the rest of the twentieth-century. It was a shameful response, but it had precedent 
and made Reefer Madness a later iteration of it; one propelled to levels earlier panics did not 
reach due to a more rapidly produced and sensationalist media. 
 By the 1930s, cannabis-related social anxiety peaked, began to inspire national and 
international political action, and greatly accelerated the rise of the Prohibition State. In the 
process, it validated, normalized, and nationalized a folkloric perception of the drug crisis that 
continually undermined the rationalist spirit that guided laws like the Pure Food and Drug Act 
and the Harrison Narcotic Act. The response to marijuana in the early-twentieth century was not 
without precedent, however. The drive against opium dens in the late-1800s exhibited that same 
 
47 “Mystery of the Strange Mexican Weed,” The Baltimore Sun, August 24, 1924. 
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spirit—and similarly focused on a form of drug use that posed little harm to social stability: 
indulgence in smokable opium. While the outbreak of Reefer Madness served as a sequel to the 
backlash against opium dens, the smoking opium narrative failed to achieve the complex social 
shaping power marijuana inspired in the 1930s. Indeed, the relentlessly sensationalistic cannabis 
coverage of that period created an era of marijuana hysteria that effectively guided the 
Prohibition State through the remainder of the twentieth-century and helped maintain support for 
a largescale war on drugs. 
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Chapter Six 
A More Sober Union: The Triumph of the Prohibition State, 1919-1939 
Wilbur E. Sutton, writing for the Muncie Evening Press in 1934 argued that “the liquor 
problem” had occupied so much of the public’s attention that Americans had missed a situation 
that “was far worse than even alcohol excess—the smoking of marihuana cigarettes by boys and 
girls.” An Elkhart, Indiana judge then called on the federal government “to root out marijuana 
smoking among the young men and women of Northern Indiana.” City officials believed 
marijuana had been brought to Elkhart by Mexican laborers eighteenth months earlier and that 
those workers were “making considerable profit on [selling the] dope.” In a statement that surely 
elevated Judge Sutton’s concern, one Indiana youth arrested for smoking cannabis informed 
local police that “the use of marijuana leaves one without will. It gives to time an incredible 
expansion which dwarfs the commonplace and reaches through the mind toward infinity for a 
temporary glimpse of heaven.”1 
That same year, a sweeping expose published by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, entitled 
“Drug Menace at the University of Kansas,” reported that the college had been overrun with 
marijuana. University officials attributed the spread of cannabis on campus to travelling jazz 
bands visiting Lawrence, Kansas. Will Johns, Special Investigator for the Kansas Attorney 
General’s office, noted that jazz band members often resorted to “marijuana or some other drug” 
in order to “obscure the monotony of their lives” and to quiet that “ceaseless thumping of jazz 
night after night.” The problem then spread to University of Kansas orchestras, one of which 
maintained its own campus cannabis patch. From the orchestras, marijuana spread throughout the 
campus. According to the article, marijuana became popular at the university because of alcohol 
 
1 Wilbur E. Sutton, “’Doping’ Youth with Marijuana,” Muncie Evening Press (Muncie, Indiana), January 26, 1934.  
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prohibition and a university rule that forbade liquor at dances. Now, “marijuana smoke” could 
regularly be smelled around campus.”2 
Whether it was morphine, codeine, chloroform, cocaine, heroin, opium, hashish, alcohol, 
or marijuana, Americans felt besieged on all sides by drug and alcohol abuse. By the 1920s, state 
and local governments, along with the federal state, had opened a two-front war on the 
problem—one aimed at alcohol and the other at drugs. Drug reform had, since the turn-of-the-
twentieth-century, complemented a similar drive for the prohibition of alcohol. As one gained 
legal and constitutional backing, those precedents propelled the push to restrict the other. There 
was consistent overlap not just in policy solutions, but the use and abuse of drugs and alcohol 
were apparently also often mutually reinforcing. Journalists, politicians, and the medical 
community often found bootleggers to be drug dealers, morphine addicts who suffered from 
alcoholism, and former binge drinkers who, as told in the story regarding University of Kansas 
orchestras, sought a cannabis high in a world without liquor. The public often viewed drugs and 
alcohol as twin evils and sought to prohibit them both in equal measure.3 
The various measures aimed at remedying the nation’s drug and alcohol use led to a 
confluence of legal, political, and social movements directed towards prohibiting both drugs and 
alcohol. The prohibition-minded state that anti-drug reformists and prohibitionists sought to 
establish reached its peak in 1919. That year, the Supreme Court not only validated the power of 
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Congress to regulate and prohibit opioids through a series of rulings confirming the 
constitutionality of the Harrison Narcotic Act, but it also passed a historic ban on the 
manufacture and sale of alcohol. It seemed to the drug and alcohol prohibitionists that a more 
sober union, underwritten by tight restrictions on non-medicinal opioids and liquor, had finally 
been perfected. The task of policing these twin bans on drugs and alcohol fell to one 
governmental body—the Internal Revenue.4  
As public support for maintaining a prohibition on alcohol eroded during the 1920s, those 
two intersecting movements diverged for the first time—or so it appeared. The federal 
government responded to the public’s declining support for alcohol prohibition by ensuring that 
its regulations on drugs did not share the same fate as the liquor law. In 1933, when Congress 
repealed the Volstead Act and the Eighteenth Amendment, the move marked a stunning 
repudiation of the Prohibition State’s crowning achievement. The federal government, then, 
quickly shifted its focus to that other pillar of the restrictive state—the fight against narcotics—
and utilized it as a site to rebuild the damaged foundation of the Prohibition State. The state, 
once fixated on the enforcement of alcohol prohibition, rapidly shifted towards drug control and 
alcohol tax violations.  
While the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Harrison Narcotic Act laid the legislative and 
legal foundations of the Prohibition State, the Volstead Act and the Marihuana Tax Act featured 
 
4 For an overview of the Supreme Court validation of the Harrison Narcotic Act, see: United States v. Jin Fuey Moy 
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the state’s ability to reflect, respond, and adjust to uncertainty and crisis. Once fixated on the 
rigorous enforcement of alcohol prohibition, the federal government seamlessly pivoted after the 
repeal of the Volstead Act to the policing of alcohol tax violations and containing the spread of 
marijuana. This elasticity maintained the core values of the Prohibition State—the gradual 
evolution of a set of restrictive policies aimed at curtailing public access to drugs and alcohol.5 
It was a seamless pivot illustrating a bureaucratic elasticity that protected the core values 
of the state, especially the government’s capacity to develop an evolving set of policies aimed at 
restricting public access to substances that seemed to threaten the public welfare. The 
reprioritizing of drug prohibition also preserved the budgets and personnel invested to execute 
the Prohibition State’s agenda, which changed surprising little even after the repeal of the 
national alcohol prohibition law. As support for alcohol prohibition waned in the 1920s, 
Congress created an independent Bureau of Prohibition also charged with enforcing drug laws. 
When that seemed to fail as well, it transferred alcohol enforcement to the Department of Justice 
and created the Bureau of Narcotics. After the repeal of alcohol prohibition, Congress then 
created the Alcohol Tax Unit which worked alongside the Bureau of Narcotics to continue the 
Prohibition State’s agenda. In that sense, it was a story of resilience and institutional elasticity 
that preserved investments in federal law enforcement.  
Indeed, the prohibitionist platform emerged from the repeal of prohibition relatively 
unphased and found as much work policing the evasion of taxes on legal alcohol as it did 
policing violations of the Volstead Act. The Bureau of Narcotics continued to thrive as well and 
 
5 See: H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, editors, Essays in Sociology (New York: Routledge, 1967). Analysis of the 
Prohibition State is guided by Max Weber’s writings on bureaucracy. It is particularly influenced by his assertion 
that “once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are among the hardest to 
destroy.” Indeed, the Prohibition State, as it pivoted away from its failure to enforce the Volstead Act, exhibited 
qualities that mirrored Weber’s assessments. He wrote “and where the bureaucratization of administration has been 
completely carried through, a form of power relation is established that is practically unshatterable.”  
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focused increasingly on the criminalization of marijuana, which was perceived as a growing 
menace in the 1930s. Instead of reeling from reputational and budgetary losses when alcohol 
prohibition came to an end in 1933, enforcement seemed to thrive. After the prohibition of 
marijuana in 1937, Congress gradually folded the Alcohol Tax Unit, along with the extensive 
resources once used in the enforcement of alcohol prohibition, and partially reinvested them in 
the intensifying drug war. While the media consistently portrayed the country’s experiment with 
alcohol prohibition as a titanic failure, its portrayal of the war on drugs was far more favorable 
and contributed to a national consensus that drug prohibition was a legitimate and vital state 
function warranting a well-funded enforcement administration. The Prohibition State had 
triumphed indeed.6 
Prelude to the War on Marijuana: The Rapid Decline of Support for the Prohibition of 
Alcohol, 1919-1933 
 
In 1920, John F. Kramer, the first head of the prohibition unit within Internal Revenue, 
claimed he loved his job so much he felt guilty receiving pay. He had no doubt that the law 
would be easily enforced, that the nation largely supported it, and that all the resources needed to 
win the battle would be readily granted. Congress allotted $2 million for national enforcement—
or roughly $30 million in 2020 dollars when adjusted for inflation—and hired a staff of just 
1,500 officers to police the new law across the entirety of the United States. It was difficult to 
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determine in that early period just how difficult policing violations of the nation’s new alcohol 
prohibition would be. Kramer, along with millions of other Americans, remained optimistic.7 
To skeptics, the budget and staff allotted to the cause seemed to indicate the government 
was not serious about enforcement. Frederic J. Haskin theorized that it would take “a fair-sized 
standing army to enforce it” and opined that the men of the Bureau of Internal Revenue felt like 
“the prince in the fairy tale who was handed a spoon with a hole in the bottom of it by an old 
witch as the price of his liberty.” Moreover, the obstacles confronting the Internal Revenue, an 
agency still evolving after the Sixteenth Amendment created a new income tax in 1913, were 
only exacerbated by its new task enforcing prohibitions on all alcohol and opioid violations 
while also overseeing the collection of the nation’s income taxes. Indeed, the tasks given Internal 
Revenue between 1913-1919 had become varied and complex.8 
The agency had been enforcing the Harrison Narcotic Act since 1914 and had 
encountered a variety of struggles in doing so. Haskin compared the “prohibition law to the anti-
narcotic law” in order to highlight how difficult enforcement would likely become with the 
additional responsibility of policing the Volstead Act. The problem with drugs, to him, had been 
“infinitely smaller” and characterized by a number of offenders that were a “mere fraction of 
those involved in bootlegging.” Even still, “it was found impossible to enforce the anti-narcotic 
law until public sentiment for it had been aroused by publicity.” Nonetheless, the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue was, by the 1920s, “charged with the enforcement of the Harrison Act and the 
Volstead Law enforcement” in a world in which alcohol prohibition was being “patterned after 
the experience secured with drug laws for many years past.” Coupling the budgets for both drug 
 
7 Theodore M. Knappen, “Prohibition Can and Will Be Enforced, Officials Say,” New York Tribune, January 18, 
1920.  
8 Frederic J. Haskin, “A Sea of Rum and Government Spoon,” Palladium-Item (Richmond, Indiana), September 13, 
1921. 
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and alcohol enforcement served as a firewall that protected the stability of the new Prohibition 
State. Prohibition agents and narcotics officers shared purpose, space, training, expertise, and 
money.9  
Whether it was prepared for the task or not, the federal government pursued the dual 
enforcement of prohibitions on the nation’s robust and thriving drug and alcohol economies. 
Frank M. Silva, director of prohibition enforcement in California, declared in 1920 that he would 
also take over the work of enforcing the Harrison Narcotic Act in the state.10 Then, in February 
1920, the government announced that “all agents and supervisors for the enforcement of the 
Harrison narcotic act” would be transferred from Internal Revenue to the federal alcohol 
prohibition director.11 Also in 1920, Congress increased the budget for the Bureau of Prohibition 
to $10 million from the initial $2 million and mandated that $1.25 million of it go to the 
enforcement of drug laws. From there, the teams worked together enforcing both alcohol and 
drug prohibitions and, by the end of 1921, had been involved in over 42,000 violations of the 
liquor laws and 9,000 narcotic offenses. The fines associated with the arrests resulted in 
$3,032,174 in revenue.12  
Sustaining the enforcement of a near total ban on both alcohol and opioids was, as 
Haskins pointed out so eloquently, a Herculean task. Worse, it seemed as though predictions that 
prohibition would lead to more economic productivity were perhaps unfounded. In an analysis of 
the results of two years of alcohol prohibition, the New York Herald reported in 1922 that the 
federal government had lost $361,216,118 in revenue—approximately 8% of the federal budget. 
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Prohibition Unit is Shown,” Arkansas Democrat (Little Rock, Arkansas), June 27, 1922.; “The Harding 
Administration and Law Enforcement in 1921-1922,”Chillicothe Gazette (Chillicothe, Ohio), October 21, 1922.  
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That loss in crucial tax dollars also accompanied an $11 million budget for policing the 
prohibitions on drugs and alcohol. Moreover, the report concluded that there had been no 
discernable increase in bank deposits to offset those figures. One of the few bright spots in the 
report came in the fact that theater receipts had increased by nearly eighty percent. While 
Americans may have been taking in more theater, there were not nearly enough theatrical 
productions to offset the enormous loss in tax revenue.13 
From its inception, arguments against prohibition began to accumulate and reshape public 
perceptions about its plausibility. One of the more powerful arguments was that the nation’s 
alcohol laws had led to a correlative increase in drug dependency. A movement started as early 
as 1925 connecting the two. The Washington Post noted “it has been asserted by those opposed 
to prohibition that its enforcement has resulted in a large increase in the use of narcotics and 
habit-forming drugs.”14 In the federal prison in Atlanta, advocates of this argument pointed out, 
there were 173 persons incarcerated for violating revenue and prohibition laws. There were 
322—or 21.3 percent of the population—locked up for violating narcotic laws. Not only had 
prohibition led to a devastating loss in national tax revenue, according to this line of thinking, but 
it also promoted a rising tide of crime and drug addiction that required expanding budgets to 
combat. In turn, it was then impossible to allot those budgets because of the financial 
hemorrhaging caused by the very law requiring those expanded budgets.15 
The narrative of failure began to implant itself in the national political story. Advocates 
of total alcohol prohibition had reckoned it would increase productivity and that working-class 
Americans would save more money, which banks would then earn interest on; that crime and the 
 
13 “Two Years of Prohibition—An Unbiased Report,” New York Herald, January 29, 1922. 
14 “Prohibition and Narcotics—From the Washington Post,” The Evening Journal (Wilmington, Delaware), August  
15, 1925.  
15 Ibid.  
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administrative costs associated with punishing it would markedly decline and a kind of modern 
utopian society would gradually emerge in response to this organically restructured economy. 
The opposite seemed to be occurring. The billions lost in tax revenue were not in any way offset 
by increased savings and crime.  
Social commentator John Erskine wrote in 1924 that “if we had a prohibition law which 
represented the will of the people, which frankly forbade the thing it was intended to stop, then 
Prohibition would be here, and perhaps here to stay.” If that had happened, he surmised “we who 
still prefer the Christian virtue of Temperance to the Mohammedan discipline of Prohibition, 
should be voted down, relegated to the past with a good many other vestiges of Christian 
civilization.”16 Had alcohol prohibition arrived with that kind of clarity, he hoped “we should be 
good sports” and “accept with some show of grace the passing of a civilization we loved.” At 
that point, at least, they would know, “for our comfort, that another civilization had arrived as a 
substitute for it, and that those who voted us down had now the satisfaction of trying out their 
new ideals.”17 Erskine believed, however, that his side was being asked to “give up a freedom we 
believed in for something the other side does not believe in either.”18  
It appeared to writers like Erskine that not only had alcohol prohibition been an 
immediate financial failure, but that those who demanded its implementation did not even 
possess the turpitude to properly enforce it. Charges of corruption and nepotism set enforcement 
back early. As of June of 1922, even though the unit boasted 2,312 employees, 6 percent of the 
force—120 agents—had been dismissed between June 30, 1921 and June 30, 1922. The grounds 
for dismissal included “conduct unbecoming an officer, extortion, acceptance of bribes, 
 
16 John Erskine, “The Prohibition Tangle,” The North American Review, Vol. 219, No. 819 (February 1924) pp. 145- 
149.  
17 Erskine, “The Prohibition Tangle,” 147.  
18 Ibid.  
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falsifying accounts, and general inefficiency.” A New York Grand Jury even concluded that 
“almost without exception” the agents who appeared before them were “not men of the type, 
intelligence, and character qualified to be charged with the enforcement of this difficult and 
important federal law.”19 
Those issues infected the narcotics division of Internal Revenue too. In 1920, Dr. W.H. 
Sage, one of the first heads of the division, appeared before a grand jury accused of accepting 
$6,400 in bribes. A month later, he was indicted on charges of violating the Harrison Act, the 
anti-opioid legislation he was charged with enforcing. Like alcohol prohibition, the oversight of 
all opioid prescriptions presented a monumental—if not wholly impossible—task. In a 
syndicated newspaper piece entitled “Narcotic Peddlers at Root of Grave Menace that Grips 
United States,” it was reported that the extensive guidelines of the Harrison Act, which required 
monthly reports from wholesalers and retailers, needed more effective enforcement. While these 
mandates placed a “check on all legitimate traffic,” the Narcotics Division of the Prohibition 
Unit had “never more than 170 men to enforce the statute, one hundred and seventy men to cover 
the entire United States!” Not only that, but one of their figureheads faced an indictment on 
bribery charges.20 
Despite these setbacks in enforcement, Congress continued to expand the legislative 
purview of the Prohibition State. On March 26, 1922, it passed the Narcotic Import and Export 
Act—or the Miller-Jones Act. The law served as an amendment to the Smoking Opium 
Exclusion Act of 1909 and placed much stronger limitations, as the title of the act suggested, on 
 
19 Imogen B. Oakley, “The Prohibition Law and the Political Machine,” The Annals of the American Academy and  
Social Science, Vol. 109, Prohibition and Its Enforcement (September 1923) pp. 165-177; Ibid, 167.  
20 “Bribery Charges in US Narcotics Division,” Belvidere Daily Republican, January 27, 1920.  
20 “Drug Peddlers Are at Root of Grave Menace that Grips United States,” Rutland Daily Herald (Rutland, 
Vermont), April 3, 1922. 
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both the import and export of opium and cocoa leaves. The act “expressly” prohibited the 
importation of any narcotic drug into the United States except the crude opium and cocoa leaves 
necessary “to provide for medical and legitimate uses only.” The latter amounts would be 
decided by a board assembled by the Secretary of State, the Treasury, and Commerce.21  
The Anti-Heroin Act followed on June 7, 1924, which prohibited the importation of 
opium for the purpose of synthesizing it into heroin, a bill that received almost no coverage in 
the United States press. Pharmaceutical firms were simply instructed to sell existing supplies and 
that medicinal heroin would no longer be available for consumption. While the Prohibition State 
continued to expand its anti-drug platform through legislation, struggles with implementation 
and the collection of objective data continued to impede real progress. The Federal Narcotic 
Control Board, created by the Narcotic Import and Export Act, assigned with determining the 
quantity of opium the United States needed for medical purposes, seems to have failed, over 
time, to develop an accurate number.  
Pointing to the evidence of a growing drug crisis, Ellen N. La Motte, writing for The 
American Journal of Nursing, cited a statistic showing that the importation of opium had actually 
increased throughout the 1920s. From 47,024 pounds in 1921, 135,093 in 1922, 99,353 in 1923 
to 142,139 in 1928 and 140,172 in 1929. Despite the revolutionary legal developments that 
empowered the Prohibition State after the First World War, rates of addiction seemed not to have 
fallen according to her statistics, which were as reliable as any others of the time period. La 
Motte argued “the number of addicts in America is variously estimated to range from 250,000 to 
a million, similar to estimates from the 1910s. She added: “being a secret habit, and not 
 
21 “Current Legislation: the China Trade Act and the Narcotic Import and Export Act,” American Bar Journal, Vol.  
8, No. 12 (December 1922): 110.  
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recognizable until the patient is down and out, these estimates can only be the merest guesses. 
There are no accurate statistics.”22 
Paul Kach, of the Baltimore Bar, argued in 1926 that “friend and foe of the Volstead alike 
admit its ineffectiveness” and suggested that “the present situation is well nigh appalling.” The 
reasons were familiar: corruption, a concomitant disrespect for those charged with enforcing the 
law, and a perceived increase in crime due to its passage—a devastating development for the 
architects of the Prohibition State. Kach painted a dire portrait where “new classes of offenders 
arise” and steadily added to the population of American criminals. They were “lured by the easy 
profits of bootlegging.” He added that as “the expense of administration mount ever higher…not 
even drunkenness decreases.” Alongside these alarming trends, he also noted that the “drug 
menace grows, and terrible though that be, it is often preferable to the vile and health-shattering 
substitutes used in place of liquor.”23 
In the face of accusations of nepotism and corruption, the Senate responded in 1925 to a 
questionnaire about whether it supported patronage in selecting prohibition agents. Eight stated 
yes while thirty-five responded no. Colliers had approached the Senate after conducting a poll of 
more than 260,000 Americans, in which a majority expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the 
agency and its approach to enforcement. Senator Norbeck of North Dakota claimed that “the 
failure of enforcement” could be attributed to those members of Congress who disagreed with 
the bill and responded by appointing their friends to state enforcement agencies.  
A majority of those surveyed believed that prohibition agents should be selected 
according to extant civil service protocols and that the decision should be entirely removed from 
 
22 Ellen N. La Motte, “The Opium Problem,” The American Journal of Nursing, Vol. 29, No. 7, July 1929.  
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politics.24 Without effective enforcement strategies or a central bureau intent on coordinating a 
professional agenda against the bootlegging industry, the predictable consequences of any 
prohibition—a black market economy in the banned substance—thrived without serious 
interference from a prohibition force. Even President Harding, in a message to Congress, decried 
“prohibition enforcement as a national scandal.”25 
In response to Hardings’ sentiment that the enforcement of prohibition represented a 
national crisis, Congress, with the support of Hardings’ successor Calvin Coolidge, created the 
Bureau of Prohibition in 1927. Its creation illustrated a strategy similar to the one they would 
deploy three years later with the formation of the Bureau of Narcotics. These transformations 
pointed to a strategy central to the Prohibition State’s survival. When faced with scandal or a 
potential loss of public support, it either transferred agencies or created new ones and installed 
fresh leadership that had the effect of diverting attention from the failings of the previous offices. 
The creation of the Bureau of Prohibition, however, could not stem the growing tide of anti-
prohibition sentiment and so it was remade again in 1930 and transferred to the Department of 
Justice as part of Porter’s Bill creating the Bureau of Narcotics.  
By putting the enforcement of prohibition within the prosecutorial arena of the federal 
government, Congress hoped to improve the agency’s reputation. It was theorized that the 
Bureau of Prohibition, which was very capable of making alcohol related arrests, still had trouble 
prosecuting cases because of its lack of experience gathering convincing evidence. Andrew W. 
Mellon, former Secretary of the Treasury, argued that the Bureau of Prohibition should have 
never been part of Internal Revenue and agreed with several congressman that it made sense to 
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move it to the Department of Justice, where it would work in close contact with those 
responsible for prosecuting the cases the bureau initiated in the field.  
In 1932, the Bureau of Prohibition employed just 130 agents yet still managed a budget 
of $9,436,646. Much of the original prohibition unit had been transferred to the enforcement of 
provisions of the Volstead Act related to industrial alcohol, which was a far less controversial 
area of policing. That unit employed the bulk of the prohibition agents—1,754—and maintained 
budgets averaging $4.5 million. The Bureau of Narcotics, in comparison, boasted 442 agents and 
a budget of $1.7 million. In that sense, the shifts were largely optical and the Prohibition State 
continued to secure significant moneys and personnel. While the reduced Bureau of Prohibition 
only had 130 agents, its budget was still nine times that of the Bureau of Narcotics, which had 
300 more agents to support. That procurement, combined with the $4.5 million given to the 
enforcement of industrial alcohol laws, meant that the budget for alcohol prohibition remained 
around $15 million—or $280 million adjusted for inflation—at the onset of an economic 
depression and just one year prior to repeal.26 
In the early-1930s, prohibition arrests also began to decline. The Bureau of Prohibition 
reported 7,033 arrests for the month of August 1932. That number was down from the 7,459 
arrests in August of 1931. A majority of the agency’s work came in the form of seizures. In that 
same month, it seized 1,224 automobiles and boats, 1,578 stills, 163 breweries, 264,877 gallons 
of beer, 150,792 gallons of spirits, and 12,080 gallons of wine. The bureau did not maintain a 
strong record in the courts, however. Of the 7, 033 arrested, 2,193 (33%) resulted in criminal 
convictions; 68 led to convictions by verdict and 1,323 simply plead guilty and faced, on 
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average, 170 days in jail and a fine of $164. Compared to the sentences levied against those in 
possession of drugs, a Volstead violation represented a slap on the wrist. 
 A frenetic raid, arrest, and seizure style that led to few significant convictions 
characterized the enforcement of alcohol prohibition. It was also a costly exercise. Not only had 
the federal government lost the modern equivalent of $5 billion in annual tax revenue, but it 
spent roughly half a billion dollars (in today’s dollars) in the enforcement of alcohol and drug 
laws. In the early phase of a severe economic depression, it was increasingly difficult to justify 
these administrative experiments. Worse, accusations of corruption, uneven enforcement, and the 
inability to convict a vast majority of those the bureau arrested only added to the arguments of 
those calling for repeal. After repeal occurred in 1933, however, the prohibition unit within the 
Department of Justice simply transitioned into the Alcohol Tax Unit of Internal Revenue and 
moved from the Department of Justice back to the Treasury.  
 The Alcohol Tax Unit that emerged after the repeal of alcohol actually represented a 
restoration of the original prohibition unit. The new agency inherited the staff of the Bureau of 
Industrial Alcohol and the 660 agents left in the old prohibition bureau of the Department of 
Justice to bring the force of the Alcohol Tax Unit to 1,850. It was the same number of employees 
the Bureau of Prohibition and the Bureau of Industrial Alcohol had two years earlier and one 
year before prohibition’s end.  
The Alcohol Tax Unit also maintained a nearly identical budget of $15 million—or $360 
million adjusted for inflation. Those invested in the prohibition of alcohol simply pivoted, once 
again, rebranded the cause, and triumphed quickly over what seemed to be an existential crisis: 
the repeal of the prohibition law. Additionally, Congress had also created the highly effective 
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Bureau of Narcotics, which focused on promoting a more active war on drugs, one that pivoted 
quickly to a war on marijuana in the mid-1930s.  
 
The Stepson of Prohibition No More: The Formation of the Bureau of Narcotics in the 
Waning Years of Alcohol Prohibition 
 
It would be impossible to police America’s drug problem, Pennsylvania Congressman 
Stephen G. Porter argued in 1930, if it was continually viewed “as a stepson of prohibition.” 
That year he introduced what became known as the Porter Bill, a plan to divorce the enforcement 
of drug laws from the fledgling prohibition bureau. His efforts reorganized crucial federal 
bureaucracies and marked an attempt to diversify the government’s investments in the 
Prohibition State and refocus it on a new war it had a better chance of winning—the one on 
drugs. Although Congress intended to continue funding the enforcement of the Volstead Act, 
representatives like Porter believed it was a mistake to fixate on that issue.27 
The Bureau of Prohibition, once seen as a vital administrative experiment in the 
enforcement of anti-liquor law, had failed to gain footing in its battle against a deeply entrenched 
substance—or so went the narrative. From 1919-1930, in fact, politicians, the media, and the 
public continually charged the bureau with corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, and the 
mismanagement of resources. Whether the criticism was fair mattered less than the ways those 
accusations reshaped its public image, one that had been irreparably damaged by 1930. At the 
same time, the narcotics division, a subsidiary agency working in the shadow of the prohibition 
bureau, continued its fight with drug use, a situation many considered far more threatening to the 
public sphere than the average violation of liquor laws. The agency was, as Porter said, the 
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overlooked stepchild of a troubled parent and the congressman hoped to offer it the attention and 
resources he believed it deserved.  
The United States Congress, at the behest of Porter, who was considered an expert on the 
nation’s problem with narcotics, initiated a bureaucratic reshuffling that would change the course 
of the Prohibition State’s history. The Porter Bill created a Bureau of Narcotics within the 
Treasury Department, under the direction of a commissioner appointed by the Secretary of State, 
who would earn a $9,000 yearly salary. The new agency would also “include all present 
employees of the Prohibition Bureau engaged exclusively in the enforcement of any law related 
to narcotic drugs.”28 Simultaneously, Congress transferred the Bureau of Prohibition to the 
Department of Justice, where it would play a supporting role in the nation’s broader fight against 
federal crime. While it would continue to gain outsized budgets and a deep staff, it was 
ultimately removed—as much as it could be—from the public eye, renamed, and relegated to the 
shadows of federal law enforcement.29 
In one fell swoop, then, the federal government downgraded the public importance of 
alcohol prohibition enforcement by disbanding the Bureau of Prohibition and moved it to a new 
department where it was rebranded as a subsidiary agency. Still not done, Congress then 
reinvested a portion of the prohibition bureau’s budget in a campaign against drugs. In the 
process, the Bureau of Narcotics gained esteem and became a prominent new face in the national 
drive against crime. Porter argued that “the principal object of the bill is to take narcotics control 
away from the Prohibition Bureau and added, “In my opinion the subject of narcotic control is of 
greater importance today than prohibition.”30  
 
28 “Bureau of Narcotics Proposed in Bill,” The Wilkes-Barre Record, January 24, 1930.  
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Porter’s bill passed just as the narcotics division fell into a crisis of corruption, ineptitude, 
nepotism, and abuse of power that had similarly plagued the public reputation of the prohibition 
bureau. As Congress considered Porter’s Bill, the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition in 
Charge of Narcotics, Colonel L.G. Nutt, found himself in the middle of a scandal. An 
investigation revealed that his son, Roland H. Nutt, and son-in-law, L.P. Mattingly, had 
borrowed money from Arnold Rothstein, notorious head of the Jewish mafia in New York, who 
had made a fortune from both bootlegging and the illegal sale of narcotics. The state of New 
York found money transfers from Rothstein to Col. Nutt’s family along with evidence that his 
son represented the gangster in an income tax case. A grand jury ultimately determined that those 
connections, while alarming, did not prevent Nutt from enforcing federal drug laws. However, 
while investigating his possible connections to Arnold Rothstein, the state of New York 
discovered that Nutt padded his arrest reports by including narcotic busts made by local police, 
not federal agents. A new investigation into that matter then commenced.31 
As a result of these allegations, Harry J. Anslinger, Assistant Commissioner of 
Prohibition, replaced Colonel Nutt as Chief of the Bureau of Narcotics, which was still an 
agency under the umbrella of the Bureau of Prohibition. That was about to change, however. 
Two weeks later, on March 22, 1930, the House Ways and Means Committee approved Porter’s 
proposal separating the control of narcotics from the Bureau of Prohibition. Then, on June 14th, 
President Herbert Hoover signed the bill and mandated the new bureau be established in thirty 
days.32 
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The creation of the Bureau of Narcotics signaled a revolutionary change in the history of 
the Prohibition State. In terms of political optics, it pointed to a willingness on the part of the 
government to acknowledge that its strategies guiding the war on alcohol were not effective nor 
sustainable and that it was open to change and administrative experimentation. That agility, 
perhaps more than any other factor, preserved the Prohibition State. While Congress could not 
abandon the enforcement of the Volstead law, it did shift its focus from pursuing liquor 
violations to fighting the nation’s alleged narcotic problem. It also continued to bestow historic 
budgets on the enforcement of alcohol prohibition, which became more of a hidden battle. The 
rebranding of agencies that year also saved both bureaus from descending into deeper levels of 
scandal, which threatened to discredit the enforcement of both alcohol and drug laws. For those 
looking to investigate corruption in those agencies, the fact they no longer existed made them 
exceedingly difficult to further probe. 
With new leadership under Harry J. Anslinger, a mandate from the United States 
Congress to pursue any and all violations of drug laws, and strong public support, the Bureau of 
Narcotics wasted little time asserting itself. In one of the bureau’s first drug raids, it was clear 
that Anslinger intended to escalate the government’s response to the nation’s perceived narcotic 
problem. In Oakland, California on August 15, 1930, agents seized opium, morphine, cocaine, 
and heroin with a street value that exceeded $100,000. It was a major bust carried out by Harry 
D. Smith, supervising agent in charge of the Pacific Coast, who proposed the raid after he 
intercepted intelligence suggesting drug dealers were using an abandoned building at 320 
Seventh Street as a dispensary. Harry J. Anslinger then ordered the seizure from Washington, 
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D.C., which led to the discovery of 127 cans of opium, one ounce of morphine, and fifty bundles 
of heroin.33 
The media viewed the raids favorably. Indeed, it celebrated the new bureau and those in 
charge of directing its movements. In a nationally syndicated article entitled “Fight on Narcotics 
Advanced,” the unnamed author argued that “the [drug] problem is akin to the prohibition 
problem.” The writer of the piece then corrected himself and argued that, in the end, the two 
issues could not even “be considered on the same plain” in terms of addictive potential. Even 
“the most ardent wet [was] apt to fully consent to restriction of the sale and use of narcotics,” it 
averred. That was because alcohol, after initial use, paled in comparison to the addictive power 
opium or cocaine wielded over first-time users. In popular discourse, in fact, it was almost taboo 
to question the importance of policing the nation’s drug laws, which made Anslinger’s vigorous 
enforcement seem justified and appropriate.  
To those who had advocated for a stronger national response to the spread of narcotics, 
the notion that alcohol prohibition had accelerated the traffic in drugs held considerable sway. It 
was a reiteration of the point made about marijuana use in the University of Kansas orchestra—
that the prohibition of alcohol, while perhaps admirable in its promotion of restraint, had 
ultimately created a far worse problem by instigating increased drug use. In an article entitled 
“Fight on Narcotics Advanced,” the author of the piece argued, “it has been said that under 
prohibition of alcohol, a great many” Americans had “turned to narcotic drugs.” The writer did 
not, however, want to get into a broader discussion about the similarities or dissimilarities of 
alcohol to narcotics. Rather, they were simply satisfied that “something [was] being done.”34 
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In a sweeping editorial titled “The Economic Losses through Drug Addiction,” writer 
Frances N. Ahl contended that the narcotic menace is the most serious problem confronting our 
police and other law enforcement officers.” Ahl claimed that the economic burden of the 250,000 
drug addicts (which they considered a conservative estimate) in the United States amounted to a 
loss of $1.57 million daily ($573,875,000 per annum). The author arrived at those numbers by 
analyzing the ways “these addicts prey upon our nation to the extent of millions,” and strained 
“our law enforcement system, our police, our judiciary, our jails, prisons, penitentiaries.” This 
many tentacled malady made the narcotic problem “an industrial menace as well as a social 
one.”35 
With many of the same concerns in mind, Congress appropriated $1,708,000 for the fight 
against drugs in the 1931 budget. This represented a $47,000 increase from 1930 and illustrated 
the extent to which Congress, even as public revenue plummeted due to the onset of the Great 
Depression, nonetheless devoted itself to greater investments in the policing of drug laws. On the 
eve of the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, amid a social milieu characterized by a sense that 
the prohibition of alcohol would not survive the 1930s, Congress dutifully reoriented the 
Prohibition State and prepared it for long-term survival. In the face of unexpected and 
unprecedented threats posed by a decline in popular support of alcohol prohibition and economic 
depression, it would be no small task.36 
The appointment of Harry J. Anslinger appeared to provide the correction Porter and 
Congress had hoped. The Bureau of Narcotics emerged as a far more organized, professional, 
and active agency than it had been under the prohibition bureau. It communicated regularly with 
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Congress, promoted awareness campaigns against narcotics, advocated for tighter municipal, 
state, and national laws, and collaborated with other federal agencies to fight national crime. In 
1931, for example, it participated in an effort to rid Chicago of organized crime and joined a 
network of federal bureaucracy intent on using any national law necessary to cripple the city’s 
notorious underworld. While the income tax law was most favored in attacking gangsters, “other 
laws in use [were] the Volstead act, Harrison act, the Mann white slave act and the Dyer 
automobile theft act.” The governmental branches “concerned in the war” included the Bureau of 
Narcotics, the Justice Department, Immigration Service, the Coast Guard, and Customs 
officials.37 
Although the Department of Justice continued to actively police alcohol prohibition, 
those operations faded from the headlines and were replaced, to some degree, by the more 
dramatic raids of the new Bureau of Narcotics. In February of 1931, a mile north of the San 
Francisco Airport, for example, H.S. Seager director of the California state Bureau of Narcotics 
ceremoniously burned over a half million dollars in drugs. The San Francisco Examiner 
gleefully reported that “a $600,000 opium pipe was smoked yesterday by the state of California.”  
The bonfire began early in the morning as “two big garbage trucks trundled slowly down the 
highway towards the rendezvous on the edge of the bay waters.” A car filled with police officers 
armed with shotguns and a bevy of motorcycle police carrying sub-machine guns flanked the 
trucks. Once they arrived at the bay’s edge, a large fire was built. The officers threw 8,000 
opium pipes into the flames along with “cooking stoves, needles, elaborate hypodermic outfits, 
crude layouts consisting of safety pins and eyedropper glasses, tins of cocaine, heroin, morphine, 
marijuana, and other deadly habit-forming drugs.” Director Seager referred to the bonfires as 
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“opium parties” and he expected that one more would result in the destruction of all drugs 
collected by the state over the past ten years.38 
The bonfire demonstrated a new and more aggressive style of national policing, but also 
pointed to a kind of public performance that put on display the new resources involved in 
attacking the country’s problem with substance abuse. Even though the massive pile of narcotics 
burned that day had been collected over the past decade, their incineration created something of 
an optical illusion suggesting that the state’s drug problem was far worse than it had previously 
appeared and thus required a force much bigger than had been assembled in the past. The scene 
also emphasized that, in the area of drug control, the government intended to master the 
enforcement style the prohibition unit was thought to have bungled; that its failure to 
successfully prohibit alcohol represented the loss of just a small battle in a larger war against 
illicit substances that the federal government was committed to win.  
The fight against drugs rapidly transformed into a nationwide war in the 1930s. That war 
included simultaneous campaigns against smoking opium, morphine, codeine, heroin, cocaine, 
and marijuana. Politicians, bureaucrats, and the media began to increasingly frame it as a war in 
public discourse as well, which helped cement the idea. “The war against narcotics is now 
advancing on many fronts,” a widely circulated article proclaimed in March of 1931. It explained 
that “the Bureau of Narcotics seeks to control the use of habit-forming drugs through the present 
laws governing their importation, sale, and manufacture.”  
Demonstrating a spirit of cooperation, the United States Public Health Service also 
deployed its Division of Mental Hygiene to determine the exact quantity of drugs required for 
medicinal and scientific purposes in the United States. The bureau also worked with the 
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American Medical Association, which sought the same information. The National Research 
Council added to this coalition of experts by experimenting with the therapeutic value of 
narcotics that possessed no addictive qualities. The paper argued “if all these methods of attack” 
were coordinated then it would result in “tremendous human good.”39 
The dramatic raids and the warlike phraseology did not define the entirety of the Bureau 
of Narcotics mission. Indeed, Anslinger focused much of his attention on the issues that plagued 
the reign of his predecessors: lack of professionalism, inconsistencies in enforcement, and 
corruption. The lack of uniformity in state drug laws encouraged these issues by creating 
conditions where agents’ approaches to drug crime varied from state to state—an environment 
that made it difficult to train new staff and nurtured a lack of cohesion that bred corruption. 
These were the same problems that hampered the success of the Bureau of Prohibition and so 
Anslinger’s attempt to correct it demonstrated an overall devotion to improving the reputation of 
the Prohibition State generally.  
In one of his first speeches, given at an annual meeting of the nation’s druggists, 
Anslinger pushed for better adherence to the Harrison Narcotic Act at the state level. He told 
delegates at the annual meeting in 1931 that “a thorough enforcement of narcotic laws was 
impossible as long as various state laws conflict and the Harrison drug act is limited in 
application.” That kind of discord created confusion and inefficiency and he reiterated and 
marketed the message of uniformity throughout the 1930s. Anslinger argued that “between the 
point in which the operation of the federal narcotic laws” extended and “the point where the 
operation of state narcotic laws, most of which are archaic, begins” there was an enormous 
gap—or what he called “a twilight zone”—that afforded “a safe refuge for the dope trafficker 
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and racketeer.”40 Anslinger believed that a national uniform drug law, simply worded, would do 
more to eradicate the drug problem than any perhaps any other measure.41 
As confidence in the nation’s fight against narcotics reached new peaks in the early-
1930s, the support for alcohol prohibition dramatically collapsed. In August of 1933, James A. 
Farley, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, declared that the enforcement of 
prohibition was a joke and that the Roosevelt Administration would not “attempt to enforce 
Federal prohibition laws” and would not “authorize further appointments to the prohibition 
service.” While incredibly ominous news for the Prohibition State, those developments were 
somewhat overshadowed by the appointment of the first woman to serve as the Chief of the 
Bureau of Narcotics overseeing the regions of Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.42 
Elizabeth Bass, who had been the Democratic national committeewoman, received word 
in August that she would become the latest narcotics chief in charge of the crucial district that 
included Chicago. Less than a year into her tenure, Chicago papers reported “a woman has 
succeeded in putting fear into narcotic law violators in three states.” Bass claimed that in just 
five months she had gained 432 drug convictions out of 450 arrests and had developed this 
successful record by accompanying her agents on raids and then showing up in court to testify. 
She also took a hardline approach and had “come around” to the belief that imposing maximum 
sentences constituted the surest cure for those addicted to drugs. “Some of my associates feared 
at first that, being a woman, I would get sentimental over addicts, especially the women,” she 
explained to the press, “but, of course, I don’t.”43 
 
40 Anslinger, January 24, 1934.  
41 “Druggist Meet,” Courier-Post (Camden, NJ), September 30, 1931. 
42 “End Dry Law Enforcement: Efforts Are a ‘Joke,” Is James A. Farley’s Claim,” The Windsor Star (Windsor,  
    Ontario) August 11, 1933. 
43 “Woman Narcotics Has Splendid Record,” The Dothan Eagle (Dothan, Alabama), January 6, 1934. 
227 
 
Instead of reigning in the policing of drugs—like it had alcohol—the government gave 
the Bureau of Narcotics wide latitude. Anslinger, in fact, spent a significant amount of time  
investigating performance enhancing drugs in the sport of horseracing. The issue reached his 
office due to the mafia’s involvement in racetrack gambling and Anslinger claimed that the 
drugging of the animals had become a general practice when he testified before the House 
Appropriations Committee in early-1934. Out of 1,200 horses, he claimed, 300 had been 
“doctored just before each race.” He called it a “terrible practice” that was “ruining the 
thoroughbred in the country.” Anslinger informed the committee he had already submitted to the 
Department of Treasury “a memorandum proposing a federal law which might curb the 
practice.” Syndicated news articles proclaimed, “Government Joins Horse Doping War” and the 
Bureau of Narcotics worked directly with the state of New York to innovate a laboratory that 
tested horse saliva for drugs.44  
 By the mid-1930s, the federal government’s approach to the regulation of drugs had been 
drastically altered by Congress and the Roosevelt Administration. Support for the nation’s so-
called dry laws had plummeted and the White House declared that it would no longer attempt to 
enforce the Volstead Act, which had been—just a few years earlier—the celebrated pinnacle of 
the prohibitionist agenda. In the process, Harry J. Anslinger’s Bureau of Narcotics emerged as a 
model agency leading the Prohibition State into the modern era.  
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The bureau promoted new and more uniform national drug laws to much acclaim, 
advocated for efficiency and professionalism, successfully collaborated with state and federal 
law enforcement agencies, and remained versatile enough to pursue developments like the Horse 
Doping War. Then, from 1933-1935, there was a kind of interregnum in the war on alcohol and 
drugs. Roosevelt abandoned the enforcement of alcohol prohibition and the Bureau of Narcotics 
maintained a status-quo approach to enforcing narcotics violations while wading into the issue of 
performance enhancing drugs. Action renewed as anti-marijuana sentiment began to spread 
throughout the United States in the wake of alcohol prohibition’s repeal, infusing the Prohibition 
State’s agenda with fresh energy. Simultaneously, the bureau formerly charged with policing 
violations of liquor laws turned, instead, to focus on the evasion of alcohol taxes, which did 
much to improve its reputation. The Prohibition State, which seemed badly wounded in 1933, 
was—just a couple of year later—poised for a significant comeback.  
Rogue of the Roadside: Marijuana and a New Front in the American Drug War 
In 1933, the state of California officially declared war on marijuana. The Californian 
called it “the nation’s depression narcotic” and claimed that William G. Walker, chief of the state 
narcotic division, was cooperating with federal officials to launch “an extensive drive on all 
marihuana growers, peddlers, and users.” The smoking of marijuana cigarettes, the department 
alleged, had grown so rapidly in California that it represented a national menace. This increased 
focus on marijuana resulted, in part, from a general transition by the Bureau of Narcotics from 
the East Coast to the Pacific, where use of the substance had always been far more widespread.45 
The newspaper media widely publicized this geographic shift in drug war fronts. The 
Spokesman-Review of Spokane, Washington declared “Enemy Pretty Well Beaten on the Eastern 
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Front” and suggested that the Pacific Coast would get renewed attention. The “incessant warfare 
to control the smuggling of narcotics into the United States,” it reported, had “turned to a new 
battlefront—the Pacific coast.” In many ways, the shift brought the war on drugs back home, to 
San Francisco, a leader in anti-drug sentiment. The city had banned opium dens in 1875 and 
developed a raid-and-arrest style of policing Chinatown that gained national attention and led to 
the passage of the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act in 1909. By 1933—the year Congress repealed 
alcohol prohibition—national focus turned again to California where the light this time shone on 
cannabis.46 
That was not the sole focus of the campaign, however, and it remained a broad war on all 
forms of drugs deemed habit-forming. “Dope, morphine, marihuana, cocaine, and its sisters of 
the green dragon,” The News Messenger of Lincoln, California reported, “is striking at the heart 
of California homes and taking a toll that cannot be exaggerated.” Just as it had in the fight 
against opium dens and smoking opium in the late-nineteenth-century, California also 
spearheaded the drive against marijuana and became one of the first states to prohibit its use in 
1914. The bordering states of Nevada, Oregon, and Washington did not prohibit it until 1923 and 
Arizona waited until 1931. California remained a trend-setter in the drug war—especially in the 
explicit connection of drug use to immigrant populations and their cultures.47 
The sensationalistic stories progressed. William G. Walker, chief of the California’s 
narcotic division, claimed a local school teacher stood accused of instructing children “how to 
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use and become addicted to morphine” and that “marihuana cigarets [sic]” were being “peddled 
to school children and ‘thrill-struck’ adolescents” for twenty-five cents. In Humboltd County, he 
continued, a man smoked one cannabis-laden cigarette and “cut off the head off his best friend.” 
Walker concluded that marijuana was “second only to heroin for creation of cruelty streaks in its 
victims.”48 Even though alcohol traditionally served as the cause of public disturbances across 
the United States, marijuana and heroin, by the 1930s, were billed as unique agents capable of 
inciting frightening mayhem.  
These kinds of sensationalized stories then spread eastward—just as those involving 
opium dens had at the turn-of-the-century—and began to influence the national narcotics 
narrative. In New York, it was reported that “narcotic authorities throughout the country” had 
started “a grim, intensive drive against the use of marihuana, one of the most insidious and 
pernicious dope evils of the twentieth-century.” The anti-cannabis narrative, which had been 
circulating since the late-nineteenth century, reached its pinnacle during the 1930s. The 
substance, considered relatively benign throughout the nineteenth-century, had now become a 
centerpiece of a new war on drugs.  
According to the “campaign” in response to the threat marijuana posed would be 
“prosecuted” with an intensity that no “similar past crusade” had known. Still, it would 
“probably fail.” The problem, those involved in it suggested, was far more entrenched than 
American citizens realized. Because it could not be eradicated wholly in the short term did not 
mean a monumental effort should not be waged. Indeed, authorities in New York urged the 
nation to conduct a “savage thrust against marihuana.” It was particularly menacing because 
addicts could grow it locally. If a person sought cocaine or heroin, the only way to obtain it was 
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from a dealer, but marijuana could be grown in window boxes, in backyards, or on any “patch of 
earth.”49 That made the substance particularly alarming to those inclined to fear its spread. Like 
tomatoes or kitchen herbs, any American could grow marijuana and then consume or sell it. For 
individuals convinced it destabilized society, the backyard-garden nature of the plant’s 
composition created panic. This panic was then exacerbated by the popular association of 
marijuana use with violent crime. Harold V. Smith, Chief of the Pennsylvania Narcotics Bureau 
began a war against cannabis in that state as well and argued that “a great deal” of “industrial 
unrest and sex crimes” could be attributed to those “under the influence of marihuana.” These 
sorts of comments illustrated the ways in which media alarmism began to significantly infiltrate 
the thinking of policymakers, who then used incredibly sensationalized, alarmist, and martial 
language to inspire government action.50 
As this crusade against cannabis gained momentum in 1934, it was still unclear which 
agency would ultimately house the old prohibition unit. That presented a moment of uncertainty 
in which the forces behind the Prohibition State’s continuation pondered the future of the 
personnel and resources that had already been invested in the war on illicit substances. It became 
immensely clear, however, that those focused on arresting substance abuse in the United States 
had no intention of retreating. Instead, they merely pivoted—seamlessly—to new fronts. Having 
gained experience in the fight on drugs in the opening decades of the twentieth century, the 
media, along with local and federal agencies, seemed poised to attack cannabis in unprecedented 
ways. At the same time, those agencies and journalists involved in combatting the substance 
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increasingly marginalized discussions about whether cannabis actually posed the risks they 
alleged it did.  
In that environment, the fight against marijuana expanded and took on the appearance of 
a socially necessary war. In a “special laboratory” maintained by the National Research Council 
at the University of Virginia, for example, researchers experimented with what they called 
“dopeless dope.” To those involved in the program, it represented the only viable option in 
reducing a problem the agency considered to have accelerated beyond logical control. The best 
statistics available suggested there were in excess of two million Americans addicted to drugs. 
Those numbers were never fully trusted because it was assumed most Americans refused to talk 
about their addictions. It was a silent scourge. That rationale made it impossible to accurately 
assess the exact number of dependents and provided space for a wide range of theories regarding 
the true extent of the problem. Many of the experts consulted still nonetheless believed that 
“since the advent of prohibition, the use of drugs [had] increased steadily.” They alleged that 
throughout the 1920s the number of addicts had quadrupled. National Research Council 
scientists nonetheless believed it might be possible “to keep the bee and remove the sting.” In 
other words, it hoped to provide the desired qualities that led to continual use while eliminating 
the concomitant physiological dependency.51 
 This broad collaborative effort to eradicate the use of drugs in American society, which 
was thought to have greatly increased in the wake of the repeal of alcohol prohibition, had much 
to do with Anslinger’s leadership at the Bureau of Narcotics. Unlike his predecessors, he avoided 
scandal, promoted cohesive action, and perhaps more importantly, was adept at marketing war 
on illicit substances in ways no other bureau chief had been. His office conducted that public 
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campaign through editorial pieces, speeches delivered at professional conferences, educational 
programs, interviews, and on the radio. Shows like “Crisis in Drug War” played with regularity 
on the Columbia Network. Cumulatively, the newspaper industry, along with state and federal 
agencies, developed what is best described as a public relations campaign against marijuana.  
In 1932, East Coast radio stations ran Anslinger’s speech to the World Narcotic Defense 
Association’s annual conference that year, where he spoke about “The Part of the Federal 
Government in the Narcotic Drug War.” The airing also included a similar speech by Edward P. 
Mulrooney, entitled “Part of Municipalities in the Narcotic Drug War.” It concluded with the 
Honorable Charles H. Tuttles’ talk “Coordinating the Power of the Federal Government, the 
States, and the Municipalities in the Narcotic Drug War.” These educational programs informed 
the public about the menace marijuana allegedly posed while also introducing the administrative 
solutions the speakers deemed necessary in curtailing its spread.52  
As the nation transitioned from its failure to enforce alcohol prohibition, the Bureau of 
Narcotics and its advocates in the media made it clear that the nation faced a different and more 
important war against drugs. This pivot was not unique to the United States and could not be 
attributed solely to the efforts of the Bureau of Narcotics. Support for alcohol prohibition did not 
collapse in the United States alone, but also in Canada, England, Russia, Finland, and throughout 
Europe. Similarly, the shift from a failed experiment with alcohol prohibition to a new war on 
drugs occurred elsewhere too. Indeed, the United States efforts were part of a transnational war 
on drugs. In May 1931, 51 nations met in Geneva to discuss the “civilized world’s fight on the 
drug traffic.” It was the most “extensive effort yet” to gain national cooperation in controlling the 
global manufacturing of narcotics. In response to an alarming increase in drug addicts on the 
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streets of London and in British asylums, Scotland Yard waged “an intensive war” against 
“heartless traffickers.” England estimated that roughly 90% of all those confined to mental 
institutions had arrived there due to the abuse of narcotics.53  
The drug war also spread to Canada and The Gazette of Montreal, Quebec announced 
that “Mounties’ War on Drugs Continue,” arguing that officers there worked dutifully to break 
up an international drug smuggling ring in Canada. The members of this alleged ring, “including 
Chinese,” were falling “into the net laid by the Mounties.”54 In March of 1931, a report from 
Paris noted that the country’s “secret police” had begun a “drive to trap international drug 
traffickers operating on a big scale between France and the United States.” Then, in September, 
1933, the Egyptian government ordered 10 British planes to “deal with the growing practice of 
smuggling drugs—particularly hashish—throughout the Sinai desert.” The aircraft included 
bomb racks, machine guns, cameras, and radios.55 
That level of international coordination in fighting the 1930s wave of drug crime was 
evident in Washington, D.C. In December of 1934, a conference held by the Department of 
Justice illustrated the extent to which the national government sought to orchestrate a more 
aggressive, scientific, and coordinated assault on the nation’s alleged crime epidemic. J. Edgar 
Hoover, director of the division of investigation of the United State Department of Justice, 
presented a paper entitled “Detection and Apprehension,” Judge Charles W. Hoffman, of 
Cincinnati, focused on “Modern Youth and Crime,” and New York Attorney General John J. 
Bennett, Jr. spoke about “Commercial Racketeering.”56 
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Harvard Criminologist Dr. Sheldon Gleuck read “The Place of Proper Police and 
Prosecution in a Crime Reduction Program” and newspaper editor Stanley Walker delivered 
ideas on “The Opportunities of the Press in the War against Crime.” H.V Kaltenborn elaborated 
on the place media held in the effort by discussing “The Role of Radio in an Anti-Crime 
Movement” and a Hollywood executive complemented it with “The Screen’s Contribution to the 
Prevention of Crime.” Harry J. Anslinger appeared at the conclusion of the conference to discuss 
“The Narcotic Problem” he claimed plagued the nation. Connecting various crime waves to the 
use of cannabis was an established trend by the 1930s. England attempted to connect it to crimes 
involving temporary insanity in the late-nineteenth century. In Mexico, the assertion that 
marijuana inspired criminal activity led the country to declare war on it. By the time the United 
States adopted that narrative in the 1930s, it had developed deep historical roots.  
 Despite this level of organization and coordination at the national and international level,  
 state legislatures were still reticent to pass uniform drug laws. In Springfield, Missouri, Jack 
Arthur Fisk, twenty-two years old, was suspected as being the source of the marijuana smoked 
by local high school students. He was arrested and jailed for sixty days, but only served two 
weeks of the sentence because it was discovered that Missouri had no anti-marijuana law. Judge 
R. Jasper Smith ruled that the state had violated his rights by charging him with “contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor” as cannabis was not mentioned in the statute. The judge concluded, 
“The only way the state can get convictions legally of persons dealing in marihuana is for the 
state legislature to pass an act against it.”57 
 The situation in Missouri represented a local political problem that hampered the success 
of the Bureau of Narcotics’ call for rigorous enforcement and blunted the momentum of the 
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American war on drugs. Many states still struggled to sternly enforce the Harrison Narcotic Act, 
which was, in 1934, twenty-years old. The San Francisco Examiner reported, “Campaigning to 
enlist the States in its drive to suppress drug peddling physicians, the Federal Narcotics Bureau is 
urging all forty-eight legislatures to adopt a uniform anti-narcotics law.” The expansion of the 
Prohibition State required a broad state level buy-in and the media, along with local and federal 
officials, pushed for uniform laws. As of December, 1934, the uniform bill had been adopted by 
nine states and 17 had applied for drafts of the act. Forty-four state legislatures met in 1934 to 
consider a uniform narcotic law that not only strengthened the mandates of the Harrison Narcotic 
Act, but also included new measures to criminalize marijuana.58 
 George F. Zimmer, a former Special Agent for United States Naval Intelligence, wrote 
that “legislatures of forty American states” would convene in January of 1935 and would be 
asked to “do what forty-five foreign nations” had already done—enact uniform narcotic laws. In 
a radio address delivered in March of 1935, President Roosevelt called upon state legislatures to 
pass more stringent drug laws that would align them with the national government and the 
international community, which had outlined its agenda in Geneva the year before. The President 
suggested that passing uniform legislation, which also banned marijuana, would allow the state 
legislatures to “give their own people far better protection than they now have against the 
ravages of the narcotic drug evil.”59  
 As the public formed its understanding of marijuana, its effects, and the extent of its use, 
sensationalist and militaristic commentary thrived. Kenneth Clark, Chief Correspondent of 
Universal Service, wrote that “shocking crimes of violence” were increasing due to the 
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consumption of cannabis. He continued, quite vividly, by suggesting that marijuana had led to 
“murders, cruel mutilations, maimings [sic], done in cold blood, as if some hideous monster was 
amuck in the land.” He also claimed that the “underworld” had tuned to the drug as a way to 
“subjugate the will of derelicts.” Commenting on a series of anecdotal cases, including a young 
Florida boy who executed his entire family with an ax after smoking the substance, Clark asked, 
“mothers and fathers of America, WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT IT? Do you want 
this fate for your sons, your daughters?” He believed two things needed to be done immediately. 
First, “federal law must be broadened and strengthened to bring this dope under control, to 
smash this hideous menace.” Secondly, individual states had to pass “narcotic drug acts” that 
would “outlaw marijuana, as well as all other dope, and provide drastic punishment for 
offenders.”60 
 To illustrate the power of a new and improved federal policing force, the bureau took part 
in an attempt at cleansing the nation of its illegal drug problem in the spring of 1935. It was a 
drive to “mop up” crime and it immediately led to the arrest of 1,909 Americans across the 
nation. Media commentary referred to this demonstration of Prohibition State activism as the 
“most sensational coup against the underworld ever attempted by the federal treasury.” The 
campaign included the Bureau of Narcotics along with 12,000 officers of the Treasury 
Department, who “swept through the country from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the 
Canadian to the Mexican borders.” It linked all officers of the Treasury Department together in a 
raid “cut deeply into the ranks of counterfeiters, bootleggers, narcotics dealers, and other law 
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violators.” By the end of the campaign to “stamp out all forms of lawlessness,” over 2,000 
Americans were arrested, 580 of them for narcotics alone.61 
 Emphasizing the symbolic importance of this campaign, Eleanor Roosevelt wrote “the 
greatest weapon against this [narcotic] evil is public opinion” and she hoped that the “recent 
narcotic drives” had focused the attention of the courts and the public on the problem. The goal, 
to her, was the imposition of “severe sentences” on drug addicts so that they would not “be 
allowed to return to society” until they had been rehabilitated. The First Lady reiterated an ethos 
that had been embraced by her husband—that drug addicts had to be sufficiently punished, 
broken of their habits by any means necessary, and slowly reintroduced to law-abiding society. 
This line of thinking had characterized the Herbert Hoover administration, which created the 
Bureau of Narcotics, Harry J. Anslinger, mainstream journalists, and a wide network of local, 
state, and federal politicians, judges, and law enforcement officials.62 
 These overt attempts to reshape public opinion marked a crucial evolution of the 
Prohibition State’s agenda. As it passed drug reform laws in the early-1900s, including the Pure 
Food and Drug Act and the Harrison Narcotic Act, public opinion had not significantly factored 
into decision making. With the collapse of the Volstead Act, however, it became clear that future 
reform efforts would require a more sustained focus on winning over the general public and 
convincing them of the necessity of action. In the meantime, the Roosevelt administration made 
efforts at expanding the government’s interests in containing the nation’s drug problem through 
executive action.  
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Roosevelt’s administration spearheaded the creation of a $5 million federal narcotics 
“farm” outside of Lexington, Kentucky, which opened in the summer of 1935. It spread over 
1,000 acres and had been built to rehabilitate upwards of 1,500 American addicts. A formal 
dedication for the new “farm” took place at 2pm on May 24, 1935 as a crowd of politicians and 
bureaucrats filed into the auditorium in the main building of the compound. The ceremony began 
with the song “America” and an invocation by Reverend George O’ Bryan. Josephine Roche, the 
first woman appointed as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury by President Roosevelt, followed 
with “a greeting from the Treasury Department.” United States Surgeon General Hugh S. 
Cummings delivered the dedicatory address, Dr. A.W. Fortune, pastor at Central Christian 
Church delivered the benediction, and the ceremony closed with the playing of the Star-Spangled 
Banner. With the farm in Lexington, the federal government now entered into the business of 
rehabilitation and exerted its power over all phases of drug dependency in the United States.63 
 William F. Conhurst wrote that the farm, a revolutionary new concept in the nation’s 
effort to reform the more than 100,000 drug addicts in the United States, would offer 
“wholesome, beneficial surroundings under the care and custody of the United States Public 
Health Service.”64 Conhurst asked, “What makes a man take dope?” According to the experts he 
consulted, more than three-fourths of the nation’s addicts arrived at the predicament because 
“previous use of opiates in medical treatment or self-treatment for the relief of pain.” Others 
became addicts because of their affiliation with drug using individuals or to “allay emotional 
distress or overcome drunkenness.” Those sentenced to the new federal farm included 
individuals who had violated federal drug laws, those whose parole required rehabilitation before 
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being integrated back into society, and natural-born Americans who voluntarily admitted 
themselves. In the summer of 1935, the first few inmates were transferred from the federal 
penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas to the Lexington narcotics farm to begin treatment.65 
 Despite these new and revolutionary methods, the drug problem continued to evolve in 
new forms. In the summer of 1935, reports of a “suicide epidemic” amongst the United States 
military in Panama began to circulate. It started with an editorial in Nelson Rounsevell’s Panama 
American, in which he alleged soldiers were driven to the smoking of marijuana as a way of 
“seeking solace from harsh and cruel treatment” by their superiors. He demanded that the 
Secretary of War investigate the deaths of four soldiers during the six-week period from May 
20th-July 5th. Indeed, the destructive potential of marijuana smoking seemed limitless. The Los 
Angeles Times reported that “when a Mexican of the lower class runs amuck, tries to snip off the 
ears of his wife with a carving knife, cut the throat of his compadre, and it takes six to eight burly 
American policeman to get him to jail—when those things happen, I say, it is as clear as day that 
the little chap, who otherwise would be no stronger than a cat, has been smoking marihuana.”66 
 The persistence of alarmist marijuana narratives increasingly lured the Bureau of 
Narcotics into the fight against cannabis. Anslinger announced another federal drive in 1935 and 
told the press that “marijuana smoking is increasing, while the use of other drugs is decreasing.” 
He suggested it was primarily used by those Americans who were between the ages of 18-22 
and, “in order to satisfy their cravings,” the addicts committed petty thefts or turned into 
shoplifters in order “to get money to pay for their cigarettes.” He also claimed that “the surest 
way to insanity,” as far as drugs were concerned, came through the smoking of marijuana as it 
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destroyed “all reasoning power” and broke down “a person’s ability to judge space, time, and 
distance.” At this point in the drive against marijuana, government officials spread 
sensationalistic tales of marijuana as prolifically as the sensationalist press. In many ways, 
Anslinger—more than any figure before him—nationalized the alarmist anti-marijuana media 
narrative. By corroborating stories of marijuana inspired crime sprees, Anslinger not only 
bolstered the media’s narrative, but also used it to shape public opinion and justify historic 
government action.67 
Anslinger’s theories, which he used to enhance the bureau’s importance, mirrored the 
cannabis-related sensationalism that flowed regularly through the American press. In “The Fight 
Against the Hashish of America,” a widespread  newspaper feature, the author began, 
“marihuana—a dread name, with terrifying implications—has appeared on the American scene 
to give officials of the United States Bureau of Narcotics a more difficult problem than the 
treacherous opium of the Orient, morphine, cocaine, or heroin.”68 It continued, “For to this 
unusual plant, so these officials say, may be traced many of the most horrible crimes in recent 
history.”69 The bureau’s efforts to protect American citizens against its presence, however, had 
been handicapped by the fact there was “no federal law controlling it, although 34 states and the 
Territory of Hawaii” had moved to regulate its sale and consumption.70 
This intensified war on cannabis became the face of the Prohibition State in the wake of 
the repeal of alcohol prohibition. Yet, the enforcement of alcohol laws had not significantly 
lessened. Even though it received far less press than the headline grabbing drug war, the Alcohol 
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Tax Unit nonetheless seized 904,295 gallons of illicit liquor, 19,024,255 gallons of mash, and 
made 34,480 arrests. The Bureau of Narcotics, during the same period, claimed 7,108 ounces of 
narcotics that led to 2,560 convictions. As the headlines increasingly focused on the war with 
marijuana, the Alcohol Tax Unit quietly continued its crusade on illicit booze. Indeed, in 1936, it 
even began to grow and received an allotment of $773,240—in addition to its $15 million 
budget—to be spent on new employees. In the process, the Bureau of Narcotics received an 
additional $25,850 for “expenses and purchase of field equipment.”71 
The war on alcohol tax violations, however, did not have the public appeal that the war 
on drugs did. The government’s perceived failure to properly police the prohibition of alcohol 
was still relatively fresh in the American mind. At this point in the story, in fact, the repeal of the 
Volstead Act had occurred just three years earlier. The battle against marijuana, however less 
relevant than the pursuit to ensure that the national government received its fair share of liquor 
tax revenue, ultimately dominated the public image. In a pamphlet distributed in honor of the 
Tenth Annual Observance of Narcotic Education Week—sponsored by the International Narcotic 
Education Association, Inc. and the World Narcotic Defense Association—the Bureau of 
Narcotics was extensively quoted. This week of awareness, held from February 22-29, focused 
on marijuana. The plan for 1936 was clearly outlined. First, it called for governors of states and 
territories to issue proclamations requesting citizens and organization to join in the observance of 
the week. Secondly, it requested that press and radio give publicity to the narcotic problem 
through news items, editorials, educational materials, and broadcasts. Thirdly, ministers, Sunday 
school teachers, Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., W.C.T.U., and other religions organizations were to 
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devote one meeting or part of a meeting during that week to discuss the dimensions of the 
nation’s drug problem.72 
The program ultimately pointed to a broad socio-political collaboration that included both 
the private and the public sector. Universities, colleges, public, parochial, and private schools 
would offer “narcotic menace study” and “clubs, fraternal orders, civic, and philanthropic 
groups” were to give the “narcotic problem serious attention by addresses, discussions, and 
study.” Then, the organizers offered a few points under the byline “for special emphasis.” They 
included, first, “efficient narcotic law and prompt and effective action against violators by the 
courts.” The program then promoted the enactment of the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act and, 
finally, an “active campaign against the Marihuana menace, including uniform legislation.” 
These efforts indicated the arrival of a new era in the drug war, in which unprecedented national 
coordination thrust the topic to the forefront of American politics. This effort benefitted, of 
course, from the unity inspired by Franklin Roosevelt’s approach to the Great Depression. The 
drug war, then, served as a rare moment of cohesion—offering the country a moment to rally 
around a topic over which few Americans disagreed. With anti-marijuana policy, then, the 
Prohibition State found a way to expand in the face of its perceived failure to successfully 
manage the prohibition of alcohol.  
Similar to efforts at controlling the spread of opium, morphine, cocaine, heroin, and 
alcohol, the battle against marijuana had international reach. In November of 1934, in Geneva, 
Switzerland, the international community had gathered again to refine its policies on drugs. The 
Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs focused on “the abuse of 
cannabis in the United States.” Importantly, it cited the records of the Bureau of Narcotics, which 
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had a clear role in shaping the foreign agenda. A League of Nations Memorandum noted that 
“The records of the Bureau of Narcotics indicate that geographical distribution of wild cannabis 
in the United State may be said to be mainly in those States bordering the Gulf and the Republic 
of Mexico.”73 
The Prohibition State also continued and expanded its role in preventing the importation 
of drugs from foreign countries—an activity it began in that first International Opium 
Conference in Shanghai in 1909. Regarding importation, the committee cited the “Food and 
Drugs Act” of 1906, which mandated that “collectors of customs are directed to refuse delivery 
of all consignments of dried flowering tops of the pistillate plants of cannabis sativa” unless 
receiving a “penal bond” ensuring it would not be sold for purposes other than medicinal. The 
committee declared cannabis was highly addictive and had the potential to create “psychomotor 
activity with a tendency to wilful [sic] violence accompanied by a complete loss of judgment and 
restraint.” The evidence presented on that international stage was often culled from the American 
press. Oftentimes the examples used, in comparison to the variety of sensationalistic options, did 
not seem to confirm any other point than marijuana could be easily purchased on the streets. In 
one instance, those gathered discussed the story of a boy from Atlanta who purchased the 
substance from a food vendor:  
While walking up around the curb market in Atlanta, Georgia, I passed the stand of the 
hot tamale man who asked me: ‘Do you want any hot tamales?’ I said ‘Don’t you have 
anything stronger?’ He said: ‘Yes’ and sold me two marihuana cigarettes for twenty-five 
cents. I had never seen this kind of cigarette before. I smoked one of them and it game me 
a headache. Then I smoked the other one and began to feel it. My mind changed in a 
queer sort of way. I craved some more of the cigarettes; and, not having any money, I 
pawned my shoes for one dollar and bought a bag of dried leaves to roll my own. After a 
couple of more cigarettes, I began to feel like I was on top of the world. I would walk up 
to anyone and ask them for anything without hesitancy. Then I felt like I would do 
 
73 “Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs: Situation as Regards Indian Hemp,”     
November 10, 1934. 
245 
 
something desperate. However, I was very tired and fell asleep for two whole days and 
nights.74 
 
 This anecdotal tale from Atlanta, provided by the Bureau of Naroctics, had been 
submitted as evidence buttressing the idea that the country suffered from a marijuana epidemic. 
Although not nearly as alarmist as other stories, the article continued to illustrate the power the 
media played in shaping national and global marijuana policy. The Bureau of Narcotics, in fact, 
collected alarmist anti-marijuana news stories and disseminated them as evidence of a drug 
epidemic. The League of Nations, for example, also quoted “an investigation carried out in a 
district in New Orleans,” which uncovered that “out of 450 prisoners, 123 whose aged ranged 
from 18 to 31 years, were marihuana addicts and there were 68 arrests during 1930 for the sale 
and possession of this product.” The Narcotic Education Association, which worked closely with 
the Bureau of Narcotics, quoted the same statistics.75 
In one of its pamphlets from the 1930s, the Narcotic Education Association reported that 
“out of 450 prisoners, there were 125 marihuana addicts, all of whom were young people ranging 
in age from 18 to 31 years; our of 37 murderers, 12 were addicted to the use of Marihuana and 
out of 193 persons convicted of important thefts, 36 were similarly addicted. About one out of 
four of all persons arrested in the city were Marihuana addicts.” The nature of this investigation, 
or even the organization that carried it out, was never revealed. Yet, it was cited in both domestic 
educational pamphlets, internal Bureau of Narcotics documents, and even in Geneva at a meeting 
of the League of Nations. These stories, which circulated internationally, continued the trend of 
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institutionalizing highly questionable statistics, facts, and incidences related to the global 
marijuana problem.76 
 The anti-cannabis campaign of the 1930s illustrated the ways in which prohibitionist 
forces gained ground in post-repeal America. Indeed, those responsible for the failure of alcohol 
prohibition enforcement, like Harry J. Anslinger, became the leaders of the anti-drug movement. 
Anslinger’s bureau emerged as the most ascendant force in post-repeal America. His attacks on 
the nation’s opioid epidemic, skill at avoiding scandal, and adept promotion of the bureau’s core 
values led to a situation in which the federal government was finally able to put marijuana on a 
path towards criminalization.  
 While the threat of marijuana seemed to appear out of nowhere in the 1930s, that was 
mostly due to the new national exposure it received. “A Chemist,” writing to the St. Louis Star 
and Times, argued that “marijuana is no new drug or dope. I have known it for twenty-five years. 
You are right when you state that marijuana is used as a substitute for liquor.” The writer also 
believed that “marijuana, cocaine, morphine, heroin, opium, all alcoholic beverages and five 
other drugs are habit forming and known by all expert chemists.”77  
In Louisville, Kentucky, officials declared that bootleggers—who had “for the most part 
folded up their joints and silently turned to honest toil or other rackets”—had transitioned to 
bootlegging “the loco weed of the southwest.” In an environment heavily dependent on anecdotal 
evidence, the suggestion that alcohol prohibition had led to a dramatic increase in drug addicts 
continued to assert itself and while Harry J. Anslinger did not create this narrative, he 
masterfully utilized it to gain support for his bureau and the fight for uniform state laws.78 
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From his office in Washington, D.C., Anslinger remained in contact with field agents and 
petitioned the newspaper media for printed copies of sensationalist cannabis-related tales. In 
1937, he wrote his District Supervisor in Denver and requested that he “please endeavor to 
ascertain and advise this Bureau the name and date of the newspapers carrying the story relating 
to the following incident:” 
In Denver, Colorado, agents of the Federal Narcotic Bureau had made arrangements with 
one Halloway for a purchase from a ‘plant’ of stolen cocaine. It was generally known that 
Halloway was addicted to marijuana and that a short time before, in a restaurant, he had 
made an unprovoked assault upon a policeman in full uniform who had entered to get a 
cup of coffee and who had to club Halloway into unconsciousness. Nevertheless, the 
night before a purchase of cocaine was to be completed, Halloway AGAIN RESORTED 
TO THE USE OF MARIHUANA, ran amuck, attempt to shoot his wife, mortally 
wounded her grandmother and, after shooting it out with police officers, finally killed 
himself. 
 
Anslinger signed the request “Very truly yours,” and sent it from Bureau headquarters in 
Washington, D.C.79 
 Anslinger collected these stories and then utilized them as a body of evidence pointing to 
the potential dangers of unchecked marijuana use. He presented Ralph H. Oyler, the District 
Supervisor in Detroit, Michigan, with a similar entreaty. “Please endeavor to ascertain and 
advice this Bureau the name and date of the newspaper carrying the story relating to the 
following incident:  
Sometime ago the silence of the state prison at Marquette, Michigan, was shattered by the 
sound of fusillade of pistol shots and an hour later a kindly prison doctor lay dead and 
beside him lay the trusty who had given his life trying to save his friend, the doctor. An 
investigation developed that arms and ammunition had been smuggled into the prison in 
the false bottoms of herring containers and that the MARIHUANA from which Tylczak, 
the murderer of the doctor and trusty, had derived his demoniac courage, had also been 
smuggled into the prison. 
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Reflecting popular assumptions about marijuana use, Anslinger urged the nation’s law 
enforcement to “search for marijuana behind cases of criminal and sex assault” claiming that “in 
more than a dozen recent cases of murder or degenerate sex attacks, many of them committed by 
youths, marijuana proved to be a contributing case.” The collection of this information—much of 
it resulting from questionable journalistic practices—showed the internal workings of the 
Prohibition State and the methods it used to advance its agenda. It also marked a significant 
turning point. Prior to Anslinger’s reign at the Bureau of Narcotics, government officials rarely 
used sensationalist media accounts of the problem to push agendas. While a great deal of 
alarmism surrounded the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Harrison Narcotic Act, 
Congress ultimately analyzed the problem, as best it could, through a rational lens. Anslinger 
changed course and, in a landscape where little accurate information on the dangers and extent of 
marijuana use existed, he utilized salacious narratives connecting the substance to a variety of 
evils.80  
Anslinger also claimed the “menace” had been relatively new to the United States and 
that, in 1931, his “marijuana file” had not even been two inches thick. By the mid-1930s, 
however, the cases had expanded to the point that they crowded “large cabinets.” The problem 
had not been well known, according to him, until an outbreak of unprovoked crime occurred, 
much of it reported by a press that had a long history of connecting violent crime with drug use. 
One case involved the murder of an entire family by an otherwise sane Florida teenager who had 
no recollection of committing the multiple homicide. Anslinger noted that during “the years 1935 
and 1936,” marijuana related crime saw its most rapid growth in the traffic.” He strongly 
reiterated that all law enforcement agencies and communities had to stand up against it. His 
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confession, however, that much of his marijuana knowledge came from the stories he sought and 
accumulated from the alarmist press, seemed to confirm the influence the newspaper industry 
had on drug policy and enforcement.81 
In some cases, Anslinger received and responded to letters from American citizens, 
showing his deep dedication to the marketing and promotion of the battle against marijuana. 
Functioning more like a media liaison than a bureau chief, Anslinger spent inordinate amounts of 
time collecting anecdotal news stories and responding to the general public. On June 30, 1937, 
Jack Golien, of the U.S. Navy, wrote about the time, several years earlier, when he was stationed 
at Coco Solo, Canal Zone. While there, he “learned that many of [his] fellows were using 
marihuana cigarettes” and that they could be purchased anywhere along the zone. His colleagues, 
however, preferred “rolling their own” and “getting their weed from the different Army Posts, 
principally at France Field, where there was a large garden of it under cultivation.” Golien then 
confessed that he had—for the duration of up to a year—used cannabis in the form of gum. He 
considered himself “one of the few people” able to “throw it aside.” He was now over sixty-
years-old and wanted to see “this thing placed with the other drugs that are handled by 
[Anslinger’s] bureau.” He concluded by explaining to Anslinger that “this note is uncalled for, 
but I hope you will see that I would like to help in the work you are doing.”82  
Anslinger’s correspondence with the public also indicated the success of his marketing 
efforts. His campaign against marijuana had become so widely known in the United States that 
individual citizens wrote him letters and—rightly—expected he would read them. His agency 
was accessible and open to the public. Anslinger’s experience in the failed war against alcohol 
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likely taught him that this kind of connection with the general public was the only way to ensure 
the long-term success of Prohibition State goals. In that sense, Anslinger oversaw the 
democratization of the Bureau of Narcotics, which had been connected from its inception to the 
Prohibition Bureau. That office, unorganized and unresponsive to the public, did not resemble 
the 1930s Bureau of Narcotics.  
  In response to one Americans’ plea to send the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts out to help 
search for and destroy marijuana, Anslinger wrote, “I have received and given careful 
consideration to your letter of June 20, 1937” and assured him that the “Bureau appreciates your 
interest in the problem of eliminating the abusive use of marihuana.” Anslinger believed, 
however, that there were “objectionable features that would make the plan impracticable in its 
execution and dangerous in its consequences.” First, there was the danger of “arousing unhealthy 
curiosity on the part of some of these young people relative to the physical effect of the use of 
marihuana.” He feared that curiosity could lead to a possible “spread of the habit among the 
young, which we are, of course, anxious to avoid.” He also mentioned to his correspondent H.R. 
6906, which had already been passed by the House of Representatives. The bill, he claimed, 
would “curb the production, traffic, and use of marihuana for abusive purposes, through the 
instrumentality of a taxing measure.”83 
 There were those who dissented. Even at the time, these sensationalized marijuana 
narratives were—to many—difficult to swallow. A few of Anslinger’s sources indicated as 
much. In response to his request for the murder of the doctor in a Michigan prison, L.J. Ulmer 
responded “I am sorry that I do not know the name of the newspaper carrying that story. As a 
matter of fact, the story is not entirely correct.” He pointed out that “undoubtedly this newspaper 
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story refers to the killing of Dr. A.W. Horbogen in our Prison Hospital here five years ago.” 
Ulmer was, at the time, a member of the State Prison Commission and he was part of the 
investigation into the smuggling of guns into the prison. First, he informed Anslinger that the 
“guns did not come in herring cans, but they came in Hormel chicken cans” and that “we were 
never able to prove definitively that Marihuana had anything to do with the men who were 
concerned in the plot which looked like an effort to escape. We have always surmised that they 
did have Marihuana, but we were unable to find any at the time.” A more logical picture 
unfolded from the letter, in which inmates—interested in escaping—smuggled in guns and used 
them to carry out the plan. The marihuana, maybe tangentially related, had never been found.84 
 George Vincent Holliday was more forceful and argued that while he “did not approve of 
the general consumption of marijuana or any other drugs indiscriminately termed narcotics,” he 
balked at the “alleged horrors connected with their use” which he considered “no more revolting 
than the monstrously publicized mouthings of the professional reformers who hysterically 
condemn them.” Many of the “facts” used by reformers, he informed Anslinger, were “utterly 
unfounded on fact, sheer tripe.” He argued that “much worse stuff has been published, of course, 
but rarely with full governmental approval.” These reformers—in this case Madame Wright and 
the Parents and Teachers “outfit”—would have been, to Holliday’s mind, “much better occupied 
with a study of eugenics, rather than narcotics.”85 
 Men like Holliday were on the wrong side of history—at that moment in time. When 
Congress finally passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, the bill inspired little opposition. The 
relative silence around new drug reform measures indicated the level of deep public consensus 
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on the issue. So, like the Heroin Act of 1924, the Marihuana Tax Act was quietly implemented. 
The debate around the dangers of marijuana had already taken place by then; not in the halls of 
Congress, but rather in the newsrooms, churches, and schools of America. It was a narrative 
driven by the media, coopted by Harry Anslinger and his bureau, and presented to institutions 
like the League of Nations and the United States Congress as a new and grave danger.   
 James F. Finneran, secretary of Massachusetts State Pharmaceutical Association, claimed 
that the law was of “such a stringent nature” that it would “in all probability mean that the drug 
would no longer be used medicinally as the amount used is small and conditions under which the 
drug may be sold are so severe it will not be profitable for manufacturers.” Whereas the 
prohibition of alcohol dealt with a widely used and culturally entrenched substance sure to 
become a black-market commodity, the use of cannabis had been marginalized in mainstream 
circles for years and its ban introduced a far less controversial and manageable prohibition. On 
many levels, the passage of marijuana prohibition illustrated the power of the lessons learned 
from the undoing of the Volstead Act and marked the reemergence of a leaner and more 
organized Prohibition State.86 
 It helped that marijuana had never been fully trusted. From the 1840s to the outbreak of 
Civil War, the medical community hoped it might become an anesthetic with the power of opium 
(but without its infamous side effects). When it proved, in response, to be erratic, incapable of 
subduing patients according to expectations, and ultimately ineffective, the medical community 
quietly pivoted from its use. That made the substance vulnerable to being rebranded by the 
newspaper media, adroit agents like Anslinger, and a United States Congress eager to reassert 
federal policing power in an era in which it had been dramatically challenged through the repeal 
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of alcohol prohibition. Without medical viability—confirmed by a network of physicians who 
disavowed its use—cannabis, or the otherized “marijuana” that it became, provided an ideal 
substance in the reformation of the post-repeal Prohibition State.  
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Conclusion 
 On March 3, 2020, federal prosecutors announced charges against a physician in 
Scranton, Pennsylvania, who was charged with “overprescribing controlled substances for no 
legitimate medical purposes.” The physician, who operated a pain management clinic, allegedly 
wrote prescriptions for “massive amounts of controlled substances, primarily opioids” and had 
started doing so in January of 2014. The indictment claimed that more than eighty percent of the 
doctor’s prescriptions were for controlled substances and that many of his patients visited more 
than one pharmacy in a single day to fill them. Federal authorities raided his clinic and house, 
seized assets, and the doctor now faces trial.1 
 The federal prosecution of the physician illustrates the enduring power of the drug 
regulatory state. Opioid laws, largely modeled after 1914’s Harrison Narcotic Act, passed over a 
century ago, which placed physicians under strict oversight and made it illegal to prescribe 
controlled substances in the interest of maintaining an addiction. While there are those who 
protest the validity of this approach and advocate for maintenance clinics similar to ones found 
in Europe, there has been no significant alteration of the law in over a century. In Scranton, 
Pennsylvania, in March of 2020, the core mandates of that policy continue as strong as they were 
over a century ago.  
 In other areas, however, many values of the regulatory state have not aged well. 
Incarceration statistics clearly show the continued vitality of drug war thinking. As of 2020, 
forty-five percent of those in federal prison are serving time for “drug offenses,” a number that 
far outpaces any other punishable crime. Indeed, the second most common offense in the federal 
prison population is a violation related to weapons, explosives, and arson—crimes that led 
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30,720 Americans to prison”.2 In 2012, statistics showed that twenty-eight percent of those 
incarcerated in federal prison for drug crimes were there due to infractions related to crack 
cocaine and twenty-six percent because of powder cocaine. Twenty-four percent of the federal 
prison population could be attributed to methamphetamine-related crimes. Additionally, twelve 
percent received sentences that came as the result of marijuana possession, and six percent 
because of heroin. More disconcerting, Black Americans, who represent over thirteen percent of 
the United States population, make up thirty-seven percent of the federal prison population. That 
grim fact is largely due to the so-called war on drugs, which has been managed by agents of 
Prohibition State era bureaucracy.3 
 At the same time, the Prohibition State’s war on marijuana, which emerged as a signature 
way it stabilized itself after the repeal of the Volstead Act, has been lost. In 2020, eleven states 
and Washington, D.C. have legalized recreational marijuana, and a majority of the states have 
eased restrictions on the medicinal use of marijuana.4 In the 1930s, anti-marijuana activists 
pushed for the criminalization of marijuana and pursued it by passing state laws aimed at 
compelling federal prohibition. In the 2010s and 2020s, public sentiment and public policy are 
moving in the opposite direction. Pro-legalization activists are making strides at the state level 
and gaining support for a federal undoing of cannabis prohibition. And, harkening back to the 
nineteenth century, the notion that marijuana is a valuable medicine has regained popular 
acceptance and researchers and physicians are again looking for new cases in which it might 
prove effective.  
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 As public officials grapple with the overpopulated federal prison population, critiques of 
the American drug war accelerate, and as states move to legalize marijuana, a very real opioid 
epidemic lingers in the backdrop. According to the Department of Health and Human Services, 
over ten million Americans “misused prescription opioids” in 2018. That same year, over 67,000 
Americans died from drug overdoses making it the leading cause of injury-related death in the 
United States. The idea that American physicians who prescribe opioids and the pharmacists who 
fill the prescriptions requires federal oversight is as strong as it was in the early-twentieth 
century. Indeed, in late-twentieth century America—just as in the late-nineteenth century—
physicians, the media, and public officials turned to address an opioid epidemic. This time 
Oxycontin replaced intravenous morphine, but the response remained relatively the same in that 
it sought to curtail access through stricter oversight of the medical and pharmaceutical 
profession. It did so while also seeking to criminalize prescriptions of opioids when they 
flagrantly violated anti-maintenance philosophies.  
 The foundation of the Prohibition State, then, remains stable. Congressional legislation, 
focused primarily on restricting public access to opioids, passed from 1901-1914, has survived 
the decades relatively well (with the exception of the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act). A more 
complicated story characterizes the legislation passed between 1914-1937. The Volstead Act 
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcohol did not survive the 1930s. The push for federal 
marijuana reform, pursued in the wake of the repeal of alcohol prohibition, passed and was 
continually strengthened throughout the twentieth century. Following its perceived failure to 
effectively enforce the prohibition of alcohol, the federal government turned towards the waging 
of a more vigorous campaign against narcotics.  
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 It was not until Richard Nixon’s election in 1970 that the Prohibition State made 
significant modern gains. Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act, which created a 
classification system ranking drugs based on their alleged danger. According to that system, 
marijuana became one of the most dangerous drugs in the world. Not only did these moves 
create controversy, but they also put the regulatory state on a trajectory that would lead to the 
further erosion of the public’s trust in its effectiveness. These policy shifts in the 1970s also led 
to the notion that President Nixon began the so-called war on drugs. In reality, Nixon’s new 
battle against drugs simply modernized Progressive Era and New Deal policy initiatives—
including the continued and dramatic overstatements regarding the threat posed by cannabis.  
 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, cocaine continued to pose social problems just as it had 
at the turn-of-the-twentieth century and the Prohibition State shifted to address them. With strong 
regulatory and punitive laws already in place, state and federal government enabled the law 
enforcement community to strictly enforce them. Consequently, the Prohibition State’s 
weaknesses emerged once again. Since the passage of the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act in 
1909, the enforcement of drug laws tended to focus disproportionately on people of color and/or 
the impoverished. Nearly from the beginning, the enforcement of drug laws often appeared to 
overwhelmingly and irrationally punish Americans based on class, race, and ethnicity. Whether 
it was Chinese, Eastern European, or Mexican immigrants, Black Americans, Russian Jews, or 
poor White Americans, each suffered from what appeared to be an unfair application of the 
punitive tools developed by the Prohibition State.  
 As Black Americans entered the prison system in record numbers due to the sale and 
possession of crack cocaine in the 1980s, it was clear that Prohibition State initiatives had 
changed little since 1908. The government viewed the same substance—powder cocaine—as far 
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less of a public menace. The primary difference seemed to depend on the individual using the 
substance. As powder cocaine was favored more by the white middle class, it garnered less 
attention and less severe punishment. That was consistent with Prohibition State values. From its 
onset, the punitive measures enforced by the law enforcement community regularly fell hardest 
on poor Americans and people of color while middle class citizens were more often cast as 
unfortunate addicts in need of mild reformation.  
 The 1990s served as a moment of transition for the government’s prohibitionist agenda. 
In 1996, California legalized medical marijuana offering one of the most significant setbacks for 
the Prohibition State since the repeal of alcohol prohibition. At the same time, however, 
pharmaceutical companies began pushing the sale of Oxycontin, a powerful opioid, that was then 
liberally prescribed in a landscape in which the enforcement of regulations on doctors and 
pharmacists had been significantly loosened since the 1910s. Since the early-2000s, Americans 
have faced with an anomalous situation, in which Prohibition State values have been 
significantly damaged through the continued legalization of cannabis but also more relevant than 
ever due to an entrenched opioid epidemic.  
 American public support for the so-called “drug war” has collapsed in important ways. 
The martial terminology casting the nation’s efforts at controlling narcotic policy has always 
been misleading, however. Polls indicate that Americans disapprove of the harsh punitive 
measures associated with the Prohibition State and there is growing support for reducing 
sentences for non-violent drug offenses. A majority of Americans also support the de-
criminalization and legalization of marijuana. These numbers are then used to suggest the nation 
is ready to end “the war on drugs.” The Prohibition State’s power, however, has historically 
rested on the regulation and control of opioids. Given the dire situation regarding the modern 
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opioid crisis, it is unlikely Americans are prepared to support the elimination of oversight related 
to pharmaceutical drugs.  
 Drug history is repeating itself, but in episodic ways. As the medical community has 
restored its optimism regarding the healing power of cannabis, mirroring trends in the profession 
most prominent in the 1840s and 1850s, an opioid crisis has unfolded. Following a familiar 
trajectory established in the late-nineteenth century, drugs like Oxycontin, widely used by the 
middle-class, has trickled into the working class.   
There is much hope in the modern public response, however. Instead of turning against 
the use of all drugs deemed illicit in response to an opioid crisis, Americans have adopted a more 
nuanced perspective. The legalization of marijuana continues as does a keen sense that poor 
Americans and people of color should not be disproportionally penalized. Researchers are also 
actively exploring the possibility of using psilocybin mushrooms to treat mental issues related to 
trauma and chronic depression. Instead of demeaning accelerated opioid use and addiction in 
poor white communities, the government has taken a more empathetic approach and focused on 
opioid restriction and rehabilitation. That trend may be a sign of continued racialization of the 
problem, but it also may indicate a more enlightened approach. More time will tell.  
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